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2ABSTRACT
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The subject of this study is David Scott who served the 
East India Company on the northern and eastern frontier of the Bengal j
Presidency from 1802 to 1831* First coming into prominence by his 
handling of relations with Bhutan and Tibet during the Nepal War of 
1814, Scott was successively concerned with the Garo hills, the Khasi 
hills and Assam, as Agent to the North East Frontier and Commissioner 
of Assam*
04; } (vij • 1 r r.1 v* flMi ;■ X Hi .. '(Ft O ' 11 .. ' ’4 .1 ;
The years of his service saw a rapid British territorial 
expansion* They were also years wherein the duties of the British 
officers, agents of the Paramount power, were greatly extended* This 
dual growth raised the urgent question of the British purpose in India, 
to which conservative or paternalist, imperial, liberal, Evangelical 
and Utilitarian answers were variously given* This thesis sets Scott 
against this questioning background and seeks to define his contribution 
to the debate*
Scott favoured British territorial expansion, and played an 
important role by his advocacy of a forward policy in Assam* His im­
perial vision also extended to the creation of European cantonments and 
even military colonies in the healthy Khasi hills, the basis for a 
possible fourth Presidency centred upon Assam* He encouraged Christian 
missionary effort, and was a pioneer in advocating its application to
3the tribal areas of the frontier* But he was also a paternalist in his 
sympathetic study of the Garos, Khasis and Ahoras, and in his efforts 
to work through native institutions in evolving an administration for 
newly annexed Assam*
His uncle, the Director David Scott, had been deeply involved 
in the question of Indian trade and commercial relations* Scott likewise 
actively pursued the possibilities of trade with Burma and China, and 
showed great practical enthusiasm in developing the resources and 
commerce of the areas in his charge. Thus both Scott's actions and his 
ideas are of interest and importance.
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7INTRODUCTION
The object of this thesis is to study the ideas and policies 
of one of the most distinguished local administrators of British India. 
This was David Scott, who served in north-east India from 1804 to 1831* 
The importance of his career lies in the fact that from his first 
appointment at Gorakhpur* the nature of his duties and his zeal for 
geographical and ethnological survey combined to make him an 
increasingly trusted expert in the affairs of the independent or semi­
independent states of the north and north-east frontier. After the first 
Nepal war (1814-1816) he became the chief channel of British contact 
with Bhutan, Sikkim, Tibet, Cooch Behar, the Garo hills and Assam. The 
conquest and annexation of Assam, which he had advocated, subsequently 
made him the chief administrator of that state. From 1814, when he first 
held charge of the Bengal district of Rangpur, until his death in 1831 
at Cherrapunji, the destiny of the Assamese people was in great 
measure influenced by the opinions and decisions of David Scott. His 
ideas and actions, often unhesitatingly accepted by higher authority, 
gradually transformed the non-Indian character of the Ahom adminis­
tration. ^  He also subdued and settled the hitherto uncompromisingly
1. Personal Records, Vol. XIX, PP. 27-61, a sketch of Scott's career 
prepared in March 1831 by Thomas Fisher; H.T. Prinsep, Register of 
the Hon'ble East India Company's Bengal Civil Servants. 1790-1842.
P.332.
2. ’Assam in the medieval period had, as a result of its conquest by 
the Ahom kings from the Shan area, become non-Indian in its culture. 
Its early affiliation with India in the time of Kumara Bhaskara had 
been practically forgotten.’
K.M. Panikkar, A Survey of Indian History. P. 148.
8independent tribes of the Garo and the Khasi hills and the Singphos of 
the north eastern frontier of Assam. Many of his measures were novel, 
but, being considered particularly appropriate to this newly conquered 
region, they secured both acceptance and considerable influence. j
Yet few of the ideas and measures David Scott propounded and
carried out in this transitional period of Assam’s history have been
studied in any detail by modern writers. About those of his earlier 
career, prior to his work in Assam, virtually nothing has been written. 
This is surprising since Scott’s importance was early recognised. More
than seventy years ago Alexander Mackenzie, when writing his History of
the relations of the Government with the hill tribes of the North-East 
Frontier of Bengal.* declared ’’the most interesting and personally 
instructive part of my task in preparing the present volume has been the 
perusal of Scott’s admirable reports and letters”, and he regretted that 
he lacked the time to prepare a volume of official selections from 
Scott’s writings. He wrote : ’’The name and fame of David Scott are still 
green on the North-East Frontier. He was one of those remarkable men 
who have from time to time been the ornament of our Indian services. Had 
the scene of his life’s labours been in North-West or Central India, 
where the great problem of Empire was then being worked out, instead of
, , t  , . ............. r, , , _  .4 . , .
amid the obscure jungles of Assam, he would occupy a place in history 
by the side of Malcolm Elphinstone and Metcalfe.”2 Unfortunately these 
lines have remained merely a ’quotable quote’ and nothing more than 
that. Forty four years later lament was still heard that ”an authorit- 
ative biography of this great administrator has yet remained a -
1. published in 1884.
2. A. Mackenzie, op.cit., P.5 n.
desideratum, nor has any attempt been made to justify the tribute paid
to his genius and attainments in the inscription on his tomb at 
1
Cherrapoonji".
Why then such neglect? Several reasons suggest themselves. 
Until recently to the general historian of India Assam has seemed a 
backwater, and India* s tiorth-Gast frontier one lacking in strategic 
importance. Those who have written on Assamese history have often been 
concerned with a longer period and wider issues than those of David 
Scott*s career, whose formative stages were in any case passed outside 
Assam. Finally David Scott may have deterred would-be biographers by 
failing to leave behind such private and family papers as would give 
colour, detail and an insight into the formation of his philosophy.
None of these reasons to-day seems sufficient bar to a study 
of David Scott. International events have given Assam an unlooked-for 
topicality and importance. There is a new or renewed interest in the 
ideas of the British officials at work in India, as witness works such 
as Eric Stokefe* English Utilitarians and India. And if personal papers 
are lacking, official documents are many, and they describe in great 
detail many of Scott's more important ideas and measures. Scott had so 
much to say that was important and interesting, and so many contro­
versial issues of the time were dealt with by him that the attempt must 
be made to depict his career from official documents and other 
contemporary publications and journals.
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Curiously enough the main handicap in studying Scott's life 
and career has proved to be not the absence of private papers but the
1. S.K. Bhuyan, Stray notes on David Scott .is Assam Review, May 1928.
absence of public controversy. By the time he was appointed to the 
chief office in Assam he had acquired so great a reputation and so 
much won the confidence of Government.that many of his early adminis­
trative measures - especially revenue and judicial - were accepted 
almost without discussion by the Government at Calcutta. Enormous 
faith and trust were put in Scott’s experience and local knowledge and 
he was given discretionary powers on many occasions.-* This, we are 
afraid, has made the study of that part of his life mainly narrative.
But the growth and development of Scott’s measures, especially in 
Assam, a distant territory with an administrative system so very unlike 
that of the rest of India, are themselves perhaps sufficient, when 
considered in detail, to reveal the working of Scott’s mind and his 
contribution to the non-regulation type of Government. The attempt is 
therefore made to view his measures and policies in relation to 
conditions in other parts of India, and to the attitudes of British 
officialdom to such conditions. In some fields, indeed, the basis of 
comparison is much wider, for Scott’s ideas on such moral and social 
questions as slavery, Christian evangelism, education or trade and 
commerce necessarily reflect the climate of opinion not only in 
British India but in Britain itself.
1. Indeed, such was the extent of the discretion granted that in 1834, 
three years after Scott’s death, the Court of Directors reproved 
the Calcutta Council for "placing unlimited confidence in Mr.Scott’s 
power of management and in allowing him to govern the country in 
his own way without satisfying yourself with respect to the mode 
in which he governed." Letter from Court, no. 14, 1834, quoted in 
R.M. Lahiri, The Annexation of Assam, p. 235*
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David Scott was born on the 14th of May 1786 in the much 
respected Scott family of Usan and Dunninald in the north east of 
Scotland, the second son of Archibald Scott.* His grandfather Robert 
Scott, born in 1705, was an advocate in Dunninald, a Member of
Parliament for the County of Angus in 1732-1734, and was created a
o
freeholder of Forfarshire in 1743. Robert, not only played an active 
part in public affairs, but also, as Laird of Dunninald, took very good 
care of his patrimony.-* David’s father, Archibald Scott, married twice. 
His first wife was Elizabeth Renny of Usan, by whom he had two 
daughters. The Rennys of Usan were very wealthy people and Elizabeth as 
the eldest lawful daughter of Robert Renny of Ulysseshaven had a 
charter under the great seal (given on 12 Feb.,1751) of the lands and 
barony of Ulysseshaven with the village, tower, fortalice and the 
fishery town of the same. Archibald thus in right of his wife Elizabeth - 
who died in December 1761 - became the heir of Usan.**
Archibald’s second wife Margaret Chalmers was the daughter of 
Principal Chalmers of King’s College, Aberdeen. By her Archibald had
ec
two sons Robert and David, and two daughters - Isabella and Anne.^
Robert, as a nominee of Henry Dundas, went out to India in 1795 as a 
writer on the Bengal Establishment and remained well acquainted with 
all the influential people in the East India affairs through his
1. Writers Petitions, Vol.17, NO. 32, enclosures attached to Scott’s 
petition to become a writer in the Bengal Establishment.
2. A.Jervise, Epitaphs and Inscriptions from Burial Grounds and Old
Buildings in the North East of Scotland Vol. II, PP.393-95;
C.H* Philips, The Correspondence of David Scott Director and 
Chairman of the East India Company relating to Indian Affairs 
1787-1805. P.XI and n.
3* C.H. Philips, op.cit., PP.X-XI and XI n.
4. A.Jervise, Op.cit., P. 393.
5. A.Jervise, op.cit., P. 394.
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uncle David Scott (1746-1805), whose daughter he married at a later 
date.1
David Scott thus came from a family of considerable local
standing, wealth and importance. He attended a good school, Musselburg
2Academy now Musselburg Grammar School where he studied Latin, French, 
drawing and geography besides writing, arithmetic and book keeping. The 
Rector of the Academy, John Taylor certified him to be meritorious and 
his fgenius and improvement* to be *very marked at all our public 
exhibitions*.-^ But in his career David Scott probably found his 
family*s standing and his own education of much less importance than 
the position and influence of his uncle. This uncle, Archibald’s 3',ounger 
brother, was also named David Scott. After acquiring a fortune and an 
exceptional knowledge of Eastern trade he had returned to a distinguished 
public career in Britain in 1786.^ His native place experienced the 
full benefit of his unwearied services as one of her representatives in 
successive parliaments for the County of Angus and for the district of 
Burghs. The records of the East India Company amply attest the zeal and 
talent with which for many years he helped as a Director and Chairman, 
to control the affairs of that commercial body.5 It was through his
1. C.H. Philips, op.cit., Letter no.26, David Scott to William Farlie, 
London, 30 March 1795, p.30. See also pp. 53, 134, 159, 160, 161, 177, 
284, 303, 304, 315, 357, 390, 400, 416 for Robert’s relationship 
with D. Scott (Sr.).
2. This information has been gratefully received from Mr. T.Henderson, 
the Headmaster of the School.
3. Writers* Petitions, vol. 17, enclosures to petition no. 32.
4. C.H. Philips, The East India Company 1784-1834. p.72; see also
C.H. Philips’s Correspondence of David Scott, pp. X-XXII.
5« Ibid; and A. Jervise, op.cit., p. 395*
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uncle’s recommendation while Chairman of the Court of Directors of 
the Company, that the younger David also got a job of a writer on the 
Bengal Establishment in August 1801.*
David Scott was appointed a writer in August 1801 and on 
27 January, 1802 he was selected for the service in India. He sailed 
that same year landing in India on 15 October 1802.^ On arrival he I
joined Fort William College. In the fourth examination held at the 
College in January 1804 Scott attained a second class both in Hindustani 
and Persian.^ During his Fort William days Scott also developed a 
close friendship with two persons who in later years, being in the most 
influential positions, probably had more effect upon Scott’s career 
than any knowledge of Persian and Hindustani. One of these was a fellow 
student George Swinton, who rose to the position of the Chief Secretary 
to the Government of India. Swinton was an extremely brilliant student 
who attained the highest distinction in the College examinations which 
he took, along with David Scott, in 1804.** Their friendship was an 
abiding one, and Swinton was of the greatest use in sponsoring Scott’s 
plans and policies and in furthering his career. The other person was 
William Carey who was Scott’s teacher in the College.5 Scott was a 
devout Christian and Carey’s missionary zeal drew the young man to him.
1. Writers Petitions, vol.17, enclosure to the petition no. 32,
David Scott’s (senior) recommendation of his nephew.
2. H.T. Prinsep, op.cit., p. 3.
3. C.Buchanan, The College of Fort William in Bengal, pp. 194-97.
4. Swinton got a degree of Honour in Persian, a degree of honour in 
Hindustani, stood fifth in Arabic, took part in the public disputation 
in Persian, secured the second prize for Persian composition and
also received an honorary reward in classics .C.Buchanan, op.cit., 
pp. 211-214.
5o S.P. Carey, William Carey, p. 353.
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When Scott was appointed to Cooch Behar and later took charge of the
Garo hills he used his influence to open up the hill country to
missionary activity.* His correspondence with Carey at the Serampore
mission headquarters became regular and their common aim brought them
into a still closer relationship of mutual support and help. To the work
of the Serampore College Scott contributed by sending three Garos, who,
together with a Punjabi, a Maratha, two Khasis, two Arakanese and several
2
Bengalis helped to give that institution its all-India scope."
Throughout his career Scott was kept busy in the north-eastern
region of India - his headquarters shifting constantly eastwards with
the develepment of new spheres of influence of the Company on that
frontier. In August, 1804, when he quitted Fort William College he was
appointed assistant to the collector of Gorakhpur, in September, 1807, he
was appointed registrar of the zilla court of Gorakhpur and assistant to
the magistrate, and then officiating magistrate. In March, 1812, he was
made acting judge and magistrate of Purnea. In December he was sent to
Rangpur as the judge and magistrate of that district. In September, 1816,
he was made the commissioner in Cooch Behar and joint magistrate at 
3iiangpur. While in this post Scott became deeply involved in the affairs 
of the Garo hill tribes. His suggestions "for promoting the general 
civilization of those barbarous tribes" led the Government of India to 
create a new post for the execution of these plans, for which of course 
they found no other person better qualified than Scott himself. Hence in
1822 Scott was made the civil commissioner of the North-East parts of____
1 S.P. Carey, William Carey, pp. 353, 361, 401, 432-3.
2 Ibid, p. 353.
3 H.T. Prinsep, op.cit., p. 332.
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Rangpur with a salary of Rs. 40,000 per annum including all travelling
and other personal charges. In addition to this laborious duty he
was to continue to hold the office of the commissioner of Cooch Behar.
To these joint posts was added on 14 November, 1823, the office of Agent
to the Governor-General on the North-East Frontier of Bengal, with an
additional allowance of 1000 rupees per month. The latter appointment
was occasioned by the unsatisfactory state of the relation between the
British government and the Burmese. On 3 December, 1828, after the
occupation of Assam, Scott was selected by the Bengal government for
appointment as Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit of Assam with special
powers under Regulation I of the year 1829.* He still retained his
office as the Governor General*s Agent on the North-East Frontier. This
multiple situation he held till his death in August, 1831. As agent to
the governor-general on the North-East Frontier of Bengal and civil
commissioner at Rangpur he drew 12,000 rupees as salary and as
commissioner of revenue and circuit of Assam, North-East Rangpur, Sherpur
and Sylhet from March, 1829, he drew Rs. 40,000 - a total salary of
2 .
52,000 rupees per annum.
1 In several documents the Commissioner of Assam was addressed as 
’Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit, 17th Division, Assam*.
According to Regulation I of 1829 the 17th Commissioners Division 
comprised Sherpore and Sylhet and it was placed for a time under 
the Commissioner of Assam and North-East Rangpur. -
See K.N. Dutt, A Hand Book to the Old Records of the Assam 
Secretariat, p. 47.
2 Personal Records, vol. XIX, pp. 27-61.
3• A* WbliB. op.cit.. dd, VIX r-rr.
Just after Scott*s death a Colonel Watson*, who calls Scott his 
’cousin and friend’ collected ’a variety of interesting notices’ about 
Scott’s public and private life. Some of this information was incorporated
i
in Adam White’s ’Memoir of the late David Scott. Esq.’. which he edited;
2
but the rest of the materials have since been mislaid or lost. It is 
particularly unfortunate that the information which Col. Watson collected 
about Scott’s early life and education prior to his embarcation for 
India and for the period subsequent to his arrival in India in the year 
1802 up to the first Burmese war should have been among the missing 
materials. The reason Watson gives for not incorporating this portion in 
the Memoir is described by him thus: "On considering that, after all, 
there could be little or nothing new to Mr. Scott’s friends and 
connexions in anything I had written; or to speak more candidly, a 
distrust of my own ability to do justice to the life and character of 
ray departed friend, finally induced me to withhold this part of the 
intended publication".3 However, from the little notes which he has in­
corporated here and there in White’s Memoir and from Scott’s own letters -
1. Archibald Watson (1779-1855) was the eldest son of James Watson and 
his wife Anne, the sixth daughter of Robert Scott of Dunninald and 
Usan. Archibald Watson married his cousin Anne, daughter of Archibald 
Scott (David Scott’s father) of Usan. His career was distinguished, 
for going out as a cadet in 1794 he became a major-general in 1838
and lieutenant-general in 1851 • He died at Abbethune on 22 August 1855> 
Major VQP. Hodson, List of Officers of the Bengal Army. 1758-1834, 
pp. 401-402.
2. Watson said that he transmitted to England most of his collection 
which he had received from different quarters ’not then entertaining 
the most distant idea of the present undertaking’ (the publishing of 
a memoir). Unfortunately we have failed to find any trace of them 
anywhere in England.
3. A. White, op.cit., pp. VIII-IX.
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public and private - and also from the writings of his subordinates 
much can be discerned of Scott*s personality. White describes for us a 
stout man, weighing 13 or 15 stone always with a smile on the lips and 
a sparkle in his small, but lively eyes** He speaks of Scott, in his
private life, as {1 the most unassuming of human beings, and his manners
o
of the most simple and unpretending11.- He was fond of discussion and 
was an excellent conversationalist. In discussion his weapon never 
carried any offensive wound nor was he disposed to suppress any one with 
the superiority of his intellect.
Contemporary officials were unanimous in reporting Scott*s 
'’uniform kindness of manner11 and his high sense of justice towards the 
n a t i v e s . H e  also entertained a high opinion of their intellectual 
capacity, and Col. Watson, when he visited Scott at Gorakhpur in 1808, 
found that it was often a subject of complaint with him that Europeans, 
in general, should evince so little regard for the feelings of natives 
of rank or respectability with whom they had occasion to associate either 
in business or in the ordinary intercourse of life.^ With regard to the
lower ranks of the natives also, Scott seldom exhibited any sense of the
moral superiority of Europeans and he was full of praise for the honesty
of the native servants in all matters entrusted to their charge. Scott's
paternal treatment of his native servants was such that they were 
devotedly attached to him. Watson writes on this : "I am convinced that,
to a man they would at any time, have hazarded their lives in his service,
1. A. White, op.cit., P. 67.
2. Ibid, P. 66.
3. Ibid.
4. J.M. Bhattacharya (ed.), Assam Buran.ji (of Haliram Dhekial Phukan) 
Appendix A Ndi. 7 and 8 , Notes from Samachar Chandrika. March and 
August 1832; A. White, Memoir, App. N6S.39 and 40, Notes from Bengal
Hurkara and The Calcutta John Bull Sept. 1831.
5. A. White, op.cit., PP. 20, 25.
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had occasion called for such a proof of their attachment”.1 We are
'
told that the leading feature in Scott’s character was an ’enlarged and
1# • A t4 A . J t i  jWitt 4
expanded1 benevolence which influenced him to exert himself to advance
the individual interests of all under his charge, both Europeans or 
native in as much as his limited means would permit.2 White informs us 
that Scott’s official work commenced at sunrise and he remained in the 
Kutcheiry until sunset when he strolled in his garden. But even at that
time if visits were paid to him he was in the habit of listening to and 
entering freely into conversation with the natives around him.-^
Scott is described as being possessed of a vigour and grasp of
understanding rarely to be met with and one which exercised itself more
readily in moral and political discussion and in scientific pursuits than 
in imaginative studies. At the same time his attainments as a linguist 
were of no mean order.^ He was well acquainted with the Persian, 
Hindustani and Bengali^ languages, and had attained considerable knowl« 
edge of the Assamese and Garo dialects. But it was the diversity of his 
pursuits which characterised his mind more than anything else. It is 
said that he was interested in philosophy, chemistry, geology, minerology, 
natural history, and zoology, and from his early years he had been much 
addicted to the study of mechanics and practical surveying. Being often 
alone, at a distance from medical aid, he had been compelled to study 
medicine and the contemporary medical officers working in his area of
jurisdiction were of opinion that his proficiency therein was very________
1. Col. Watson’s comment in White’s Memoir. P. 25.
2. A. White, op.cit., PP. 55-56.
3. Ibid, PP. 57-58.
h. Ibid, P. 52.
5. One example of Scott’s knowledge of Bengali is his translation of 
Kishen Kant Bose’s Account of Bootan printed in the volume on 
Political Missions to Bootan by Ashley Eden and others.
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respectable,1 He was in the habit of subscribing to, and reading, the
~ ’* '\ 1^ ‘lf AflTiJ ' •* i' v ■?" J T.r ca *§ > f> r.
different medical periodicals, and to the Medical and Physical Society 
of Calcutta he sent a paper on Chutwan. a febrifuge bark used amongst
Mi. > >: v. hi; r u  V. *'•>»! Jt ( ; ■ „ fj, 1 I ■ r ' T'Ct S
p
the natives, Adam White writes about the range of Scott*s mind : "On 
seeing Mr. Scott for the first time, it struck me with astonishment how 
he had been able to acquire this diversity of knowledge, knowing that 
throughout his career in India, he had been busily employed : but I 
ascertained afterwards, that he was in the habit of reading late at 
night, after his friends had left him for the evening".-*
Col. Watson tells us a little more about Scott’s insatiable love
consluftrp j^  jlxj . xxi .i x «, Xu ?. tv ci*-t**■ ’■ * s d t  f ^
for books. When he visited Scott in 1808 at Gorakhpur, he found that 
one of the latter’s main leisure occupations was general reading. He 
found Scott particularly interested in Chemistry and practical mechanics 
etc., the last chiefly in connection with his agricultural pursuits and 
gardening] on both of which he was extremely keen. "Scott’s library then,
though not extensive, was well chosen and arranged, so that the general
reader was sure to find abundant amusement, and the more studious 
something adapted to his particular train of thought, in whatever branch 
of research his views might lead him. The translation of the Greek and 
Roman classics; some of the best historians and most celebrated writers 
on^subject of natural and moral philosophy and political economy; books 
of reference; dictionaries of most languages; ancient and modern maps 
etc. occupied select corners of his collection."^ Watson also makes it
1. A. White, op.cit., PP. 52-53*
2. Asiatic Journal 1827 Vol. 23, P. 507.
3. A. White, op.cit., P. 54.
4. Ibid, PP. 54-56 n.
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clear that the library was not entirely serious and practical in its 
contents. Fiction, chivalry, romance we/d all included and acquaintance 
might be renewed with Defoe, Richardson, Anna Radcliffe, or even with 
Amadis de Gaul and the renowned son of Mandi. At a later date Scott’s 
"own casket selection", included Rassels, Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy. 
Shakespeare, Thomas a Kempis, Paradise Lost, the select works of 
Bishop Hall and others.^
p
Bold and stout as he was Scott loved mountain climbing*
Archery was his favourite game and while in the Khasi, hills he acquired 
considerable skill in it. In his early career at Gorakhpur Scott was 
also particularly fond of hunting and shooting and even in Assam amidst 
official preoccupations he was always ready at the call of his youthful 
friends to join them in a tiger or boar hunt.^
The same dash and boldness, the same vigour and enterprise 
which he displayed in such sports he displayed in no less measure, as 
will be seen, in his administration or in the skirmishes in which he 
was involved whether with the rebel Khasis or the Burmese in Assam.
MMm t-hft t:H rr ttrffH aad B i uavafcmir, In  I3<*5 they c  \ &  J m a d  t o
1* A. White, op.cit., PP. 54-56 n,
2* 1iiflt• i4;i 07T,n , P. 53.
3. Ibid, P. 60.
CHAPTER I
FRONTIER TROUBLES AND THE ASCENDENCY OF DAVID SCOTT,
The place and period of Scott’s first appointment in India were 
alike significant for his later rise to position and fame. The place was 
Gorakhpur and the period 1804 to 1811*, years when the Nepalese by their
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ceaseless incursions into the borderlands of the district’s northern 
parganas were sowing the seeds of the first Nepalese war of 1814.
Gorakhpur, in the modern Uttar Pradesh had been acquired by the 
East India Company in 1801. Its first district officer J. Routledge was 
appalled by the state of the country on his arrival. He had no reliable 
subordinates, no police and no adequate means of assessing or collecting 
the revenue; and he was constantly harassed by the presence of the dis­
charged officials and troops who were still busily engaged in plundering 
the unfortunate inhabitants.2 To crown all these internal disorders 
there was an external danger too : the Nepalese had been taking advantage 
of the prevailing anarchy in Gorakhpur long before its cession and they 
continued their incursions thereafter. They first annexed the Terai and 
then the parganas of Tilpur and B i n a y a k p u r I n  1805 they claimed to 
hold Butwal by right of conquest and sent officials to collect the revenue.
1. Aug. 1804 Asst, to the Collector of Gorakhpur.
Sept.1807 Registrar of the Zilla Court of Gorakhpur.
Oct. 1811 Officiating Magistrate of Gorakhpur.
vide Personal Records, vol. XIX, p, 27; Prinsep, op.cit., p. 332;
C.E. Buckland, Dictionary of Indian Biography, p. 378.
2. H0Ro Nevill, Gorakhpur, p. 185, 
3* Ibid, p. 186.
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Thereupon the Butwal raj family, in return for a pension, made over their 
rights to the Company# But by 1806 the Nepalese had annexed two thirds 
of the disputed territory and they subsequently completed its annexation. 
This emboldened them, for in 1810-11 they crossed the inner Butwal 
boundary and seized some villages in Bansi.* When the collector of 
Gorakhpur, J.H.Grant, informed the Government of this, Scott, then 
officiating magistrate, was asked to report on the matter and to take 
military action if necessary# Scott did think it necessary to move a 
sepoy detachment forward, which reported the assembling of Nepalese troops 
on the Bansi border.^ It proved impossible to improve relations with 
them and war became inevitable#^
Gorakhpur was Scott’s training ground both in internal and 
frontier administration# But Scott did not stay there long. In 1812 he 
was appointed acting judge and magistrate in Purnea and in 1813, with the 
same designation he was posted to Rangpur# However, Scott continued to be 
involved in one way or another, in Nepal affairs.^ At Purnea he had to 
tackle the problem of gangrobbery which prevailed on the Morung border of 
that district, robbery perpetuated by the predatary Nepalese. Scott 
suggested several police measures, such as the creation of a chain of 
chokies or police posts placed as near as possible to the Morung 
boundaries and by means calculated to ensure their co-operation on every
1. H.R. Nevill, p. 186.
2# B.P.C. 17 January 1812, nos# 46-47, letter of J#H. Grant dated 
Oct# 1811 Scott to Dowdeswell, 30 Dec. 1811.
3* Lord Moira, in 1813, reported that it looked as if "there could never 
be real peace until we should yield to the Gorkhas our provinces north 
of the Ganges making that river the boundary between us". A. Lamb, 
Britain and Chinese Central Asia, p. 37.
4. Personal Records, vol. XIX, pp. 27-61.
23
alarm of plundering incursions.* But his real contribution on Nepal 
affairs was made while he was at Rangpur. He was asked by John Adam, 
Secretary in the secret, political and foreign department to supply
information about the Nepalese and their territory, especially the country
2
around Palpah. From the military point of view, Lord Moira was 
particularly anxious to know whether there was any route practicable for 
troops, with or without artillery, from British territory to Palpah. The 
mass of information Scott supplied^ established his zeal for enquiry and 
research. He gave information about the borderland and even about
"  ^ A!* 1/ ( 'I J # i [ ♦ Hi C 011a 11C t vJS® f XDftt&llS
territory inside Nepal, based partly on his own observation and partly on
knowledge gathered through his contact with several Nepali messengers. In
acknowledging Scott*s letter the Governor-General complimented Scott by
saying that he considered "the application of time which you were enabled
to spare from the performance of your ordinary official duties to the
acquisition of knowledge which has thus become beneficial to the public
service to be highly creditable to your zeal, industry and spirit of useful
u
enquiry and research."
Lord Moira was very impressed with Scott* s ‘'talents, address and 
zeal’* and he desired Scott’s continued help in the operations of the 
Gurkha war. It was thought essential for its prosecution that the other
Himalayan states like Bhutan, Sikkim and Tibet should be neutralised or
- XlTcT ~ I
1. ; Personal Records, vol. XIX, p.27,A l March 1814, paras 8-12.
2. Home Misc., vol. 644, pp. 103-5, Adam to Scott 30 July 1814.
3# Home Misc., vol. 644, pp. 245-73, Scott to Adam 12 Aug. 1814.
4. Home Misc., vol. 644, pp. 277-8, Adam to Scott, 9 Sept. 1814.
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incited against Nepal. The latter object was not found difficult to 
achieve as all three states had a common grievance against Nepal. Scott 
was therefore entrusted with the job of collecting fresh information 
about the political conditions of these states, supplementing what was 
already known about them from Dr. Buchanan who had accompanied Captain Knox 
to Katmandu in 1801, and of opening official negotiations with them.-*
The old ruling family of Sikkim had obvious grievances, for some
, t- t \ i i * ' j* tfj fi* \' } *
years earlier the country had been conquered by the Gurkhas and its 
ruling family made fugitives in the hills. In that conflict the Tibetans 
had assisted the Sikkim rulers who were linked by marriage with the lamas 
of Lhasa and Bhutan.^ Hastings therefore hoped that the promise to 
restore the old princely family in Sikkim would be well received in all 
three countries and secure their support. Scott was authorised to assure 
the raja of Sikkim and through him any other chiefs who might rise in 
support of the British government, that a stipulation for their future 
independence would be introduced into any treaty of peace which the 
British government might conclude with the Nepalese. Scott was further 
asked to open a channel of communication through Sikkim with Tibet and the 
Deb Raja of Bhutan inorder to clarify the British position and to explain 
the origin and object of British proceedings against Nepal.^ This was 
very necessary since, from 1792 Nepal had been a Chinese territory and it 
was unknown how a British attack upon Nepal would be received by the 
Chinese authorities.
1. Horae Misc., vol. 646, pp. 735-44, Adam to Scott, 26 Nov. 1814;
A. Lamb, op.cit., p. 39.
2. Home Misc., vol. 646, Papers relating to Nepal, p. 268 : Memo on Sikkim 
by Dr. Buchanan, and Adam to Scott, 2 Nov. 1814. See also A. Lamb,
op. cit., p. 42.
3* Home Misc., Vol. 646, pp. 735-44, Adam to Scott, 24 Nov. 1814.
A second reason for wishing to open such contacts was that ;
rumours were afloat that the Gurkhas had been trying to exilte the
Bhutanese to join in an attack upon Sikkim and to rise against the
British.1 Any junction between them would close the best route for
communication with Lhasa. There were, indeed, precise reports that the
Bhutanese had assembled their troops at Dalimcotta.* Scott was therefore
given the immediate task of finding out the truth of such rumours, a task
2
which served to keep him in the public eye.
Two other men were involved in Sikkim - Bhutanese affairs at this 
time, and Scott was to come into conflict with the views of both of them. 
They were Captain B. Latter, commanding the Companys’ northern frontier
east of the Kosi, who in the spring of 1815 entered Morung to lend
support to the Sikkim authorities, and N. MacLeod, the Commissioner of 
Cooch Behar. Captain Latter had a forceful, aggressive temperament and
| J . ft T 4 1 r/ t a  I tr & 'I jt *1 £ L ^  4 l*i & "9 fa. • t $ I** $u ?“*,> 4  ^ -i 4
he deplored any appeasement of the independent northern states. So, even 
though he personally found no evidence of the rumoured Bhutanese troop- 
concentration at Dalimcotta, he wrote, "I must state my declared opinion 
that no time ought to be lost in preparing to repel aggression on the 
part of the Deb Raja, and any dilatory or indecisive measures might be
attended with very serious consequences and, I am so convinced of the
^ « t o i  Q i  p o  » * * • « j  c  o  11  t o  H o n e  K t  o n . \ a c  1 1 n j i  u  c  v  * t o  v#v * ► r* o v < l o  x ^  \
necessity of acting in the most firm and decided manner that had I
1. Home Misc., vol. 648, p. 453, Capt. Latter to MacLeod, Commissioner of 
Cooch Behar, 19 Nov. 1814.
* Dalimcotta Duar - one of the eleven passes extending along the
Northern Frontier of Bengal, between the Tista river on the west and 
Manas river on the east. Better known as Darling Fort in English, 
vide S.N. Sen, Records in Oriental Languages : vol. I Bengali letters, 
p. 82 of the English section.
2. For relations with Tibet and Bhutan see A. Lamb, op.cit., ch. 2.
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possessed correct information with regard to the assembling of any body 
of armed men I would on my own responsibility have occupied the post 
of Kyrantee.”*
Captain Latter*s bellicose views alone could not do much harm
so long as he himself was controlled by the judicial authority# But
MacLeod, who invested Latter with discretionary powers to act to his best
2
judgement on that frontier line , was also undoubtedly hasty in his 
judgement and policy. He had gone beyond his power by investing Latter 
with such power in an area where Scott as magistrate of Rangpur, possessed 
the controlling authority in time of peace.J One instance of MacLeods* 
hasty decision was this : unhappily, he, while Commissioner in Cooch 
Behar, had lost all confidence in the raja of Cooch Behar. He was therefore 
only too ready to fall in with Captain Latters views and even to suspect the 
raja of Cooch Behar of an anti-British conspiracy with the Bhutanese.
Indeed he ultimately was led to charge the raja with conspiracy with the 
Nepalese against the Company, through Bhutanese officials at Baksa Duar. 
From a zinkaff, or minor Bhutanese official,** MacLeod heard the story 
that the Cooch Behar raja had surrendered his rights over Maraghat to the 
Bhutanese to win their support against the British.^
1* Home Misc., vol. 648, p. 453, Latter to MacLeod, 19 Nov. 1814.
2. Ibid, pp. 445, Scott to Monckton, (Acting Secy, to Gvt.), 28 Nov.1814.
3. Ihid.
4. Zinkaffs were the lowest grade officials of the Bhutan government and 
almost all high officials originally started their career as zinkaffs 
or poes (sepoys or peons) - see Babu Kishen Kant Bose, Account of 
Bootan. translated into English by D. Scott and incorporated in 
Political Missions to Bootan. p. 201.
5. S.N. Sen, op.cit., Letter no. 136, pp. 39, 161.
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Scott, who in January 1815 had found the Bhutanese willing to 
accept his agent Krishna Kant Bose at their capital, and to permit his 
going forward to Lhasa* was not impressed by MacLeod’s slender evidence 
or in agreement with his impetuousity• His study of the situation enabled 
him to give a much more considered opinion on the Bhutanese problem,
Scott said : “although there is reason to believe that the system of for­
bearance under continued aggression which has been pursued by the British 
government in its intercourse with the northern states, has from their 
total incapacity justly to appreciate its motives had the effect of 
removing in some degree that dread of its power which they formerly enter­
tained yet the pusillanimous character of the Bhutanese and their total 
want of discipline, arms, and military means of every kind render it in 
my humble opinion highly improbable that the Deb Raja should seriously 
think of engaging in a war ifih which he can gain nothing and may lose,
without an effort on the part of his enemy the whole of his
2
territories below the hills". Moreover he was able to show the im­
practicability of a correspondence between the raja and the subas of 
Chamarchi and Baksa Duar, in which MacLeod had believed,-* With his 
judgement the vice-president of the Council at Calcutta had independently 
come to agree. In a letter to MacLeod, who ultimately lost his Cooch Behar 
commissionership, he argued that the Bhutanese had no hostile intentions. 
He ascribed the military preparation of the Bhutanese on their Morung 
frontier entirely to the impression of fear and jealousy produced on their 
1# see A. Lamb, op.cit., p. 43.
2. Home Misc., Vol. 648, p. 445, Scott to Monckton, 28 Nov. 1814.
3* S.N. Sen, op.cit., pp. 43-44.
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minds by the movements of the British troops to points contiguous to
that frontier. That move was clearly defensive for no corresponding ;
preparations were being made by the Bhutanese on the Rangpur frontier,
through whose passes any offensive could best be launched. It was not to
be expected that the Deb Raja, without any British provocation and
merely to support the Nepalese would involve himself in a war which would
be disastrous to him.^ When Scott, through certain Bhutanese merchants
subsequently gathered information that no military preparations had been 
2
made , the Calcutta authorities, confirmed in their own conclusions, came 
to place still greater reliance upon Scott’s judgement. So while the 
Vice-President in Council wrote that he "would have felt regret if the 
zeal and solicitude of Captain Latter for the honour and interest of
q
government had led him to adopt that measure", Scott acquired an en­
hanced reputation for level-headed expertise. He was therefore used as the 
instrument for assuring the Deb Raja that "the sole object of the British 
arrangement was to chastize the Nepalese and that its operations had no 
connection whatever with Bhutan" and for seeking permission to send an 
agent through Bhutan to Lhasa.** Also in January he despatched the
1. Home Misc., vol. 648, p. 473, Monckton to MacLeod, 29 Nov. 1814.
2* Ibid, p. 461, Scott to Monckton, 30 Nov. 1814.
3. Ibid, p 0 465, Monckton to Scott, 6 Dec. 1814.
4. The jealousy of the Bhutan government induced it to refuse strangers 
admission into the interior of the country and hence to convey the 
sentiment of the British government Scott was left with two alter­
natives : either to make a formal application which would take time or 
to send a person in disguise.Scott considered this latter mode of 
procedure wneither likely to prove agreeable to any person duly 
qualified for the duty in quest ion’* nor "compatible with the dignity
and the views of the British government." Since the reply to his letter
would cause considerable delay, Scott meanwhile thought it proper to 
send a concise statement of British policy towards Nepal through the 
zamindar of Bijni who was connected with Deb Raja.
Home Misc., vol. 650, pp. 77-86, Scott to Adam, 20 January, 1815.
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zamindar of Baikunthpur to the Sikkim Court as confidential agent.1
In September 1816, Scott’s usefulness was recognised by his
appointment as commissioner of Cooch Behar in supersession of MacLeod.
The government reported to the Court of Directors that "the negotiations
in which Mr. Scott had been recently employed with some of those states
and the knowledge which he had in consequence acquired of our political
relations with them,peculiarly qualified him for the successful discharge
2
of these duties”. In his new post he was expected to be "the channel
for conducting on the part of the British government all business of a
political nature with Bhutan, Assam, and other independent states and
3
Chieftains in the northern and north-eastern frontier of Rungpore".. So, 
besides settling the feuds in Cooch Behar between the families of the 
raja, the Dewan Deo and Nazir Deo\ Scott found himself called upon to 
interfere in the boundary dispute between the Deb Raja of Bhutan and the 
raja of Cooch Behar. This was another case wherein his thoroughness, 
sincerity and impartiality could be tested.
The dispute between Cooch Behar and Bhutan was over Maraghat or 
to speak more precisely the lands which constituted the principal part of 
the local division called Gird Maraghat. Scott described it, according
1 Ilome Misc., vol. 650, pp. 77-86, Scott to Adam, 20 January, 1815.
J.L.B., 24 Oct. 1817; Personal Records, vol. XIX, pp. 27-61; B.P.C.
26 Oct. 1816, no. 71.
3 Ibid.
4 For this feud and its settlement see S.N. Sen, op.cit., pp. 1-31, 
and pp. IV-X of the English section; A.A. Khan Chaudhury A History 
of Cooch Behar. Part I. pp. 193-230. Messieurs Mercer and Chauvets, 
Renort on Cooch Behar. 1788. in ’The Cooch Behar Select Records, II.*
5 B.P.C. 14 June 1817, no. 30, ocott to Adam, 24 May 1817.
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to Rennellfs map*, as "bounded on the south by the territory of Cooch 
Behar, and on the north by an ancient road called the Bhangamallee, on
the west by the Joldhoka river and on the east by the Manshi or rather
by a branch of that river running somewhat westward of its course as laid 
down in the map1'. With the exception of twenty-six insignificant hamlets 
the tract in question, previously to the year 1809, had long been in the 
quiet possession of the Bhutan government. Disturbances on the frontier 
of Maraghat and the Lakhi Duar* about the end of the year 1808 led to 
Company troops being despatched for the protection of the raja of Cooch 
Behar1s territory. An enquiry was started soon after by James Morgan the 
then Collector of Rangpur and ex-officio Resident of Cooch Behar. This 
enquiry was completed by John Digby, Morgan’s successor in the collector- 
ship of Rangpur. Their verdict was that the lands formed a part of the 
Cooch Behar territory. The raja consequently took possession of them in 
the year 1811- 12.2
Scott found sufficient grounds to believe that the enquiry of
Morgan and Digby had not been sufficiently full and detailed, and that
they had failed to note the earlier decision of the Dinajpur Council, who
after consulting Charles Purlings’s-^  own handwritten document, had
1® This map was published in England in 1779 and the materials for it
must, consequently, have been collected several years before the date 
of the alleged usurpation of the Bhutanese and probably consisted of 
the survey of the frontier executed after the peace with Bhutan.
B.P.C. 10 Oct. 1817, no. 43, Scott to Lushington, >9 Aug- 1317.
Lakhi Duar is one of the eleven passes extending along the Northern 
Frontier of Bengal and is situated between the Tista river on the west 
and Manas on the east, vide S.N. Sen, op,cit., p, 88 of the English 
section,
2. B.P.C. 14 June 1817, no. 30, Scott to Adam, 24 May 1817.
3. Charles Purlings was the Asst, at Dinajpur or Rangpur in 1771 and 
negotiated the treaty with the raja of Cooch Behar in 1772. He became 
the collector of Rangpur for 1777-1790. For details of his career see 
Bengal Past and Present, vol. XIV.
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declared in '1777 that Maraghat along with some other spots*, was the 
possession of Bhutan. Scott therefore reported ’’although it appeared to 
me ... that a mere reference to the decree of the Dinajpore Council and 
to the Raja of Cooch Behar’s own statement of his claims was quite 
sufficient to show that they were totally destitute of foundation yet in 
order to satisfy the parties and prevent any representations of their 
witnesses not having been examined, I proceeded to Maraghat in the be­
ginning of January and during fifteen days examined all such persons as 
the agents of the Bhutan government and of the Raja of Cooch Behar thought
fit to bring forward for the purpose of proving the time and mode of
2
obtaining possession of Maraghat”. Scott stated that when war broke out 
between Bhutan and Cooch Behar in 1772 and the Company moved in support 
of the latter, the area in question had been occupied by British troops 
who defeated the Bhutanese near the Bhangamali road. Under the peace 
treaty negotiated by Boyle with the Deb Raja in 1775, which Warren 
Hastings deliberately made a lenient one, the area was restored to the 
Bhutanese though without any formal settlement of boundaries.^ Some 
years later in 1780 or 1781 Narendra Narayan Kunwar, as representative of 
the Cooch Behar royal family, came and possessed himself of the land 
of Maraghat, or ”as one of the witnesses stated, merely plundered the 
ryots and created a fort from which he was very soon obliged to retire.’*
In the course of a few months after his first appearance he was killed
at Bhuthat by the Bhutanese and from that time to the year 1809, the 
Deb Raja always held undisputed possession of the lands, excepting the
1. They were : Chachakhata, Paglahat, Lakhi Duar and Kifanti,
S eut s oN. Sen, op.cit., p. 46.
2. B.P.C. 14 June 1817, no. 30, Scott to Adam, 24 May 1817.
3. For these early relations with Bhutan, see A. Lamb, op.cit., pp.8-14.
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twenty-six challas or hamlets belonging to the Cooch Behar raja.1 Scott 
concluded that, taking account of the decree of the Dinajpur Council, 
the 1775 treaty of peace with Bhutan, and of the acknowledged Bhutanese 
possession of the lands from within a very few years after the execution 
of those documents to the year 1809 the claim of the Cooch Behar raja 
could only be properly allowed in Mauja Maraghat* (comprising the 
twenty-six hamlets and farms) and not in Gird Maraghat which was the 
absolute property of the Deb Raja. The Government was satisfied with 
Scott’s findings and ordered that Gird Maraghat should be restored to 
the Deb Raja. Scott explained the case to Cooch Behar and asked for the 
hitherto disputed lands to be handed over, together with an account of 
the collections made in Maraghat during the Cooch Behari occupation of 
the place.2 In 1818 the Deb Raja informed Scott that Dewan Krishna Kant 
had handed over possession of the disputed land to Chito Tandi, his re­
presentative . ^
Mention of Krishna Kant Bose recalls that this was the man whom 
Scott had sent as his agent to Bhutan, in 1815, in the hope that he 
would open up a line of communication with Tibet, via Bhutan. He failed 
in that object - Scott blaming his lack of discretion*1 - but he did 
acquire a considerable knowledge of Bhutanese affairs, he was able to 
assist in the settlement of the Cooch Behar border dispute, and it was he
1* B.P.C. 14 June 1817, no. 30, Scott to Adam, 24 May 1817*
* Mauja Maraghat covered an area of 3,065 bighas of land.
vide A. Ahmed, History of Cooch Behar (in Bengali), pp. 355-6.
2. B.P.C. 14 June 1817, no. 31, Adam to Scott, 14 June 1817.
3. S.N. Sen, op.cit., pp. 48-51.
4. See A. Lamb, op.cit., p.43* But it should be mentioned that Scott 
wrote to the Government at a later date that ’no capable person but 
himself (Krishna Kant) could be found to undertake the business’. 
B.P.C. 24 Nov. 1821, no. 81, Scott to Swinton, 21 Sept. 1821;
Board’s Collections, vol. 810/21724, pp. 12-13.
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who in 18X6 first reported the arrival of a Chinese force at Lhasa which 
was for a time to cause Lord Moira considerable alarm,^ No less important 
he produced an Account of Bootan , written in Bengali but translated by- 
David Scott, which contained a full description of the territory, with an 
elaborate discussion of the administrative system, its economic products, 
and of the routes leading to it, and which won the praise of such later 
envoys as R.B.Pemberton and Sir Ashley Eden, Kishen Kant also produced
3
a work on the grammar and vocabulary of the Bhutanese language.
One purpose of Kishen Kant Bose’s mission had been to check the
reports of a Bhutanese military threat which had been current in 1815,
and which had roused the truculence of Captain Latter, Those reports had
proved false, but in 1817 there was a real source of conflict when the
Bhutanese began stopping boats on the Tista river and demanding duties
from the merchants cutting timber in the tract of country ceded to the
4
Company by the Gurkhas between that river and the Mahanadi, Scott res­
ponded by sending an agent to enquire of the Deb Raja by what authority 
the demands were made. This was once again too mild a proceeding for 
Captain Latter, now agent for the Government in the ceded Morung pargana. 
Latter wanted immediate action, and he wrote to Calcutta pointing out 
that the tract had been ceded to the Company, that the exactions were 
unauthorised, and that if they were not forcibly resisted neither
1 A. Lamb, op.cit., p. 46.
2 B.C., vol. 810/21724, pp. 21-133. The published version is included
in Political Missions to Bootan by Ashley Eden and others, pp,l87-206c
3 B.C., vol. 810/21724, pp. 1-21.
4 B.P.C. 19 Sept. 1817, nos. 68-70, Scott to Lushington, 6 Sept. 1817,
Latter to Scott, 11 July 1817 and 2 Sept. 1817*
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merchants nor ryots would be safe from plunder by the Bhutanese. Scott’s 
mild action he believed "would entirely alter the complexion of the
business and in my opinion lead to endless discussion ... if this should
.
be done it would probably induce^Bhutias to advance a joint claim to the 
forests itself for they have just as much right to one as the o t h e r . O n  
this occasion the Calcutta Council agreed with Latter^, but before any 
action had been taken, Scott was able to report that the Deb Raja had
■ i' • ■ ■ f ;^ ■ -*•  ^ ~' s • :»■ •1.
replied, disclaiming the acts of those who had exacted money from the 
merchants and stating that positive orders had been issued to the subah 
of Dalimcotta to desist from such claims and release the persons stated to 
have confined. Scott’s methods were thus vindicated, and his influence 
displayed, and not until 1832 were there any further disturbances on the 
Bhutan frontier.
It is clear from the narrative of events in this chapter that 
one of the main weakness in the Company’s position on the northern 
frontier was that it lacked adequate means of communicating with its 
neighbours. In the Nepal war it had had to rely on the reports of ad­
venturous travellers, upon bazar gossip, and upon the hurried despatch of 
such agents as Krishna Kant Bose by Scott to ascertain Bhutanese intentions, 
or to explain its own to the Chinese authorities in Lhasa. Scott had 
gathered agents and interpreters on an ad-hoe basis, but something 
permanent was evidently required. Finally in November, 1823 a single 
individual was given responsibility for the whole frontier region, and a
1# B.P.C. 19 Sept. 1817, no. 70, Latter to Lushington (private)
10 Sept. 1817.
2. B.P.C. 19 Sept. 1817, no. 71, Lushington to Latter, 19 Sept. 1817.
3. B.P.C. 3 Oct. 1817, no. 37, Scott to Lushington, 19 Sept. 1817.
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monthly establishment on 1,256 rupees for the maintenance of a staff 
capable of treating with all the neighbouring states. The man chosen to 
be Agent to the Governor-General on the North-East Frontier was of course 
David Scott, and he was given an officer of recognised linguistic attain­
ments, Siddon, as translator in his office. Scott assembled a team of 
seven interpreters and twelve messengers, speaking Lepcha, Bhutia, 
Tibetan, Burmese, Manipuri, Khasi and Assamese, who assisted Siddon in 
the preparation of grammars and vocabularies.1 The special needs and 
problems of frontier control were thus recognised and provided for and 
Scott’s mastery proclaimed and given still wider scope.
1* B.S.P.C. 6 August 1824, no. 30, Scott to Swinton, 16 July 1824.
In G.A. Grierson’s stupendous work, Linguistic Survey of India we do 
not find any mention about these grammars and vocabularies, but the 
official records show the good use made of them. For example, on 
Dr. H. Carey’s suggestion the grammar and vocabulary of Bhutan pre­
pared by Krishna Kant Bose were transmitted to Fort William College 
for use. On these particular works Scott qpined "the chief merit of 
the performance is the perfect accuracy with which the pronaunciation 
of the letters and words has been marked.”
Board’s Collections, vol. 810/21724, pp, 1-21.
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CHAPTER II 
DAVID SCOTT AND THE GAROS
*
In many parts of India, the period between Wellesley’s ’abortive 
attempt at supremacy* and Hastings’ achievement of it, was one of 
administrative deterioration.1 The Indian states system was crumbling; 
British rule was not yet firmly seated : it was a time of opportunity for 
the strong and ruthless. This was evidently so in Pindari-ridden Central 
India, but true also of more obscure comers like the north-east frontier 
and of lesser figures such as the zamindars of Karaibari, Kalumalupara, 
Mechpara and Habraghat.
But the Company’s government, in these same years, was in­
creasingly reluctant to ignore disorder outside its borders and readier to 
accept new duties and responsibilities within them, Wellesley had declared, 
’’The civil servants of the East India Company can no longer be considered
as the Agents of a commercial concern .....   their duties are those of
statesmen in every other part of the world, with no other characteristic 
differences than the obstacles opposed by an unfavourable climate, by a 
foreign language and by the peculiar usages and laws of India, and by the
manners of its inhabitants."^ Kaye, with equal conviction boasted, ’’Our
. i i  i » ... .. | L  ^  1 ] i  j. j  t„ • . . i f > 1 1  c y%e:i. jr . *1 i I ff ! £  *1. i t  j
English rulers are not now chargeable with obliviousness of their ob­
1. P. Spear, India : A Modern History, p. 214.
2. L.S.S. O’Malley, History of Bengal Bihar and Orissa under British
rule, pp. 290- 1.
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ligations as representatives of Christianity and agents of civilization.”1 
Scott* s share in the general process during the years 1815 to 1821 when, 
as commissioner of Cooch Behar and judge-magistrate of Rangpur he was 
responsible for the Garo frontiers, is the subject of this chapter.
The present Garo Hills district, constituted in 1869, is a 
mountainous area of some three thousand square miles, lying above the
.rx J"1 VI" V** If-V ■■i-n * ' ' 1 *- * i l _ - . ^ * A 1
plains districts of Rangpur and Mymensing. Its inhabitants, the Garos, 
are a section of the great Bodo race which at one time occupied much of 
the Brahmaputra valley, but which probably was driven into the hills by 
the early Hindu invaders from Bengal.^ The present political district of
; fid (JO ‘w; ' T'f t?’ H ' ■ ' * ;
the Garo hills corresponds closely with the topography - that is, the 
district ends exactly where the hills end. Its boundary also approximates 
the ethnic boundary between the Garos and other groups. But in Mughal 
times, at the foot of the hills, Hindu chiefs were found holding a number 
of great estates embracing many Garo villages. In return for a small 
tribute paid to the Mughal faujdar of Rangamati as token of fealty to the 
Mughal emperor these chiefs or zamindars were confirmed in their marcher 
lordships. The tribute took the form of a number of elephants or a small 
quantity of the precious wood called aghur. Their estates were never 
subjected to a land revenue assessment, but they were obliged to maintain 
certain petty garrisons, to contribute to the maintenance of the Dacca 
artillery park, and to collect and pay sair or miscellaneous duties. These
1 . J.W. Kaye, Administration of the East India Company, p. ^63.
2. B.C. Allen, and others, Eastern Bengal and Assam, pp. 500-502; 
A. Playfair, The Garos. p. 1.
3. R. Burling, Rengsanggri. pp. 18-19.
1761-1785. romitt«<> tv»e London 1 • January
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payments were usually made in cotton*, grown in the Garo hills.1
In these payments the Mughal f auj dar was further concerned be­
cause he usually financed the purchase of the cotton by advances to the 
zamindars. So long as the fau.idar paid the stipulated revenue to the 
Mughal authorities of Dacca his transactions with the zamindars never 
came into question. The profits of these cotton dealings were his own 
concern. For the zamindars the advantage of the system was, of course, 
that the faujdar encouraged and supported the extension of their control 
over the Garo villages and their reduction of those villages to revenue 
payment.2
When the East India Company acquired the Diwani of Bengal they
inherited this system. It was left unchanged. The function of the faujdar
as an intermediary was taken over by a sazawal. annually appointed, who
«
contracted to pay the district revenues to the Government, making his 
own arrangements for collecting them from the zamindars. They in their
A
turn, as independent as before, collected the revenues of their zaminda- 
ries, and paid them over to the sazawal in cotton. In 1788, however, the 
Company abolished sair dues and made the collection of such miscellaneous 
cesses illegal. The zamindars who had always enjoyed a percentage of the
3
revenues they collected, were compensated for the loss of the sair dues.
Scott*s attention, as judge-magistrate, was drawn to the Garo 
frontier, not by any such revenue question, but by various outrages and
acts of violence committed bv the Garos in January and Fp.bruary^ of 1815
* This revenue paid in cotton by the hill chiefs can be compared with 
Kapas mahal or cotton revenue collected from the hill tracts of 
Chittagong from 1713 - Mr* A.M. Serajuddin, who has prepared a 
doctoral thesis on the The Revenue Administration of Chittagong 
1761-1785. to be submitted to the London University in January 1964, 
has fully dealt with Kapas mahal.
1 A. Mackenzie, op.cit., p. 245*
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, pp. 245-246.
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upon the inhabitants of the frontier zamindaries of Kalumalupara and 
Karaibari.1 His determination to eradicate such evils, by eliminating 
their causes, led him to a sustained investigation of the relations be­
tween the Garos and the zamindars along the foothills.2 The Company had 
hitherto known little of the relationships, and like the Mughals had 
cared little so long as the revenues were paid. The causes of the Garo 
risings were therefore not understood until Scott undertook his enquiries 
and produced his report of the 20th August, 1816.
Scott found that the four r great zamindars of the frontier had 
all sought to reduce the Garos to a tributary or completely subject 
status. In Karaibari the vigorous measures adopted by the former zamindars 
had enabled them to reduce the greater part of the Garos on the estate to
the condition of the other ryots. Only a few of the Garo frontier chiefs
still remained on a tributary footing, supplying cotton on terms highly 
favourable to the zamindar, and making considerable money payments, 
nominally gifts at the festivals, but really extorted by threat of the 
zamindarfs displeasure.
In Kalumalupara the original zamindari family was less vigorous, 
and the Garos contiguous to the estate had merely paid tribute. When the 
whole of the pargana was sold for revenue arrears the purchaser lost all 
authority over them, though some chiefs still took a few rupees advance 
and delivered a small quantity of cotton.
1. B.C.J.C. 7 Feb. 1815, nos. 19-23, Scott to Bayley 16 Jan. 1815,
17 Jan. 1815, 25 Jan. 1815; Latter to Scott 21 Jan. 1815; Bayley to
Scott 7 Feb. 1815.
2. J.L.B., vol. k, 7 Oct. 1815, paras 261-271; B.C.J.C. 16 Feb. 1816, 
nos. 15-16, Scott to Bayley, 16 Jan. 1816 and 31 Jan. 1816.
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In Mechpara the zamindars, especially in the years 1776 and 1777, 
had made extensive conquests, hut a minor succeeding soon after, most of 
these had been lost by 1816. Only a few outlying Garo villages in the 
plains remained assimilated, and subject to the regulations of government* 
In the hill tracts the chiefs were merely tributary, paying cotton on 
favourable terms and occasionally admitting the zamindar as their 
criminal judge.
In Habraghat, the last estate on the left bank of the Brahmaputra
t HfiI r  C O V  v O B i  t j1, j, i ijt # T* O? * •  ri * . J. j
and towards the Assam side the zamindar had adopted the most successful 
measures of all. The Garos of the plains villages and of the first range 
of hills had all been reduced to unconditional subjection to the laws and 
regulations of Bengal, Their sardars had been transformed into jagirdars, 
charged with defence of the passes. The clans further within the hills, 
on the other hand, had been released from all dependence on or connection 
with the zamindar, except such as resulted from their resorting to the 
haths (markets) on his estate.^
These various political relationships were the result, as Scott 
pointed out of two generations of conflict, waged without interference
p N '
from the government. In the same years an explosive economic relation­
ship had been established, Garo cotton, though coarse and of short staple 
and useful mainly for stuffing or adulteration^, was a main item in the 
eastern internal trade,2* Over this the zamindars secured control, partly
1. B.C.J,C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 47, Scott’s report of 20 Aug. 1816, 
paras 30-36.
2. Statements of Ramrag Sardar, RamDany Sardar and Dany Sing Sardar taken 
in the thana of Dhubri in zilla Rangpur on 7th April 1816. B,C,J,C.
27 Sept, 1816, no. 48, enclosures 1, 2 and 3.
3. A. Playfair, op.cit., P. XV.
4. N. Ahmed, An Economic geography of East Pakistan^ p. 78*
through the haths established on their estates, partly by continuing 
quite illegally to exact sair and other payments in cotton, even after
their abolition in 1788.*
who. Pe petiTdftfe pi • i nf the cotton t • ■ •■!? RiMa for
When the Regulations on 1793 were promulgated the inhabitants of 
the Garo villages on the conquered tracts were much too independent to 
submit to such a code of laws. But for many years they continued to sub­
mit to the authority of the zamindars as their judges and to deliver
2
their cotton, as tribute or revenue, on the established terms.
But the diffusion of British authority in Bengal had two results*,.
As the Garo became aware that the zamindars had lost the right to enforce
their demands for dues, they came openly to assert their independence and 
to demand redress or revenge for their grievances. They complained that 
heavy dues were exacted at the zamindari haths. that advances were forced 
upon them for the supply of cotton which was then taken at only about one 
sixth of its real value, that fines were levied from whole villages for 
any criminal offence and that wholesale seizure and imprisonment of the
3
inhabitants was likewise inflicted. That such grievances were real is 
to be seen from the account of the working of such a hath in the Habraghat 
zamindari given by Montgomery Martin. "At each market place a person who 
paid a rent to the Vijni Raja kept a ware house for salt. This he sold to 
petty traders at eight rupees a man (84 s.w. a ser). The petty trader,
j
adding clay and water, increased its weight 1/8 part, and then exchanged
it with the Garos, at one man of salt for three mans of cotton. The Garo
- - - - - -
1 B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 47, Scott’s report of 20 Aug. 1816, 
paras 37-42; B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 48, enclosures 1,2 and 3, 
statements of Ramrag Sardar and others at Dhubri on 7 April 1816.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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therefore, for eight rupees worth of salt, which,were there no monopoly 
or duties except the Company’s, would cost about 5% rupees, gives 3 mans 
15 sers of cotton in the seed, which at Goalpara is usually worth 5 rupees 
the man. He besides pays a share of the cotton to the Raja, for permission 
to trade in his market."*
At the same time to the Garos the weakening of the zamindars1 
police and military power made forcible retaliation more tempting. Although 
they had the duty of guarding the passes, the zamindars no longer main­
tained large military establishments preferring to rely on occasional
punitive expeditions rather than make a sustained effort to guard the
2
settled villages. The Garos had a tradition of raiding, for they be­
lieved that the spirits of their headmen required the souls of others to 
attend them, they had real grievances, they had opportunity for revenge. 
There was thus both an element of the universal warfare of the hills upon 
the plains and of that social banditry which Hobsbawn calls the<*endemic 
peasant protest against oppression and poverty, a cry for venegance on the 
rich and the oppressors.>?3 The Garos, Scott reported, would descend on 
Kalumalupara demanding pigs, goats, fowls or such other articles as took 
their fancy, and the ryots, knowing there was nothing to deter the hi Ilmen, 
complied. If the raid was not attended with violence or murder it was 
seldom reported, for the sufferers had repeatedly seen people of con­
sequence murdered and their houses plundered with perfect impunity. When
1. M. Martin, Eastern India, vol. Ill, pp. 686-7.
2. B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 47, Scott’s report of 20 Aug. 1816, 
paras 23-24; B.C. Allen and others, op.cit., p. 502.
3. E.J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels, p.5.
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such acts became too frequent for endurance they either used to desert 
the villages or purchase the forbearence of the Garos by an additional 
donation of mata-rakha or blackmail,,*
Scott’s first measures against the Garo raiders were military
action and institution of an economic blockade by closing the haths -
the two traditional remedies,^ Though the war with Nepal made inconvenient
any drastic military action against the Garos, he was given the service
of Lt. Davidson, the officer commanding the local corps at Sylbet, and
was authorised to employ eastward of the Brahmaputra any of the burkandazes
or guards who could be spared from the sadr stations or from the police
thanas of the district of Rangpur.^ But Scott soon discovered that the
causes of these outrages were too deep-rooted to be solved by military
4
show or one or two severe military measures, Scott asked the Supreme 
Government the significant question whether "the state of things which 
obtains in the pargana east of the Brahmaputra is not such as to justify 
the sup€fc£0auon of the ordinary course of law."5 In other words, Scott 
doubted whether the existing Bengal Regulations were suitable for the 
inhabitants of the area.
The Supreme Government at Calcutta approved of Scott’s punitive 
measures, noted his suggestions about change in the Regulations , but 
asked that he should make further inquiries into the topography of the
1. B.C.J.C. 16 Feb. 1816, no, 15, Scott to Bayley 16 Jan. 1816.
2. B.C.J.C. 16 Feb. 1816, nos. 15-18, Scott to Bayley 16 Jan. 1816,
Bayley to Scott, 16 Feb. 1816.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. B.C.J.C. 16 Feb. 1816, no. 17, Scott to Bayley 31 Jan. 1816.
6 . B.C.J.C. 16 Feb. 1816, no. 18, Bayley to Scott 16 Feb. 1816.
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country, the habits and the character of the tribes and their motives
Vo w<5»»ke
before endeavouring^any change in the existing order. Scott was given
i
extra allowances for touring in the Garo frontier. The governor-general,
Lord Hastings, further asked Scott whether a system of internal management 
similar to that successfully applied by. Cleveland in the hills of IBhagalpur, could be introduced into the Garo hills. In particular he 
asked Scott to consider the establishment of a small local corps, mainly
of Garo hillmen, to be stationed on the frontier at the haths and passes;
'
the permanent posting of an officer in that part of Rangpur lying east of 
the Brahmaputra, vested with civil and criminal powers; and the regulation 
of trade so as to encourage commercial intercourse with the Garos and 
other frontier tribes.
To these instructions and queries, issued in February, Scott 
replied after months of touring the areas inhabited by the dependent and 
tributary Garos, with a statement outlining his major conclusions, on 
20 August, 1816.
His first conclusion was that the zamindars’ assertions that the 
Garo villages which they had subdued formed a part of the estates upon 
which they paid revenue was totally groundless. But if the zamindars had 
no revenue rights over the Garo hills were they then within British 
jurisdiction at all, and if so, in what sense ? Scott put forward the 
interesting argument that ’’whatever may have been the motive of the 
chaudhuries (zamindars) for concealing the real nature of their interests 
in this tract of country, from Government, it appears to me that their 
conquests if made at the time they held their estates, for the defence of 
the frontier, must be considered as legal acquisitions conferring a right
1. B.C.J.Co 16 Feb. 1816, no. 18, Bayley to Scott 16 Feb. 1816.
on the British government as the superior of the conquerors, to 
sovereignty of the country subdued.”1 Scott went on to add, "the zamindais 
themselves after being released from the responsibility of defending the 
country, and deprived of the official character in which they acquired 
these territories, cannot be entitled,/vmere individuals,. and subjects9to 
derive any pecuniary profit from the lands which have all along continued 
in tae hands of the original occupants and of their descendants over 
whom the zamindars have rather exercised the right of property apper­
taining to the sovereign than those of mere land holders.”2 Scott thus 
argued that the British government had the right to step over the heads 
of the zamindars since they failed to perform the duties of defence laid 
on them by the Government, and make its own arrangements with the Garos.
: «Lf I t . > •. ,v v + . V- #
Scott next considered the applicability to the Garo hills of 
Cleveland’s system in Bhagalpur. Cleveland in 1778 had allotted subsidies 
to the headmen of the Mai Paharias and had supported the influence thus 
acquired by raising a corps of 400 Mai Paharias archers which functioned 
as an effective police force, keeping order in the hills by tribal methods, 
and enforcing the decisions of the tribunal created by Cleveland and 
known as the Hill Assembly.^ Such expedients Scott did not think would 
work among the Garos. He pointed out that when Cleveland introduced 
British authority into the Bhagalpur hills the inhabitants appeared to 
have been governed by a regular gradation of chiefs whose authority was
1. B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 47, Scott’s report of 20 Aug. 1816, 
para 49.
2. Ibid.
3. J.H. Hutton, Primitive Tribes in O’Malley’s Modern India and the
West, p. 418.
undisputed. These persons had first been taught to respect the British 
government’s power by repeated and severe chastisement for their inroads 
upon the plains. Then they had been induced to relinquish the raiding to 
which they were driven by their extreme poverty by the grant of adequate 
subsidies. They had thereby been made into ready and willing instruments 
for the control and management of their fellow countrymen.1
The Garos, by contrast, were rich*, and their leading men were 
unlikely to be tempted by the subsidies which had such weight with the 
Bhagalpur chiefs. Moreover Garo society was very democratic : the Garos 
exultingly compared their country to a crab, which they affirm has no 
head. Whatever, then, might be the force of influence which the Garo chiefs 
acquired from personal character, extensive family connections or wealth, 
their good will, Scott believed would be of little political value to the 
Company. However efficient a popular chief might prove in commanding the
fiN U Titil f.Kfija m t i ly f l f l  P ftjj t h e  J? • t i l  \
service of numerous followers for external warfare, or even in the
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exercise of arbitrary power at home, such leadership was still far from 
being consolidated into any system of acknowledged legal authority. An 
influence founded principally, if not solely, upon public opinion was 
evidently not capable of being instrumental to any purpose obnoxious to 
the general sentiments and national spirit of the people at large.2
Under such circumstances, Scott held that the introduction of 
British authority amongst the Garos, merely by winning over the chiefs 
was quite impracticable. Instead, a direct connexion with the tribes 
should be established, if necessary, imposed by force. Since the Garos,
I
■
t*r I
1 . B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 47, Scott’s report of 20 Aug. 1816, 
paras 25-27.
* "There can hardly be another aboriginal tribe in India more easily 
circumstanced than the Garos. Real famine never touches them."
A. Playfair, op.cit., p.4.
2. Scott’s report of 20 Aug. 1816, paras 25-27.
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though in the past merely tributaries of the zamindarsy currently were 
more or less dependent upon them, Scott felt that the British were in a 
position forcibly to intervene in their affairs.*
Scott therefore recommended that the Garo villages should be 
brought directly under government control and that a special code of 
regulations should be applied to them. With the exception of tfe* those 
in Habraghat all the Garo villages over which the zamindars had exercised 
authority, but which had neither been recorded in the Collector’s office 
nor subject to the Bengal Code, should be placed under the immediate 
superintendence of a British official. If the zamindars appeared entitled 
to compensation they should be allowed a deduction from their revenue 
payments. Thereafter special rules should be worked out for the internal 
management of the inhabitants. These rules should provide both for the 
security of British subjects and eventually for the improvement of the 
Garos themselves. But for the present British interference with the 
•protected* Garos ought to be extremely limited : they should be required 
to make a simple acknowledgement of the supremacy of Government by
paying a trifling tribute.
eacn ® va vion ongni. we wa«*' t~ y no »erriraen'* j
Despite his earlier statements about the limited influence of 
the chiefs, Scott also set out a detailed plan for enlisting their co­
operation in the control of their clansmen. He proposed that up to one 
thousand rupees a year might be put at the disposal of the magistrate for 
distribution in presents to those Garo chiefs who had been receiving 
blackmail from the plains villages. Such grants, and permission to trade 
at the haths during the ensuing cold season should only be granted after
1. B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 47, Scott’s report of 20 Aug. 1816, 
para 28.
the Garo sardars or headmen, of the frontier villages had subscribed to
in cotton, in acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Company,* that they 
should stand surety for one another, and for the appearance of their 
dependants and villages; that they and their dependants should refrain 
from outrages upon the ryots, surrender any raider seeking refuge in 
their para, and cease to keep human skulls in their houses; that they
should report any plans for raiding that might come to their knowledge; 
that they should come unarmed to the haths. abandon all claims to exact 
perquisites, pay fair prices and engage to refer all differences to the 
police muharrir of the hath, abiding by the magistrate; that they should
allow the interpreters and officers of government to enter their villas-es
conditions their houses and other property should be c
at each station oug m  10 oe xatcen Dy government,, aaequ*n,e remission 01
. . . . . .   ^ I
revenue being granted to the zamindars, for use as a market place and for
cover the remission of revenue while a sales tax of 12 annas per maund 
of cotton would very much more than cover the cost of managing the 
markets* Scott estimated expenditure at about 3000 rupees and the probable 
tax yield at 30,000 rupees since he calculated that cotton sales amounted
1. B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. k7, Scott’s report of 20 Aug. 1816, 
paras 50-51*
2. Ibid, paras 52-53.
some seven conditions.*
These conditions were that they should pay an annual tribute,
without molestation; and finally, that if they should
2
to confiscation by the magistrate.
To encourage peaceful trade Scott further suggested that 50 acres
warehousing. The rent of the ground appropriated to warehouses would
50
to eight tip us and maunds at Habraghat, ten at Mechpara, twelve at 
Kalumalupara, ten at Karaibari, or a total of forty thousand maunds.^
The revenues to be expected from the Garo haths were considered 
by Scott* sufficient to meet the expenses of a native judicial establish­
ment, a local corps and a Garo hath police, which he estimated as follows
Judicial establishment - 5,000
Garo police and presents - 3,880
; t of the di • \.t it  ' rd o-i % h• .-i.\ , and between 5 il
Collection of duties - 3,000
Local corps - 14.400
26,280
But the yield would be far short of the expenses that would be entailed
if an additional English officer were appointed* Scott, therefore
suggested that the tract should be placed under the care of the Commissio­
ner for Cooch Behar and that*, that officer should be required to spend
at least four months in every year in visiting the Garo frontier and
2
making a tour throughout the whole of his jurisdiction. Dhubri he 
suggested would be a very convenient tour centre, being only forty miles 
from Cooch Behar and as central a spot as could be found for the estab­
lished haths at Chitabari, Titaria, Bengakuta, Rajballat, Singimari and I
Palumari at which two-thirds of the whole Garo trade was carried on.-'
The Council at Calcutta was duly impressed with Scott*s "able 
and very interesting" report. They considered that the fruitfulness of 
his proposed measures would chiefly depend on the "character, temper and
1. B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 47, Scott’s report of 20 Aug. 1816,
paras 83 and 8 6-8 7 .
2. Ibid, para 97.
3 . Ibid, para 99.
qualifications of the individual to whose execution they might be en­
trusted"1, and what better person then to undertake the responsibility 
than Scott himself ? But Scott could scarcely undertake this additional 
duty without serious interruption to his administration of civil and 
criminal justice as judge-magistrate of Rangpur. Their solution was to 
appoint another judicial officer to Rangpur, making Scott commissioner in 
Cooch Behar and joint magistrate of Rangpur with special charge of that 
part of the district eastward of the Brahmaputra, and between that river
and Cooch Behar. This new charge consisted of the thanas of Dhubri,
o
Nageswarl, Goalpara and Karaibari* The government further gave Scott 
the widest discretionary power to make ,fany such arrangements as local 
considerations might appear to d e m a n d
Scott was already on his fact-finding tour with Ensign Terranean 
and his detachment when in April 1817 he received his new charge and 
otders from government. He thereupon published a proclamation in all the 
villages expressing government’s readiness to grant a general amnesty 
provided the Garos paid a fine, restored the property plundered in the 
raids of 1 8 1 5, delivered up all their human skulls and pledged themselves 
to submit to the rules which government would establish with due regard
ii
to their legitimate customs*
In consequence of the parwana several of the sardars in Mechpara 
attended Scott at different places. Scott left no room for compromise on
1. J.L.B., vol. 6 , letter of 24 Oct. 1817.
2. B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 48, Bayley to Scott 27 Sept. 1816.
3. B.C.J.C. 5 April 1817, no. 18, Bayley to Scott 5 April 1817.
4. B.C.J.C. 5 April 1817, no. 16, Scott to Bayley 5 March 1817.
the conditions considering that it was essential that the Garos should
I.110 oiri w ji j&rt 0 ?1$ ityfit <sn c* & i ^ ~ ^ v~ * *.*'*■*$ &w *  ^ i I
plainly see that nothing would come of resistance and that the very
^Iv tt l f t K l l f i  w h i f i h  t  t l i* f*h i P' T&l i r  /i*r*sa V ** - i ,, \ +. „• * ^
favourable terms offered by the government merely showed its clemency. 1
n t t m t  1 A n i i a ) ({(l | v, ... *
His plan was successful and early in March, 1817, the sardars of nine out
of the twelve villages belonging to the pass of Tikri in Mechpara attended
\ ' ?.*v::je-a > • * z a x i n a u i  |i
Scott, paid a fine of 800 rupees and agreed to the other conditions laid
down by Scott.^ The articles of agreement which they signed were these:
The chiefs promised never to commit violence upon the Company’s
subjects - or any one else - or to permit British subjects to do so, upon
pain of such punishment as the magistrate might think fit to inflict.
< ..v or r\s■ ■ mee and, ic ti t thes# i
They bound themselves to apprehend and deliver to the magistrate^
c ir  v l C I 6 8  0«I J P U i . J.Y T*ff& O • ■ • ^ .
people at Tikri any Garo belonging to that duar or pass who should be 
guilty of such violence to the Company’s subjects.
They promised to give early information to the police of any 
plan by any Garo assembly to invade the lowlands.
They undertook to settle their disputes among themselves by 
arbitration, according to the ancient customs and to give up private 
blood feuds.
They agreed to grant to the wazirs, interpreters and servants of
. . .  . . * - i 1 x a mi, A  it 4 a n i ! f A r  a rwi % r v*  ^ I
the Company, easy access at all times to their villages, and to assume 
responsibility for their safety.
. - c _  ^ ■«   ^ .. , , „ * -1 7, ** 4 4 a  I
f  H  ( a  t 2  w- *V S ij JL W S . S  '{•-** > J u J T  w  m v  I
They also undertook to take such punj i advances from government
. ■ , , .
as were sanctioned by established custom and to deliver cotton at the
themeasures had proved meet raecessfml* The Garos released vexatteusi
established rate or pay the value in money.
1. B.C.J.C. 5 April 1817, no. 16, Scott to Bayley 5 M a r c h  1817.
2. Ibid.
f
53
■
The British magistrates were to ascertain the boundaries of 
the lands which the chiefs and their ancestors had long cultivated on 
pun.1i advances and settle them according to justice.
The Garos for their part agreed to pay rents, like other ryots 
upon any lands they cultivated within the zamindaries under the Company.
The chiefs promised that they would go unarmed to the haths« 
make no pretensions to perquisites and pay the market price for what they 
purchased*
H f * *  oft«m $ « n * t t i e I ;r. sr fewm • v  r« • aofsaidat u* I
The chiefs also promised to abandon the practice of keeping,
buying or selling human heads, and, for the due performance of these
articles of agreement, became mutually responsible.*
This agreement became the model for Scott’s subsequent agreements
»flj
with tributary Garo chiefs of Halugaon and Nibari and the independent 
villages of Boku, Okra, Sunal, Buraduki, Rangbugri, Rangsibgiri, Ramchu- 
giri, Jamgonda, Maniupara, Khamagiri, Mansang and Dubungiri. 6
Shortly after making these engagements in April 1817 Scott and 
Ensign Wilton who was surveying the Garo frontier, together with many of 
their servants were attacked with violent fever. Ensign Wilton fell a 
victim to the climate and Scott suffered a dangerous and protracted ill-
ness which interrupted the progress of his settlement of Garo affairs.
mUii% be required, « p«Utlca* Matusf* But
Despite this setback the governor-general was able to report to /
the Directors, in a despatch of 2k October 1817 that Scott’s first
2* 2b Dec* 10.21, no, v , *o +>*ty l&y 27 bqpf* |
measures had proved most successful. The Garos released from the vexatious 
interference of the zamindars, had been quiet and orderly* So much so,
1. B.C.J.C. 2 May 1817, no. 26, Scott to Bayley 14 April 1817.
2. Ibid.
3. B.C.J.C. 9 Sept. 1817, no. 21, Scott to Bayley, 10 Aug. 1817;
J.L.B., vol. 6 , 2k Oct. 1817®
indeed, that the Company's forces had been withdrawn, and it had proved 
unnecessary to raise the whole of the local corps for service on the
y  - T. I ■v• I A  I.) v t & ®  • • c. I
Garo frontier which had been proposed by Scott.^a net r eff u lax* ions * .*% w*f ■ 5, d. to >• .&1 to . [<
The improvement which Scott's activities and settlement pro- 
duced are evident from the figures of crime on the Garo frontier. In 1807
-
three villages, in 1813 and 1815 two villages and in 1816 about 150  
villages in the plains had been burned during Garo raids, while in every 
year from 1807 for which records were available there had been some loss 
of life, often considerable# In 1817 however there were no raids, in 
1818 three persons only were killed, and in 1819 again there were no 
raids. 2
No less impressive was the success of the new system in 
bringing offenders to justice# In 1819 thirty out of thirty-one persons 
concerned in dacoity were apprehended and brought to trial^, in 1820 
all four concerned in the one recorded dacoity were apprehended. In all 
other forms of crime of a heinous nature except burglary the police 
success was complete#^ Such evident success made it the easier for Scott 
to secure the approval of Government for his further proposals#
So far all the arrangements made with the tributary Garos had 
been carried out by the government without any hint that legislative 
sanction might be required, as a purely political measure# But Scott's
1, J#L#B#, vol• 6 , letter of 2k Oct. 1817*
2. B.C.J.C# 28 Dec. 1821, no. 8 8, Scott to Bayley 27 Sept. 1819.
Comparative figures of Garo raids.
3 # 'Statement of robberies and crimes of a heinous nature committed in
the paraganas of Habraghat, Mechpara, Kaluroalupara and Karaibari in
1819'. B.C.J.C. 28 Dec. 1821, no. 95, Scott to Bayley 20 Jan. 1821.
4. Ditto. 1820, B.C.J.C. 28 Dec. 1821, no. 97, Scott to Bayley 
7 Nov. 1821.
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concern was with all the Garos, including those settled within the 
Company's territories and thus nominally subject to the Company's laws 
and regulations. It was not possible, Scott believed, to exclude all the 
Garos from the Company's jurisdiction and to rely upon the restored 
authority of the zamindars for the peace and protection of the border, 
though that was what the Directors had suggested in 1815. 1 On the other 
hand, Scott pointed out, "The Regulations are evidently inapplicable 
to the existing state of society amongst them, a people in general 
entirely ignorant of the Bengal language or any other dialect understood 
in our courts"^ Accordingly Scott proposed the enactment of a regulation 
for separating from the estates the border zamindars all lands held'by 
the hill tribes and for the resumption to the government and eventual
restoration to their former owners of all lands of which the Garos or
other hill tribes might have been forcibly dispossessed by the zamindars
3
since 1765#
Scott proposed that the administration of civil and criminal 
justice, the collection of revenue, the superintendence of the police, 
and every other branch of government within the tract should be vested 
in a special Commissioner appointed by the governor-general-in-Council. 
Paragraph 24 in the Draft Regulation framed by Scott, thus read "The 
authority of the Commissioner in revenue matters and in civil causes and 
the jurisdiction in criminal cases vested in that officer and in the 
court of Mizamut Adawlat by this regulation, shall extend from the
1. B.C.J.C. 28 Dec. 1821, no. 92f Extract from Scott's letter to 
Secretary Bayley 15 Aug. 1816.
2. B.C.J.C. 28 Dec. 1821, no. 8 8, Scott to Bayley 27 Sept. 1819.
3. Ibid.
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Burhampootar river eastward over all lands occupied by Garrows or other 
hill tribes formerly considered as tributary to, or dependent upon, 
the zumeendars of Habraghat, Mechpara, Caloomaloopara and Currybaree. The 
Governor-General-in-Council will, however, exercise his discretion in 
releasing the inhabitants of any of the above villages from the control 
of the British government. He will also exercise a similar discretion in 
extending its authority over other Garrow communities which may be at 
present independent ... ... and it shall in cases of above nature be 
sufficient for the separation or annexation of such territory that a 
proclamation be issued to that effect by order of Government in the 
villages thereby affected without any further special enactment for that 
purpose" . 1
Scott’s draft Regulation, containing twenty-six sections, 
covered precisely the extent of the existing and the proposed Regulations 
and the jurisdiction of the new commissioner in numerous cases on civil,Jl v
criminal and police matters relating to the Garos and other hilltribes 
in their relations with one another and with other subjects of the new 
division. A distinction was made between the Garos and other hill tribes 
and the other subjects speaking Bengali. In the latter’s case the 
existing Bengal Regulations were to be considered in force and the 
commissioner in such a case was to perform the functions then exercised 
by the judge and magistrate. Provisions were made for trials of the 
criminals among the Garos and other hill tribes and the commissioner was 
empowered to judge and punish either by himself directly in minor 
offences, or with the prior approval of the Nizamat adalat in cases of
!• B.C.J.C. 28 Dec. 1821, no. 89. Scott’s draft Regulation of 1819.
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graver charges. On the proceedures of dealing with crimes committed by 
the people from the low country or by other individuals subject to the 
general regulations and of collecting revenue, it was to be left to the 
governor-general for further orders. 1
The important thing was to bring all the Garos, whether de­
pendent or tributary, under the direct British control, without the 
interposition of the zamindars. Cleveland in 1778 had attained the same
object in Bhagalpur by making the country of the Mai Paharias *a govern-
2
ment estate holding rent-free from government direct*. But the very
much greater extent of the Garo lands, coupled with the fact that many
Garos had long lived in the lowland areas under the Bengal Regulations
demanded a broader plan. Scott saw that a separate administration was
essential. As had happened in the case of the tribes of Chota Nagpur and
Palamax£^ the introduction of the * Cornwallis system* with scant respect
for tribal language and tribal custom had done little justice to the
Garos of the north-east frontier of Bengal. The tribesmen, subjected to
an alien judicial system, administered by men who neither spoke nor
understood their language, had been driven into a hostile isolation.
Scott argued that his new plan would remove this anomaly and attain the
security and general welfare of the Garos and other hill tribes living in
hthe eastern part of Rangpur on the left bank of the Brahmaputra,
1. B.C.J.C. 28 Dec. 1821, no. 89, Scott’s draft Regulation of 1819.
2. J.H. Hutton, op.cit., p. 418.
3. see J*C. Jha, Tribal unrest on_the south-west Frontier of the.. B e n g a l
Presidensy 1 8 3 1 -1 8 3 3 4 p. 310.
4. B.C.J.C. 28 Dec. 1821, no. 8 8 , Scott to Bayley 27 Sept. 1819.
58
Although Scott believed that trial by the commissioner, alone or 
with the aid of Garo assessors, would be the most efficient mode of trial, 
and proposed that the new regulations should make the commissioner the 
supreme judicator,* he was conscious that more and more Garos should be 
employed in the police and judicial administration* In his Draft Regu­
lation of 1819 he therefore suggested rules to that end which might be 
issued by the governor-general.
The rules had a double purpose, to give the Garo chiefs a share 
in the policing of the Garo hills, and to associate them with the 
judicial administration* The rules provided in the first place for the 
recognition of existing sardars or heads of villages, and of jaskars or 
chiefs of the local divisions called duars* whose authority was estab­
lished within their respective limits, and for the nomination of fit 
persons for such posts by the inhabitants of the village or the sardars 
of the division where none at present enjoyed such authority*
These sardars and Laskars should be responsible for reporting 
murders and other heinous offences within their limits and for attempting 
the discovery and apprehension of the perpetrators thereof. They should 
also be made responsible for the security of the lowland territory ad­
joining their villages or duars and for preventing Garo inroads or out­
rages upon that territory, and for apprehending any Garo who should 
commit such outrage* To assist them in preserving order, the mandals or 
village officers of all border lowland villages should be obliged to 
report all crimes committed by the hillmen both to the police offices and 
to the nearest Garo sardar, who would then, in concert with the taskars
1. B.C.J.C* 28 Dec. 1821, no« 88, Scott to Bayley 27 Sept. 1819.
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and other sardars, seek to trace and apprehend the offenders. In return 
for these services the j<askars and sardars would be allowed a salary.
In case of misconduct, however, they would be removable from office by 
the commissioner*
For administration of justice the draft rules provided that the 
sardar should be empowered to take cognizance of civil disputs between 
the inhabitants of his village, and the jaskar of such disputes between 
villages in his division. In either case the aid should be taken of a 
panchayat consisting of the principal husbandmen or persons chosen by the 
parties themselves. Where a decision had to be enforced upon one of the 
parties it should be first referred to the commissioner. Petty criminal 
offences should be treated as civil causes and settled accordingly, the 
panchayat awarding such damages to the injured party as custom provided.
Scott proposed that police darogas should be appointed with the 
usual powers at convenient stations in the lowlands, but that they should 
take cognizance only of murder, homicide, and of robbery, theft, burglary 
and affrays attenckawith homicide or wounding, in the hills. Even in such 
cases the daroga should observe the principle of securing the aid of the 
Garo sardars and Laskars and of their barkandazes in apprehending the 
offenders.
Finally Scott proposed that when the commissioner tried Garo 
cases he should be assisted by five Garo assessors. They should be con­
sulted on all points connected with the peculiar customs and manners of
Enclosure Z  of Svott^ Draft of lv , 7 «
the Garos, and their opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner 
should be recorded, though this should not bind the court in passing
’ f  I 
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judgement* All other matters of dispute, civil or criminal, which the 
sardars and taskars were unable to settle in the manner above prescribed
CL,
should be tried before panchayat either appointed by the dommissioner or 
chosen by the parties* Their decision if not considered by the commissioner 
to be obviously unjust, should immediately be carried into execution*1 
By using their own chiefs in police and judicial matters Scott
A
hoped to make the Garos the agents in the process of theirAcivilization. 
Cleveland had employed this method in Bhagalpur^and like Cleveland Scott 
hoped also by this means to *arn the hill peoples’ confidence* By 
limiting the normal jurisdiction of the Company’s darogas to the lowlands 
only, and making them work together with the sardars and Las kars in 
arresting serious criminals, it was intended to promote better under­
standing and co-operation between the Garos and the Company’s servants. L 
But Scott’s task was more difficult than Cleveland’s, for in the Garo 
hills a strong body of organised and co-operative chiefs had in some 
measure to be created* To this end he proposed to arrange two annual 
assemblies of the Garo chiefs of each paragana where the Commissioner 
would entertain them at public expense, and they would renew their fealty 
to the Government* At these assemblies any pending criminal cases would
v * X I
also be tried*^ Through such regular meetings, and by such co-operation 
in the judicial administration it was hoped to bring into existence a 
powerful body of hill chiefs, loyal to the government and serving as 
useful subsidiary agents for the maintenance of law and order*
1* Enclosure 2 of Scott’s Draft Regulation of 1819.
B.C.J.C. 28 Dec. 1821, no. 90.
2. B.C.J.C. 28 Dec. 1821, no. 90* Enclosure 2 of Scott’s letter of
27 Sept. 1819.
3. Ibid.
To these various proposals the governor-qeneral-in-eouncil and 
the Court of Directors eventually replied with approval. In December,
1821 Scott was nominated as the first civil commissioner of the north­
east parts of Rangpur. The Calcutta Council speaking of the zeal and 
intellegence displayed by Scott, expressed their desire to make use of 
his lf talents and local e x p e r i e n c e I n  recognition of <»the responsibility 
and arduous nature of the functions*i which their new commissioner would 
have to perform they allowed him a salary of 40,000 rupees a year, in­
cluding all travelling and personal charges, a sum they considered to be 
no more than adequate.1 This administrative action was followed in 1822 
by legislation. The Regulation X of 1822 was passed on the 19 September, 
1822, embodying Scott’s proposals. Its preamble declared that "with a 
view to promote the desirable object of reclaiming these races to the 
habits of civilized life, it seems necessary that a special plan for the
administration of justice, of a kind adapted to their peculiar customs and
+w
prejudices, should be arranged and concerted with head men, and that
A  T
measures should at the same time be taken for freeing them from dependence 
on the zamindars of the British provinces".2 Accordingly, section II of 
the Regulation separated the tract of country comprised in the thanas of 
Goalpara, Dhubri, and Karaibari from the jurisdiction of the district of 
Rangpur and declared the operation of the existing Regulations to be sus­
pended except in cases of subjects other than the Garos and other hill 
tribes. The new Regulation then defined the powers of the Civil Commiss­
ioner for the North-East parts of Rangpur in administering civil and
1# J.L.B., vol 8, letter of 8 Feb. 1822.
2. R. Clarke, The Regulations of the Government of Fort William in
Bengal, vol. II, pp. 659-663» preamble of the Regulation X 
of 1822.
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criminal justice, the collection of revenue, and the superintendence of 
the police. Although strictly based on Scott’s draft, it did not in­
corporate all the rules which Scott had drafted, but it left sufficient 
discretion in the hands of the government to meet all cases that might 
arise subsequently.
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CHAPTER III
THE EXTERNAL DANGER TO THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER AND DAVID SCOTT
To the Company the strategic north-east frontier of Bengal 
meant the whole of the hill ranges surrounding the Assam valley, for the 
security of its Bengal territories rested not only on the peaceable 
demeanour of the peoples of the immediate frontier hills, but also of 
those of the independent regions such as Cachar, Assam, Manipur and 
Burma beyond them* Any power which might advance along the Brahmaputra 
into central and eastern Bengal was a potential threat*
In the early part of the nineteenth century the Company’s 
government felt no fear of the Ahom dynasty in Assam, for its weakness 
was very evident* But from 1817 the gradual rise to dominance of the 
Burmese in Assam demanded serious attention, for it gave a new complexion 
to the problem of a Burmese threat to Rangpur and Chittagong* Scott saw 
with alarm the Burmese encroachments upon the Chittagong frontier, and the 
greater danger inherent in their seizure of power in the upper Brahmaputra 
valley, and he concluded that the safety of the Company’s north-east 
frontier depended on the existence of a strong and friendly power in 
Assam* The Ahom rulers were certainly friendly but clearly not strong 
enough to stand unaided against the Burmese aggressors. Therefore Scott 
argued, the British should intervene on their behalf, driving out the 
Burmese, and making the Assamese strong friendly neighbours. Scott held 
and expressed these views strongly* The purpose of this chapter is to 
show the dominant role which the opinions of this trusted frontier officer
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pla}red in the preparation of Amherst’s controversial* Burmese war*
Scott first came into contact with the confused politics of 
Ahom Assam as magistrate of Rangpur* The old king Suklingpha Kamaleswar 
Singh died in 1811 and thereafter a struggle for power developed between 
members of the royal line and their hereditary prime ministers — the 
buragohains. In February, 1814, the young raja, Chandra Kanta wrote to the 
governor general, Lord Hastings, recalling the friendship extended to his 
family by Lord Minto, his immediate predecessor, and asking for assistance 
in quelling the internal dissensions within his kingdom* The raja 
mentioned the incursions of the Nora, Khamti, Dafla and Moamaria tribes, 
the plundering of parganas in Kamrup and on the Bijni boundary2 by such 
rebels as Manik Chand, and the threat of invasion by a royal pretender, 
Brajanath Kunwar, aided by an adventurous English trader Robert Bruce,
3
from the Rangpur district. It was with this last threat that Scott was 
immediately concerned, for the Supreme Government ordered him to take 
prompt and rigorous measures to prevent any such invasions. This was a 
duty, they felt, ’’imposed on the British government no less by its sub­
sisting relation with that power, than by a regard for the tranquillity
of its own possessions which must be endangered by the proceedings under 
' 4
cons i derat ion” *_____________________     j
1 The President of the Board of Control, C.W. Williams Wynn, was to 
comment on this war that Britain could not conquer the world out of
’mere humanity’ just because Britons believed that only under their
rule were people happy.
See G.D. Bearce, British Attitudes Towards India* 1784-1858, p.50.
ft Qnf 1ft f
2 B.P.C. 29 Apr* 1814, no. 51, The Raja of Assam to the Governor 
General, received on 3 Feb. 1814.
3 B.P.C. 29 Apr. 1814, noe. 23, Scott to Adam, 18 Apr. 1814.
4 B.P.C. 29 Apr. 1814, no. 52, Adam to Scott, 29 Apr. 1814.
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This open attack upon the raja’s position Scott duly prevented*1 
But more difficult to deal with were the pleas of an envoy Badan Chandra 
Barphukan, through whom the raja appealed for help against the buragohain, 
ufoo was alleged to be keeping the raja virtually a prisoner. The letter 
the envoy bore complained about the continued enmity of the buragohain, 
who was accused of poisoning the raja’s father and uncle and of putting 
to death nearly one thousand persons who, being faithful servants of the 
royal family, had ventured to remonstrate against his mischievous pro­
ceedings* The raja sought British help against this one man’s tyranny, 
reminding Lord Hastings that the Company had previously given help to 
Raja Gaurinath (1780-1795)* He asked for at least six companies of 
sipahis to be sent to his aid, declaring his readiness in return to be­
come a tributary ruler under British protection, and to pay a sum of one 
lakh and a half of Narayani rupees. He also promised a favourable settle­
ment of custom dues for the benefit of both the British traders and his 
own government.2
The government, which had recognized a special relationship with 
the royal family in 1814, declined in 1815 to take any action on Chandra 
Kanta’s behalf. The secretary to the governor-general wrote to Scott to 
say "the British government not being bound by any engagements to support
the riaja and being connected with the government of Assam merely by the> i
general relation of amity and friendship, it cannot consistently with its 
own principles of policy comply with the Raja’s solicitation while the
1. B.P.C. 13 May 1814, nos. 58-59* Scott to Adam Apt*.
2. B.P.C. 8 Dec. 1815, no. 53, enclosure 2, Raja C h a n d r a  Kanta’s letter 
of 28 Katrie 1822 (B.S.); B.P.C. 8 Dec. 1815, nos. 52-53 (1), Scott 
to Adam 15 Nov. 1815*
government of Assam shall continue to maintain with us the same friendly 
relations which now exist, and while the domestic feuds of the government 
are not of a nature to affect the tranquillity of the Company’s provindes
we are necessarily precluded from interference in its internal affairs
latftjrfftr* with ihit of fertlga rvitievaS he was f«l Iv
and you will accordingly be pleased to observe generally to the paja’s 
agent in reply to his propositions that our policy is merely to attend
to the concerns of our own government and not to interfere into those
aware & t ary '‘bj action# to BrftjfAit&th Ihmw&r’# pro***
of other states even although the greatest advantage be offered as the
1
price of our interference". Scott duly performed his task of politely
? * ’?u j r ® a  i o  wr/t! s t h e  S r  * s-- ■■■-X’v a ’-•? * o n  f o r  n  if ^
refusing the agent of the raja, and there the matter ended.
On 17 May, 1817, however, Scott had to report that since the 
British had refused to help resolve the conflicts within the Ahom kingdom, 
Badan Chandra had sought the aid of the Burmese, with whose help the 
buragohain had been expelled. What is more, though the expelled Buragohain 
Purnananda died soon after, his eldest son Ruchinath had taken post at 
Gauhati and another son had arrived at Rangpur to invite the exiled 
Brajanath Kunwar to ascend the throne, and to solicit British armed inter- 
vention. Three days later, Scott, giving "more precise information on
fj
Assam", reported that the army which had entered Assam was not composed of
Burmese and Cachar people but of the subjects of the rajas of Moran, Khamti
and Singpho - the three independent chiefs whose territories lay between
j
3
Assam and Ava. *
1 B.P.C. 8 Dec. 1815, no. 54, Adam to Scott, 8 Dec. 1815*
2 B.P.C. 24 May 1817, no. 32, Scott to Adam, 17 May 1817*
3 B.P.C. 31 May 1817, nos. 91-92, Scott to Adam, 20 May 1817•P4HI) , I . , m
* As will be seen Scott’s earlier information was more correct for it
was the Burmese,^assisted by these people who invaded Assam. There
are evidences of^urmese own grievance against the Ahoms.
See G.C. Barua, Ahom Buran.ii. pp. 375-6, and J.A.S.B., Aug. 1838,
p. 673 about the Burmese grievances against Purnananda Buragohain
who had given support to the refractory shans or Naras.
nScott also reported the immediate action he had taken in
'
response to the pleas of Ruchinath Buragohain and of Brajanath Kunwar 
who had also waited on him* He had informed the Buragohain* s men* that 
as it was inconsistent with the principle of the British government to 
interfere with the internal concerns of foreign nations he was fully- 
persuaded that no military aid would be granted to them, but that he 
would nevertheless submit their request to government* He also told them 
that though he was not aware of any objections to Brajanath Kunwar*s pro­
ceeding to Assam unaccompanied by any armed force, the latter would be 
required to secure the British government’s previous sanction for his 
departure. Scott also explained to Brajanath that he could not be allowed 
to take any military force with him and that in the event of his again 
being compelled to take refuge in British territory, government would
not then sanction the renewal of his pension* But Brajanath decided to
o
leave Assam on any terms. Following Ruchinath Buragohain*s plan, 
Brajanath, with his son, arrived safely at Jorhat* There was no opposition 
worth the name, and Raja Chandra Kanta fled to Rangpore.* Though un­
fortunately, Brajanath could not be enthroned as he had a scar on his 
body, which was a disqualification for the raj according to Ahom custom, 
his son Purandar Singh was accepted by people as King of Assam early in 
1818.^ All this time Scott remained under the impression that it was the
1* Among others Jagannath Dhekial Phukan was sent to Chitmari by 
Ruchinath to invite Brajanath*
G. Borooah, Assam Buran.1 i. p. 192.
2* B.P.C. 31 May 1817, nos. 91-92, Scott to Adam, 20 May 1817*
* This Rangpore is in Upper Assam and from here onwards this spelling 
will be used to distinguish it from Rangpur district in Bengal.
3* G. Borooah, op.cit*, pp. 192-3.
Singphos, Khamtis and Moamarias and not the Burmese who had invaded 
Assam in answer to Barphi*kan’s call for help.
In 1819 the young buragohain and Raja Purandar Singh were 
driven from Gauhati by the faction headed by Chandra Kanta, supported by 
the Burmese. In September both of them addressed letters to Government
from their refuge at Chilmari, in the district of Rangpur, asking for
X rBritish help. By this time the Bumese had received from Raja Chandra
Kanta an acknowledgement of his vassal status and many thousand of
Assamese had fled to British territory. The question of interfering in
Assam politics was thus again raised.2 Scott forwarded petitions from
Purandar Singh^, offering to become a tributary of the Company in return
for their aid, and from Ruchinath \  claimant to the post of buragohain.
He also forwarded a counter claim from Raja Chandra Kanta for the
surrender of the two pretenders^. To this last, answer was made by Swinton
in 1820 that while they remained peaceable refugees the British government
would continue to offer them asylum^. It was not quite so easy to deal
with the Buragohain’s petition, which had also explained the power and
position of the Assamese prime minister vis-a-vis the raja, for the
Supreme Government felt uncertain about the Buragohain*s true authority.
"We should remark" they told the Court of Directors, "that there is some
confusion and obscurity in the petition presented by the Bura Goheyn, he
1. B.C., vol. 770/20904, pp. 9-11;
H.H. Wilson, Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, p. 6,
Document no. 8.
2. B.P.C. 29 July 1820, no. 79# Scott to Swinton, 4 Sept. 1819.
3. B.P.C. 29 July 1820, no. 80, Scott to Swinton, 1 Nov. 1819.
4. B.P.C. 29 July 1820, nos.81-82, Scott to Swinton, 27 Dec. 1819.
5. B.P.C. 29 July 1820, nos.90 & 94, Raja Chandra Kanta’s letters
received on 8 Nov. 1819 and 14 June 1820.
6. B.C., vol. 770/20904, p. 14; P.L.B 12 Sept. 1823, para 94,
B.P.C. 29 July 1820, Governor General’s letter to Raja Chandra Kanta, 
20 July 1820.
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sometimes represented himself as the adherent and supporter of Poorander 
bingh, and at other tiroes seems to state the supreme authority as resting 
in his own person, owing to the default of legal heirs to the Raj”.1 
Nevertheless the government made it clear to the fugitives that it was 
not its policy to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign state,
nor to pronounce on disputed titles to the musnad, but rather to maintain
friendly relations with whoever was the reigning prince.2
The reply was a restatement of the position earlier taken up by
Barlow and by the Court of Directors in relation to the affairs of Raj-
3
putana and Central India* That position had proved untenable in the
face of Pindari inroads, and the hopes of a self-contained peace false.
* v w r , } j  I  . v / i g  1 1 s o u r  o i  hiVjfc... . r ? S 8 ® i o n t  H
Under Lord Hastings extensive campaigns had been necessary before the
 .........  " ‘ " ' " ' ^  I
Pindaris were crushed, the Marathas humbled and the peshwaship abolished,
and all the important chiefs of India made to enter into treaty relations
.
with the Company. The hope that the Company could remain aloof and in-
***** P
different to events in Assam soon proved equally misplaced. 1821 saw a
further complication of the affairs of Ahom Assam and the raising of
■
wider policy issues by Scott. In February, Scott reported that there were
1 H.H. Wilson, op.cit., p. 6, Document no. 8.
2 Ibid.
3 Barlow rejected the appeals of the Rajput ruler of Jaipur for protec­
tion against the Pindaris and Marathas, declaring his determination to 
observe the principle of non-interference in the internal concerns of 
the Indian states and in their transactions with each other. The 
British government’s attention would henceforth be limited to the in­
ternal prosperity of the Company’s territory. (B.S.P.C. 13 Feb. 1806
no. 67. Btirlow to Rajah of Jaipur, 3 Feb. 1816) Against this General 
Lake - in Scott’s role - argued that to abandon the Rajput states 
would "probably terminate in a renewal of hostilities under circum­
stances of the most serious disadvantage". (B.S.P.C. 6 Feb. 1806, no.
15, Lake to Btirlow 17 Jan. 1806) In the event Lake’s predictions 
proved correct. - This reference is gratefully received from
Mr. B.N. Ghosh who has been working on British Relations with the 
Pathans and Pindaris for a London Univerity doctoral thesis.
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not more than one thousand Burmese in Assam*, and that Raja Chandra Kanta
emboldened by their slackness, was planning to throw off their yoke with
the aid of Ahom refugees in the Company’s territory,2 He had also to
report preparations by the ex-raja Purandar Singh for an attack from
3
Bhutan upon Assam* In May, the Burmese declared Raja Chandra Kanta de­
posed for his connivance at the murder of their supporter Badan Chandra 
4
Barphukan* The Burmese installed another Ahom prince, Jogeswar Singh in 
Chandra Kanta’s place, who was a mere puppet in their hands.*5 The Calcutta 
Council, whose earlier non-interference policy had been approved by the 
Court of Directors , now began to feel that "continued refusal to inter­
fere in the affairs of Assam has by no means prevented the troubles and 
discontented state of that country from proving a source of embarrassment 
to the British government". The government of Ava had taken advantage of 
the dissensions prevailing in the Assamese territory to occupy the 
country, so that Burmese forces had come into contact with British
rv ' .
7
territories at another and most inconvenient point.
Scott took advantage of these doubts to press again for inter­
vention. In his letter of 19 May he argued that the arrogant character 
of the Burmese, and their government’s spirit of conquest must make their
advance into Assam dangerous. He therefore asked "whether the interests
of the British government would not be best consulted by permitting the
Assam refugees to obtain the necessary means for the expulsion of the 
o
invaders". Scott offered two arguments for such a course : an Assamese
1 B.P.C. 19 March 1821, no. Ill, Scott to Swinton, 6 Feb. 1821.
2 B.P.C. 19 March 1821, no. 112, Scott to Swinton, 6 Feb. 1821.
3 B.C. vol. 770/20904, pp. 19-20.
4 H.H. Wilson, op.cit., p. 7, Document no. 8 .
5 B.C. vol. 770/20904, p. 21.
6 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
7 Ibid.
8 B.P.C. 16 June 1821, no. 69, Scott to Swinton, 19 May 1821.
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rising against the Burmese was inevitable; and if, for lack of support 
it failed, consolidation of Burmese authority in Assam went on unhampered, 
the Company would be driven to station a considerable force on the un­
healthy eastern frontier*1 He added, that the cruelties practised by the 
Burmese, and the devastation of property had made the whole people de­
sirous of being relieved from them, and that all that seemed necessary to 
enable either Purandar Singh or the Buragohain to establish their autho­
rity, was a supply of firearms2*
The Calcutta authorities did furnish the Buragohain with a 
rahdari pass for two hundred armed men and permitted him to purchase arms 
privately* But they did so without in any way accepting Scott’s analysis 
of the situation* Since no effective authority existed in Assam, such 
limited assistance could not be construed, they felt, as a hostile move 
against a neighbouring power^, and they were careful to prevent any 
appearance of countenancing the Buragohain’s attempt* But although the 
assistance rendered was meagre, Scott helped the fugitives to make full 
use of it* He issued instructions to lieutenant Magowan of the Rangpur 
Local Battalion that the transport of arras, ammunitions, and other 
military stores to Assam be permitted^and that natives of Assam should be 
at liberty to return to their country with arms either singly or in a 
body* He also allowed Hindustani soldiers to go to Assam provided they 
went singly**1
1* B.P.C* 16 June 1821, no. 69, Scott to Swinton, 19 May 1821*
2. Ibid; Wilson, op.cit*, p. 7, Document no. 8 ; B.C., vol. 770/20904,
pp. 22-23.
3. B.P.C* 16 June 1821, no* 71, Prinsep to Scott, 9 June 1821.
4. B.P.C. 26 January 1822, no. 77, Scott to Lt. Magowan, 19 Dec. 1821, 
and to Prinsep 23 Dec. 1821.
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For all the favour shown, Purandar Singh*s bid failed, his 
troops being defeated by Chandra Kanta, his rival for the throne, to whom 
Robert Bruce thereupon transferred his services. At the end of October 
1821 it was Chandra Kanta*s turn to apply for British assistance, through 
Robert Bruce. On Scott’s advice the government issued orders to the 
Territorial Department to give effect to any pass that Scott might issue 
and to grant permission for the transport of military stores to Assam 
should application be made at the Presidency.1 Scott believing Chandra 
Kanta*s position to be favourable after Purandar*s defeat2 and in the 
absence of any large force of Burmese, gave permission to Bruce to 
purchase three hundred muskets and ninety maunds of gunpowder for Chandra 
Kanta. It is to be noted that although at the time the Company’s re­
lations with Burma were strained they were not declaredly hostile. The 
Supreme Government by giving a free hand to Scott had allowed itself, 
however reluctantly, to be driven into conflict with the Burmese; "one 
of those unjustifiable and improper proceedings", its critic declared, 
"which the legislature in their enactment wisely and judiciously meant to 3 
prohibit.."**.
Chandra Kanta’s success in defeating Purandar and capturing all 
the districts bordering upon the Company’s territories led the enthusi­
astic Scott to abandon Purandar Singh and the Buragohain.5 But such
1. B.P.C. 8 Dec. 1821, nos. 81-82, Scott to Swinton, 3 Nov. 1821 and 
Swinton to Scott, 30 Nov. 1821; H.H. Wilson, op.clt., p.8, Document 
no. 8.
2• B.P.C. 8 Dec. 1821, no. 81, Scott to Swinton, 3 Nov. 1821.
3. Ibid.
4. Captain W. White, A political history of the Extraordinary Events
which led to the Burmese War, p. 118.
5. B.C., vol. 770/20904, p. 24.
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success also drove the Burmese government to send the greatest of its 
generals1, Mingi Maha Bandula, to Assam with a large force in the month 
of April 1822.2 At Mahgaph, near Jorhat, a battle took place in which 
Chandra Kanta, after fighting gallantly for a long time, succumbed to the 
superior force of Bandula.-' On 30 September Scott reported that Chandra 
Kanta had been expelled from Assam by the Burmese party, and had fled to 
the chowky opposite Goalpara.^
Chandra Kantavs defeat marked the extinction of Ahom authority 
in Assam, for towards the end of June 1822, Mingi Maha Tiiwa, the command­
ing officer of the Burmese army at the Assam chowky, was declared Raja 
of Assam. Scott wrote to the Supreme Government at Calcutta; "the Burmese 
having obtained complete mastery of Assam and a person of that nation 
having been appointed to the supreme authority, the country may now be
K
considered as a province of the Burman empireo"-^
i.';- Uii ...: ■' ;• :*i .•*'?' i ' t .. ■ :
Though in June 1822 Scott and Lt. Davidson, who commanded at
&arfl c hiAxi x ha M&i a dx*** no r • ® xiy d** ^ v? * 7*i. \ * ^ u
Goalpara, reported the Burmese peaceable, they found ample cause to fear
their forces.** Davidson from his own experience knew the effectiveness
of their swift warboats each carrying anything up to 150 armed men#
Davidson and Scott were careful therefore not to allow Ahom refugees to
1. He is still a great hero in Burma, and when sovereignty was trans­
ferred to the Burmese by the Labour Government in 1948, the big square 
in the centre of Rangoon was renamed after him.
D# Woodman, The Making of Burma, p. 70.
2# B.P.C. 6 July 1822, no.49, Scott to Swinton, 10 July 1822; also in 
Scotts*s Historical Notes, B.S.P.C., 14 July 1826.
3. B.C., vol. 770/20904, p. 25.
4# H.H. Wilson, op.cit., p. 8 , Document no. 8.
5. B.P.C. 26 July 1822, no. 50, Scott to Prinsep, 11 July 1822.
6. B.C., vol. 770/20904, p. 41. Reports of various outrages, committed
on the British frontier villages by the Burmese troops had been re­
ceived by Scott. H.H. Wilson, op.cit., p.8 , Document no. 8 .
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provoke the Burmese, and Scott urged the despatch to the frontier of 
considerable reinforcements.1 In July Scott heard from a Burmese vakil 
that two months earlier the Burmese commander Mingi Maha Tilwa had con­
templated a full scale attack upon the Goalpara district with an army of 
2
20,000 men , and Scott in a private letter addressed to George Swinton, 
political secretary to the government, reported the danger threatening the 
eastern frontier of Bengal. "Government will now begin to feel", Scott 
wrote, "the inconvenience of the time of conduct imposed upon them by the
3
Act of Parliament , and will have to keep a much larger force in this 
quarter than would have sufficed in 1816". He then stressed the gravity 
of the Burmese menace by pointing out that the whole of Dacca, Mymensing, 
Rangpur, and Natore districts now lay at the mercy of the Burmese. They 
now commanded the river routes into eastern Bengal and it would be as 
difficult to fight with them on water as it was to fight against the Pin­
daris on land in South India. Their occupation of the Brahmaputra valley 
had changed the whole complexion of the Burmese problem. It would be a 
great miscalculation, Scott thought, to judge the capacities of the Burmese 
in control of the Brahmaputra simply by the slow movements of their troops 
in the mountainous tract bordering on Chittagong and Tipperah. From the 
Brahmaputra valley they could easily sail down and sack Dacca and the
1 B.C. vol. 770/20904, p. 41. Reports of various outrages, committed
on the British frontier villages by the Burmese troops had been 
received by Scott. H.H. Wilson, op.cit., p. 8 , Document no. 8 .
2 B.C. vol. 770/20904, p. 45.
3 Meaning the Charter Act of 1793} which laid down that the pursuit 
of schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India were re­
pugnant to the wish, honour and policy of British nation.
4 B.P.C. 26 July 1822, no. 51, Scott to Swinton, 10 July 1822.
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adjoining districts, and against such a naval attack the superior dis­
cipline of the British troops would not be of much use.1
Despite the government’s plain statement in 1820 that it was not 
concerned with the internal politics of Assam, and despite the falsifi­
cation of his hopes first of Purandar Singh and then of Chandra Kanta, 
Scott continued to develop and press for a forward policy in Assam. He 
pointed out that the Burmese had laid claim to Dacca and that in 1793 
Captain Cox had represented to the Burmese government that Assam was a 
tributary of the British government. ”It does not require much insight 
into Asiatic politics”, he said, ”to enable me to predict that they [the 
Burmese} will not neglect the first opportunity of asserting their claims
under the encouragement of being allowed quietly to possess themselves of
o
a country that we not long ago declared to be a dependency of ours”, 
Scott’s forceful advocacy did induce the government to adopt
r,
various precautionary measures. The whole frontier was placed under the 
special command of a lieutenant-colonel assisted by a brigade-major. The 
river Tista was considered to be the western boundary of his command, 
which included the frontier districts of Rangpur, Dacca, Sylhet and 
Tipperah. The particular threat from the Burmese war boats was also 
tackled by the despatch of oared boats of the longest size, armed with a 
twelve-pounder carronade in the bows and a party of five golandazes 
(matchlockmen) per boat. Later, Lord Hastings reporting to London on the 
Burmese conquest of Assam, said that there was not the remotest danger
1. B.P.C. 26 July 1822, no. 51, Scott to Swinton, 10 July 1822.
2. Ibid.
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of a rupture with the Burmese. Only because the accumulation of disorderly 
troops on the Assam-Bengal border exposed British villages to marauding 
parties had it been thought necessary to reinforce that frontier.1
Yet it is clear that the addition of six hundred miles to the 
Anglo-Burmese border did increase the danger of conflict and the strategic 
importance of the Bengali frontier regions. By the end of August, 1822, 
Scott was able to point to one clear case of Burmese aggression - the 
occupation of an island in the Brahmaputra near Goalpara which had been 
in British hands. He made this the occasion to stress the impolicy of
submitting to such Burmese provocation, the more so as Burmese reinforce-
2
ments were known to be moving up. But the government rather pooh-poohed
Scott’s report about the island incident and he was gently reproved for
being so bellicose and alarmist about "points of no importance, where
3
expense may be entailed without possibility of advantage". The report
was softened by giving to Scott the charge of direct relations with
Sikkim, in addition to his other duties, on the death of the previous
4
superintendent Major Latter. However by the autumn of 1823 Scott’s 
warnings about Burmese intentions and his proposals for active measures 
came to seem more reasonable. In October Swinton told Scott of Burmese 
attacks upon an island in the Naf river (in the Chittagong district) and. 
their threats to commence a general invasion if their possession of it
1 Home Misc., vol. 673, pp« 659-60, extract from a letter of Marques 
of Hastings dated Calcutta, 27 July 1822.
2 B.P.C. 27 Sept. 1822, no. 68, Davidson to Scott, 25 Aug. 1822.
3 B.P.C. 27 Sept. 1822, no. 69, Swinton to Scott, 27 Sept. 1822.
4 B.P.C. 27 Sept. 1822, no. 65, Swinton to Scott, 27 Sept. 1822.
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were disputed* He also announced precautionary troop movements to 
Rangpur, Sylhet and Dacca.1
This letter of Swinton*s crossed with one of Scott*s, also of 
31 Oct. 1823, in which he pressed for action. Though he was sure the 
Burmese in Assam had no intention of committing any hostile act there, 
he saw in the Chittagong dispute an occasion for settling the problem of 
security along the whole eastern frontier. Any rupture with Ava over the
Naf river island should be followed by the march of a Company’s force
foreign itsvaaicit. Me I.tw- ’■*' ■" *1- juts' ^ ^ *• 1 »r«'vvido s-inch a
into Assam "when there is not a doubt that the inhabitants of the 
country would rise in all directions upon the Burmese, who do not at
present exeed 1000 men, and cut them off in detailn .^ In a private letter
to Swinton, Scott put it, **the best and cheapest defence of this frontier 
would be the invasion of Assam”-^. Even if the existing differences^ with 
the Burmese Court were adjusted by negotiations, the evacuation of Assam 
by the Burmese "should be insisted upon as a sine qua non - were it 
even at the expense of our paying to them the annual tribute they at 
present deprive from that country, and which does not probably exceed a 
lack of rupees"^. Should force be needed to evict the Burmese from Assam 
Scott thought that eight to nine hundred infantry, two risalas of
irregular cavalry, six field pieces, and a few battering guns "in case
of accidents" would suffice. Of no less interest were Scott’s comments
1. B.S.P.C. 31 Oct. 1823, no. 15. Swinton to Scott, 31 Oct. 1823.
2. B.S.P.C. 14 Nov. 1823, no. 13. Scott to Swinton, 31 Oct. 1823.
3. B.S.P.C. 14 Nov. 1823, ao. 16. Scott to Swinton, 31 Oct. 1823.
4. The Sahapuri and other incidents on the Chittagong border.
5. B.S.P.C. 14 Nov. 1823, no. 16. Scott’s private letter to Swinton,
31 Oct. 1823.
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upon what should be done after the Burmese had been evicted, peacefully 
or otherwise, from Assam* Scott assumed that native ruler whoever might 
seem to have the best claim to be raja would be installed* But he did not 
believe that a satisfactory administration would emerge without British 
tutelage* "The imbecility, rapacity and barbarous cruelty of the Assam 
native administration having always been remarkable even amongst Asiatic
. • i  i  *
states", he held out little hope "that such rulers Si ould improve in 
the art of governing when relieved from the risk of *.* rebellion or 
foreign invasion." He therefore urged the need to provide such a ruler 
with a subsidiary force, or with officefe to discipline the native Assamese 
forces* He also pressed that the Company should insist upon a rigid ob­
servance of the commercial treaty of 1793, "owing to the infringement of 
which a great loss is sustained to the British merchants and also by the 
government in a diminished demand for Bengal salt occasioned by the 
exorbitant price to which it is now raised.nl Finally Scott urged, with 
passion, that the Company should, from the first avow its right to inter-
fere in the internal administration of the country.
excelled h\ ■*& Hiifm ntnrrScott, in a most Interesting passage, attacked the wisdom of
past treaties of subsidiary alliance under which such interference had
i
been excluded. "Policy and justice alike require an open and previously
understood departure from the principle that has hitherto formed the basis ,
1
of our tributary alliances, viz* that we shall not interfere in the ,
• A  f i t t J i h  a r f  ; O n '  t V •• w  *  *’-=-••• I
internal administration of the dependent prince. This principle of the
international law of the European states appears to be founded upon a
consideration of the nature of the Feudal and Representative Governments
         ._________
1. B.S.P.C. 14 Nov. 1823, no. 16. Scott to Swinton, 31 Oct. 1823.
2. I bid.
. 1
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of that portion of the globe, which sufficiently provided against any 
gross mismanagement on the part of the dependent Ally and rendered un­
necessary the interference of the Protecting state”* But in India, where 
the Company was dealing with despotic governments - and Assam was a 
very bad example - "the impracticality of reconciling the actual ob­
servance of this system with the plainest dictates of justice and 
humanity, has repeatedly forced the British government to acts of at 
least a questionable colour.” Better, then, Scott argued, establish 
the right to interfere.*
Scott's arguments might not have carried much weight with 
Calcutta had not events in Cachar and Manipur increased the tension.
These two petty states had known no peace for years. Manipur had been 
forced to acknowledge Burmese suzerainty in 1812. Cachar, under a 
succession of weak rulers had become an easy prey to invasions from Mani­
pur and Jayantla. In the early years of the century the rulers of Manipur
ictlcit guarantee *■-%' Gofeind Cha*••&•'<< ?.y * v-s*! '* #^4 ■ >v;. I * d
had fled to Cachar whenever they were seriously threatened by the 
Burmese^, and in 1823 the legitimate ruler of Cachar Gobind Chandra was 
expelled by Manipuri adventurers. Gobind Chandra had thereupon appealed 
to the Burmese for help.
i
In November 1823 a Burmese force began concentrating at Gauhati, 
and Scott, fearing they were destined for an advance into Cachar, warned 
the Burmese on 24 November that an alliance existed between the English i
and Cachar-^. On 28 November Amherst gave Scott authority to move troops
1. B.S.P.C. 14 Nov. 1823, no. 16. Scott's private letter to Swinton,
31 Oct. 1823.
2. See J.M. Roy, The History of Manipur, pp. 63-68.
3. B.S.P.C. 12 Dec. 1823, no. 3. Scott to Burmese officer commanding,
24 Nov. 1823.
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from Sylhet into Cachar if his warning went unheeded** On 1 December 
Scott repeated his warning in the governor-general* s name2. On 15 December 
news was sent by Bruce at Gauhati of three thousand Burmese troops 
ha vine advanced.-*
Scott, forwarding this news to Calcutta, outlined the political 
or military measures which he thought might be taken. His first proposal 
was for a military advance up river towards Assam to compel the Burmese 
to abandon their movement into Cachar. His second was for an alliance 
with the ruler of Jaip)it ci . His third was for a joint Anglo-Burmese 
guarantee of the independence of Gobind Chandra, as ruler of Cachar11.
To this news government reacted first by expressing some doubt as to the 
reality of the reported move on Cachar or at least as to its seriousness, 
and then by giving a reluctant permission to take the proposed military 
measures, but only if matters came to extremities. The proposal for a 
joint guarantee of Gobind Chandra was disallowed since it would give to 
the Burmese that very right to interfere in Cachar which it was wished to 
prevent^#
Meanwhile, on 14 January 1824, Scott hearing of a continuing 
Burmese advance had ordered Major Cooper to advance up river towards 
Goalpara, and had himself set off for Sylhet^. By the 19th Scott was 
reporting a first clash with Burmese f o r c e s a t  Bikrampur, in which the
I. B.S.P.C.
00 Nov. 1823, no. 6, Swinton to Scott, 28 Nov. 1823*
2. B.S.P.C. 2nd Jan. 1824, no. 14, Scott to Swinton, 15 Dec. 1823<
3. B.S.P.C. 9 Jan. 1824, no. 1, Scott to Swinton, 19 Dec. 1823.
4. Ibid.
no. 6 , Swinton to Scott, 17 Jan. 1824.5. B.S.P.C. 17 Jan. 1824,
6. B.S*P•C. 30 Jan. 1824, no.17, Scott to Swinton, 14 Jan. 1824.
7. B.S.P.C. 30 Jan. 1824, nos.8-9, Scott to Swinton, 19 Jan. 1824
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Company's troops had won the day* Scott sought to press the advantage, 
diplomatic as well as military, by advancing into Assam, but though 
Scott was authorised to expell the Burmese from Cachar whilst the season 
was still favourable, he was told not to commit the Company to an attack 
on Assam1* On 22 January, after moving from Sylhet to BadaJ^ur, Scott
opened communications with the Burmese commander, requesting him to with-
o
draw from Cachar .
On the 23rd he wrote to the Burmese commander requesting him 
to withdraw from Cachar^. On the 25th he privately wrote to Swinton for 
the reinforcements he obviously hoped would have to be used* His mind was 
also actively considering the advantages of seizing the southern bank of 
the Brahmaputra as far as Gauhati, and of constructing a road thence to 
link up with Sylhet\ On 1st February he received the Burmese commander's 
reply, declaring that his orders were to pursue the ManipurIans into 
English territory if they were not surrendered^. On the 2nd Scott warned 
them against any advance, and threatened action against Assam should they 
move* Meanwhile, having warned the Burmese that Ja>vntia was under 
British protection^, Scott was busy threatening the raja of that territory 
to prevent his submitting to them^.
1* B.S.P.C* 30 Jan, 1824, nos. 13-14, Scotts private letter to Swinton,
20 Jan. 1824 and Swinton's reply, 27 Jan. 1824.
2. B.S.P.C. 6 Feb* 1824, no. 6 , Scott to Swinton, 25 Jan. 1824.
3. B.S.P.C. 13 Feb. 1824, no. 9, Scott to Burmese commander, 23 Jan. 1824,
4. B.S.P.C. 6 Feb. 1824, no. 6 , Scott to Swinton, 25 Jan. 1824.
5. B.S.P.C. Translation of a letter from the Burmese chief commanding
Mlngi Maha Nanda Kroden. B.S.P.C. 13 Feb. 1824, no. 7*
6. B.S.P.C. 13 Feb. 1824, no. 9, Scott to Burmese commander, 2 Feb.1824.
7. B.S.P.C. 13 Feb. 1824, no. 8, Scott to Swinton, 3 Feb. 1824.
The Burmese claimed to have inherited suzerainty over 
^Jaintia from the Assam ruler.
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On the 6th February Scott wrote another long and detailed 
analysis of the danger threatening Bengal while the Burmese were allowed 
to hold Assam. Calling upon the experience of Symes’ embassy to Ava* 
he painted a vivid and alarming picture of Burmese war boats speeding 
to the plunder of monsoon innundated Bengali villages. Against such 
enemies no defence was possible - except their expulsion from their base 
in Assam^* By the 10th Amherst and his council were so far convinced 
of the inevitability of war that they wrote to Bombay and Madras asking 
for their military support2. On that day Scott asked for permission to 
set in motion the advance from Goalpara-*.
After rejecting all Assamese appeals for aid in 1820 they had 
come by stages first to permit unofficial countenance of arms running 
and invasion, then to a more positive belief in the need to encourage the 
Assamese to expel the Burmese invaders and the Cacharis to stand against 
them\ and finally to accept Scott’s arguments for an advance into Lower 
Assam. Swinton in November 1823 reported that government had admitted 
that a British advance to Gauhati and the occupation of the valley be­
tween Gauhati and Goalpara was necessary "even as a measure of defensive 
policy”5. Scott in his letter to the Burmese commander in Cachar could at
*. Bodawpayna's conquests had created a frontier situation necessiating 
British political intercourse with Burma and Captain Michael Symes was 
the first of the three envoys who were sent to Ava in the eighteenth 
century. Symes visited Ava both in 1795 and in 1802 (Cambridge History 
of India, vol. V, p. 559). In his An account of an embassy to the 
Kingdom of Ava in the year 1795 Symes gives a vivid picture of the 
well-equipped Burmese war boats and their "extremely impetuous" attack. 
He says: "By far the most respectable part of the Birman military 
force is their establishment of war-boats." 
see Lt.-Col Michael Symes, cp clb,, vol. II, pp. 58-60.
1. B.S.P.C. 13 Feb.1824, no.16, Scott to Swinton, 6 Feb.1824.
2. B.S.P.C. 13 Feb.1824,nos.1,2,3* Counsil’s letter to Presidencies,
10 Feb.1824.
3. B.S.P.C. 20 Feb.1824, no. 7, Scott to Swinton, 10 Feb. 1824.
4. B.S.P.C. 14 Nov. 1823,no.17, Swinton to Scott, 17 Nov. 1823.
5. B.S.P.C. 13 Feb.1824, no.17, Swinton to Scott, 13 Feb. 1824.
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last boldly say: "Hitherto you have experienced the advantage of being 
at peace with us, now, if you insist upon war you will also taste its 
bitter fruits"*.
On 20 February 1824, a resolution of the governor-^eneral-in - 
Council, reviewing Burmese actions in Arakan, Cachar and Assam declared 
that they "must be regarded as having placed the two countries in a state 
of actual war". They further resolved "that the force assembled at 
Gowalpara be ordered to advance upon Gauhati ... to expel the enemy from
oJc
the commanding position which they occupyAthe upper part of the Brahma­
putra". They had at last been convinced by Scott that only thus could 
Bengal be safeguarded^. On 5 March war was publicly declared and on the 
13th the British forces moved forward from their camp at Goalpara under 
the^ommand of Lt.-Col. George MacMorine'*.
Scott played a great part in planning and carrying out the 
military operations during the Burmese war. Even after war had been de­
clared and the troops set in motion.it was the civilian Scott who guided 
the advance of the force;supplying information regarding the state of
roads, the possibility of obtaining supplies, and the attitude of the
4
local people of the country.
1. H.H. Wilson, op.cit., Document no. 22 (d)
2. B.S.P.C. 20 Feb. 1824, no. 13* Resolution of the Governor-General- in
Council, 20 Feb. 1824; B.S.P.C. 20 Feb. 1824, no. 15, Swinton to Scott 
20 Feb. 1824; H.H. Wilson, op.cit., pp.28-33, Documents nos.28-29#
3# H.H. Wilson: - Historical sketch of the Burmese war, p. 18.
4. Lt. Col. J. MacMorine was in regular correspondence with Scott. "I
feel extremely obliged" he wrote, "by your kind and free communi­
cations and suggestions on the subject which your knowledge of the 
country and people renders you of course more capable of forming a 
correct judgement on the means to be employed than what I can possibly 
devise ... MacMorine to Scott, 10 Feb. 1824, B.S.P.C. 12 March 
1824, no. 17; Hoipe Misc., vol. 662, pp. 434-9*
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In all his despatches about the Burmese in Assam Scott had 
shown himself keenly aware of the strength and weaknesses of the 
Company’s defences, and particularly concerned about the Burmese naval 
threat to Eastern Bengal* Scott had visualised three possible Burmese 
invasion routes: the first from Manipur by Tipperah and Cachar; the second
I
by Cachar and Jaiyvtia and the third from Assam by the Brahmaputra1. From 
the first route he expected little danger, since it ran through jungle 
almost impenetrable at any season of the year, and with the minimum of 
British military support could be defended by the inhabitants of Tipperah. 
The second and the third routes needed immediate attention. To the 
military commander Lt. Col. MacMorine he wrote of the third route, down 
the Brahmaputra, WI must confess that after mature reflection on this 
subject during the course of several years I am unable to devise any 
effectual and readily practicable means of meeting it other than that of 
expelling the Burmese from the upper part of the river”2. That was be­
cause the Burmese war canoes with a speed of 8-10 miles an hour, once 
they had broken through the Company’s flotilla at Goalpara could never be 
caught by British gunboats with a speed of only k to 5 miles an hour.'*
When in February the Government ordered an advance from Goalpara up the ; 
Assam valley they were putting into practice the measure so often urged 
by Scott to meet the greatest Burmese threat. The subsequent military 
operations, as Scott had foreseen, put paid to any possible Burmese thrust 
down the Brahmaputra.
1. B.S.P.C. 13 Feb. 1824, no. 16, Scott to MacMorine, 6 Feb. 1824.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
I
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But Scott, while assisting the successful military advance up 
the Brahmaputra did not cease to try to ward off the other danger he had 
foreseen - that of a Burmese advance through Cachar and Jaintia. Here 
his chosen method was diplomatic. On 6 March he concluded a treaty with 
Raja Gobind Chandra of Cachar, by which the latter placed Cachar under 
British protection.1 On the 10th he secured a similar treaty with Raja
Ram Singh of Jaintia, the raja promisidng to give his military support
o
to the Company by advancing to attack the Burmese east of Gauhati. On 
the 20th Scott agreed with Raja Gambhir Singh of Manipur to supply him
3
with arms for the recovery of Manipur from the Burmese. On the 21st and
24th Scott made arrangements with raja of Khyrim and Sulang, one of the
rulers of the Khasi hills, for the passage of Scott and his troops
through the hills to Gauhati, the raja opening a dak route and improving
4
the road in return for a small jagir. To all these efforts to secure the
A
eastern flank of Bengal and Sylhet - efforts made in the midst of active 
military preparations - the governor-general-in-council accorded a 
gratified approval. Scott also sought to use Assamese dislike of the 
Burmese. He had assured the government of the likelihood of Assamese sup-
jdj
port and received sanction for appeals to them to rise.^He had hopes also of
r
1 Treaty with Cachar made by David Scott on 6 March 1824.
B.S.P.C. 2 Apr. 1824, no. 7f
2 Treaty with Jaintia. B.S.P.C. 2 Apr. 1824, nos. 8-9*
3 B.S.P.C. 2 Apr. 1824, no. 22, Scott to Swinton, 20 March 1824.
4 B.S.P.C. 2 Apr. 1824, nos. 10 and 16, Scott*s private letter to
Swinton of 21 March 1824 and of 24 March 1824.
5 B.S.P.C. 2 Apr. 1824, no. 13, Swinton to Scott, 2 Apr. 1824.
6 In a proclamation to the Assamese soon after the British troops
entered the territory of Assam Scott recounted the miserable con­
dition of the local inhabitants under the Burmese rule of terror and 
sought to incite the Assamese to wreak vengeance on the remnant of 
those who had caused them so many calamities, by helping the British 
army.
Home Misc., vol. 662, pp. 169-175o
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securing the services of other tribes such as the Singphos and Khamtis.
Col* MacMorine on 13 March led his troops from Goalpara towards
Gauhati along both banks of the Brahmaputra. At this time Scott’s early
presence in Assam had been declared an ’object of the highest importance’
for the government. Scott therefore prepared to leave Sylhet for the 
2
Assam valley* His flank-march with an escort of three companies of the
23rd Native Infantry over the Jaintia hills formed Scott’s chief con-
3
tribution to the campaign. He secured co-operation in this march of the 
raja of Jaintia and his brother-in-law Esang Kunwar\ and was much 
assisted by Durgaram Khound, a one-time Khargharia Phukan (one in charge 
of magazine), whose local knowledge of the Nowgong area was to prove 
invaluable and who later showed great courage when employed by the
5
intelligence department. By 14 April Scott had reached Raha chowki and 
he thereupon set off for Kaliabar, hoping to link up with Colonel 
MacMorine’s force and prevent any return of the Burmese who had withdrawn 
when the raja of Jaintia’s forces advanced.^ On 15 April he arrived at 
Nowgong, seventy-five miles up river from Gauhati.
Nowgong was then one of the largest towns in Assam, extending 
for some seven miles along both banks of the Kalang river, and containing
1 B.S.P.C. 12 March 1824, no. 23, Swinton to Scott, 12 March 1824.
2 B.S.P.C. 2 March 1824, no. 12, Scott to Swinton,
3 E.B. Shaw, The First Burmese War and the British Conquest of Assam. 
Assam Review, May 1928, p. 16. The long-term importance of Scott’s 
march was that it led to the British occupation of the Khasi hills.
4 B.S.P.C. 30 Nov. 1827, no. 4, Scott to Sterling, 11 Sept. 1826.
5 B.S.P.C. 16 Nov. 1827, nos. 48-49, Scott to Swinton, 10 S ept. 1827.
6 B.S.P.C. 7 May 1824, no. 6, Scott to Swinton, 14 Apr. 1824.
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some four thousand families.* Here in Nowgong, which was and still is, 
the granary of Assam, Scott first learnt about the paik system^ of labour 
contributions to the State and immediately took advantage of the system 
by commuting the service of 500 of the existing paiks in return for the 
supply of 4000 maunds of rice* The remaining crown paiks were asked to 
clean, store and to take care of this rice as their labour service.^
Not content with these immediate practical measures, Scott was 
soon assessing the strategic importance of Nowgong. On 16 April he wrote 
to Calcutta recommending that the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment 
should be posted at Nowgong both with reference to the expediency of 
keeping up a sufficient force in Assam and also because the town was 
likely to prove much more healthy and better provisioned than any other 
part of the frontier. The cantonment for the troops, he pointed out, 
would be built by the paiks without any expense to the Company. Scott made 
the further point that the maintenance of a body of troops at Nowgong was 
also required on account of the marriage ties between the Burmese and many 
of the chief inhabitants, whose wives, daughters and female relations had 
been given to, or forcibly taken by the Burmese conquerors. In consequence 
of this state of things the chief people of Nowgong,were, Scott thought, 
perhaps less inclined to a change of masters than those in any other
considerable district in Assam.^ The general masses, Scott reported, felt
5
the utmost satisfaction at the arrival of the British troops.
1. B.S.P.C. 7 May 1824, no. 7, Scott to Swinton, 16 Apr. 1824.
2. See Lrtfrajchapter IV. p;
3. B.S.P.C. 7 May 1824, no. 7, Scott to Swinton, 16 Apr. 1824.
4. Ibid.
5 . Ibid.
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The first phase of the campaign in Assam ended in July when
Col* Richards, who had succeeded to the command in Assam^ returned to
Gauhati after the Burmese retreat to Maramukh. Up to this time the result
had been decidedly in favour of the English*
Throughout this period, as government had requested^Scott had
been in constant touch with Col* Richards, pouring out ideas and
suggestions* He had ordered the building of cantonments at Nowgong^, he
3
urged the procurement of Tibetan mules , Assamese bullocks or Dangar
4
porters of Ranghar for the next advance into Upper Assam or the invasion 
of Burma* But throughout July and August his great preoccupation came to 
be with Col* Richards himself, who wished to retire upon Gauhati after 
his success* Scott pressed for the continuance of the corps at Raha 
chowky, whence the newly liberated Assamese could be protected from
5
Burmese revenge and the invasion route to Cachar could be blocked. To 
this, however, Col* Richards could not be persuaded to agree, despite 
Scott’s appeals to him and to Swinton. Scott feared that all would be 
undone by the British withdrawal of their protecting forces, and he later 
expressed his belief that if Col. Richards had advanced soon after the 
occupation of Gauhati,the greater part of Assam could have been cleared 
of the enemy - their numbers and their equipment being in no way formid­
able* A forward march, he thought, would also have effectively prevented 
the enemy from recruiting their finances by contributions levied from
1* On 30 May Brig. MacMorine died of cholera and Col. Richards took 
the charge of C.in C.
2. B.S.P.C. 7 May 1824, no. 7, Scott to Swinton, 16 Apr. 1824.
3. B.S.P.C. 1 Oct. 1824, nos. 26-27, Scott to Swinton, 10 Sept. 1824.
4* B.S.P.C. 9 Apr. 1824, no. 5, Scott to Swinton, 28 March 1824.
5. B.S.P.C. 23 July 1824, nos. 9-10.
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Nowgong and elsewhere.^ He was particularly unhappy about Richard*7 de­
cision to withdraw because it upset his plans for the establishment of 
commercial links with the country to the east of Assam. Even at this 
very early stage, Scott had opened up relations with the hereditary 
chiefs of Burmese-held Mogaon by sending Assamese messengers to his court* 
A withdrawal now would destroy the favourable impression Scott had made 
and destroy all hopes of future trade relations.2
The government had recognized, before hostilities had begun, 
that any advance into Assam would commit them to supporting its inhabit­
ants against the Burmese.-^ But,as their enquiries from Scott made clear, 
they had in mind that such protection should be afforded by means of a 
defensive alliance with one of the Ahom princes. This Scott opposed : 
any declaration on the subject of setting up a native prince in Assam, 
he argued, was 11 premature and impolitic*' as it would discourage the 
people who had lost all confidence in their chiefs, "their imbecility,
i!
cowardice and treacherous principles having been so fully developed in
the last contest so as to remain no longer concealed even to the meanest 
u
peasant". Scott also strongly urged the annexation of the southern 
bank of the Brahmaputra as far as Raha chowky on the border of Cachar,
so as to seal off the invasion routed into Cachar.^
1* Home Misc. , vol. 663, pp. 755-765* Scott to Swinton, 16 Oct. 1824;
B.S.P.C. 29 Oct. 1824, nos. 25-26.
2. B.S.P.C. 29 Oct. 1824, nos. 25-26, Scott to Swinton, 16 Oct. 1824.
3. B.S . P. C. 17 Jan. 1824, no. 6, Swinton to Scott.
4. B.S.P.C. 20 Feb. 1824, no. 7, Scott to Swinton, 10 Feb. 1824.
5. Ibid.
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Scott* s views on the inadvisability of any commitment to the 
Ahom princes "much divided among themselves, and ... generally obnoxious 
to the body of the people”, were accepted* So, after the occupation of 
Gauhati, was his desire to see Lower Assam occupied. Early in October, 
therefore Col# Richards was ordered to resume his advance from Gauhati, 
his task "the conquest of Assam and the entire expulsion of the Burmese"# 
Scott, for his part was to win over the Singphos and other hill tribes and 
to establish an administration - revenue, police and judicial - in the 
wake of the advancing army.* By mid-January 1825 Col. Richards forces 
had reached Jorhat and before the end of the month the Burmese had 
surrendered their fort at Rangpore and thus virtually abandoned Assam to 
British control.2
- ■    —    ■ ■■ — -  ■ ■ ■    ■ ■■ ■ ■ ■    —  --------------------------------------------------
1# Resolution of the Governor General in Council on 8 Oct. 1824.
B.S.P.C. 8 Oct. 1824, no. 4.
2. B.S.P.C. 18 Jan. 1825, nos. 4 and 7, Richards to Scott, 19 Jan. 1825 
and 29 Jan# 1825*
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CHAPTER IV
THE MILITARY DEFENCE OF THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF ASSAM
AND THE QUESTION OF AN AHQM RESTORATION
( 1 )
Tranquillisation of the eastern frontier of Assam
With the fall of Rangpore on 31 January, 1825, the expulsion 
of the Burmese and the lifting of their threat to Bengal was virtually 
completed.* From that date onwards it became possible to create first 
a provisional and then a more settled administration for lower Assam, 
now firmly occupied by British forces. To that task Scott was to apply 
himself, first as joint commissioner with Lt. Col. Richards, and from 
1826, as sole commissioner for Assam.
But Scott was not left undisturbed in the task of creating a 
civil administration, for the expulsion of the Burmese did not of it­
self bring tranquillity to all Assam. The collapse and overthrow of
Ofi' 7 t* 1  f l f  i \  - t H  ? !*' V :.‘- life : * 11 H O  : Kt't, i ® * - . »4 A  *'■ ■ H I ®
Ahom administration in upper Assam had made possible the grasping of
power by other tribal groups. The first to challenge Ahom authority,
had been the Moamariqs.2 They occupied the south bank of the Brahmaputra,
from Sadiya to the Burhri Dihing, in the modem district of Dibrugarh, 
      —    — ,
1 For the enemy held no other fortified position in the province.
2 For the early history of the Moamarias see S.O. Hannay, A short
account of the Moa-Morah Sect and of the country occupied by the
Bor Senapattee. India Office Mss.Eur. D 517.
and though they were regarded as true Assamese, they had been dis­
tinguished, ever since the Hinduisation* of the Assam tribes, by their 
devotion to the religious tenets of a Guru who had denounced Brahmanism 
and taught a form of Vaisnavism1. It was their rebellion in the 1790's 
against Raja Gaurinath Singh, which had "contributed so largely to the 
fall of the Ahom power".2 But the turmoil they created was promptly 
used by another tribal group, that of the Singphos, regarded as a 
western branch of the Kachins of the Hukawng valley, who crossed into 
the head of the Assam valley and settled between the Pat^koi range and 
the river* The Singphos, a warlike tribe added their ravages to those 
of the Burmese, and helped to depopulate upper Assam.^ A second in­
vading people, the Khamtis came from a shan state beyond the Patkoi 
range, and though of the same stock as the Ahoms were distinguished from 
them by being Buddhists.^ They first emigrated from their native hills 
during the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the Ahom ruler 
gave them permission to settle on the banks of the Tengapani. But during
* Since the reign of Gadadhar Singha in 1681 the Ahoms had been active­
ly patronising Saktaism as opposed to the Vaisnavite form of Hinduism* 
The reforming zeal of the Vaisn^va preachers, who took the lead in the
act of conversion, extended only to the inhabitants of the duars, and
did not reach the hill tribes in the hinterland*
See S.K. Bhuyan, Anglo-Assamese Relations. 1771-1826. pp. 18 and 33* •
1 B.S.P.C. 17 March 1826, no. 25, Capt. Neufville's Epitome of the
geographical and political information respecting the tract of
country in Upper Assam beyond Rungpore ; B.S.P.C. 10 June 1825,
no. 26, Neufville to Scott 15 April I825f W. Robinson, A Discriptive
Account of Assam, p. 326.
2 Physical and Political Geography of the Province of Assam, p. 71.
3 See S.F. Hannay, Sketch of the Singphos or the Kakhyens of Burma.
p . 44«
k Physical and Political Geography of the Province of Assam, pp. 222-3.
5. Ibid, p. 226.
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the troubled reign of Raja Gaurinath they made several irruptions into 
Sadiya district and at length ejected the ruling chieftain, the Sadiya 
Khowa Gohain, usurping his title and jurisdiction and reducing the 
Assamese to dependence and slavery* The troubles of the Burmese inva­
sions merely gave them the opportunity to extend their plundering.* As
a result of all these invasions and usurpations the lands to the east 
of Rangpore, along both banks of the Brahmaputra had been largely laid 
waste and left to the encroachment of deep jungle.2
All this area had so far remained untouched by British troops,
and the reduction of the tribes to peaceful subjection and allegiance 
to the Company had still to be effected. When in March 1825 Assamese 
from upper Assam approached Scott for help against Singpho and Khamti 
depradations, he therefore despatched Captain Neufville, with Col. 
Richard^^ concurrence, to occupy Sadiya and oust the Singphos.^ A 
further extension of the British frontier, with all the complications 
w h i c h  that must entail, was in the making.
For accurate information about the tribes of upper Assam Scott
' useful-a |
relied much on the information supplied by Neufville. Neufville main­
tained a regular journal recording the geographical and political 
features of this tract, including also the "barren, desolate and jungle-
covered" foothills of the present North-East Frontier Agency. The Mlris,
   '* i
1 B.S.P.C. 10 June 1825, no. 26, Neufville to Scott, 15 April 1825;
W. Robinson, op.cit*, p. 364.
2 B.S.P.C. 10 June 1825, no. 26, Neufville to Scott, 15 April 1825.
3 B.S.P.C. 15 April 1825, nos. 13-14, Scott to Richards, 9 March 1825
and Scott to Swinton 10 March 1825.
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one of the tribes of this area, he described as a "nearly barbarous 
hill race, rudely armed with bows and arrows, and differing altogether 
in language, appearance and habits from the inhabitants of Assam proper," 
though "quiet and inoffensive*”* But even before Neufville1s advance, 
Scott had been considering what British relations with the people of the 
frontier tract of Assam might be. He was convinced that though hostile 
to the Burmese they would be incapable of effective resistance to those 
invaders "without a complete alteration in their intellectual and social 
condition which it must be a work of time to effect." On the other 
hand their history of bloodshed, rapine and political instability would 1 
make it too dangerous to the settled lowlanders for the British to put 
such arms into their hands as would render them really formidable to the 
Burmese and capable of themselves undertaking the defence of the border. 
Indeed, Scott’s first thinking was about how to coerce them into order, 
and for a while he even thought of using Burmese prisoners for control
of the frontier tribes : "Upon the conclusion of peace I would propose
*1168 x o t  Vi *•.%® t i c o r  a f t e r i o r ? * *  » ■ v • *
to settle prisoners as cultivators in the lower part of Assam or in the
pergana of Mechpara ...... they might hereafter prove useful as a
militia to be employed against the Garos, Daflas*, and other tribes in­
habiting almost inaccessible country with whom we are now likely to have , 
dispute.
— ---------------------------------------  — - — — ---------------------------------------------- — —   ----------------------
1 B.S.P.C. 10 June 1825, no. 26, Neufville to Scott, 15 April 1825.
2 B.S.P.C. 26 Nov. 1824, no. 11, Scott to Swinton, 9 Nov. 1824.
3 B.S.P.C. 3 Dec. 1824, no. 8, Scott to Swinton, 17 Nov. 1824.
* The Daflas occupy a vast stretch of hills and forest which roughly 
covers the western half of the subansiri division of the present 
North-East Frontier Agency. See B.K. Shukla ^ The Daf las .
4 Home Misc. vol. 673, pp. 729-30, Scott to Swinton, 14 March 1825.
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But no breathing space was ever given for the working out with 
government of such plans, for in March 1825 came news that seven thousand 
five hundred Singphos, some six hundred and sixty of them armed with 
muskets, had assembled at the mouth of the Nao-Dihing and formed canton­
ments* The two Assamese who had brought this news also reported the 
plundering of the districts of Sessi, Dhimaji and Bardolani, the driving
off of the cattle and enslavement of the inhabitants**
ours,
Scott was in no doubt that action was absolutely necessary. The 
strategic posts at Borhat, Jaypur and Sadiya must be guarded and the 
Assamese inhabitants of upper Assam protected. "The abandonment of that 
part of the country near Sadiya", he wrote, "would necessarily most 
seriously injure our reputation and character for good faith besides 
entailing ruin and misery upon thousands whom we are bound to protect,.,, 
and deprive us in the event of there being a necessity for a second 
campaign £  against the Burmese 3  aH  the local influence and facili-
p
ties for ulterior operations." The immediate task, as Scott and 
Neufville both saw, was to liberate the hundreds of Assamese captives. 
Neufville was asked to give every encouragement to such of the Singpho 
chiefs who might desire to enter into negotiations upon the basis of 
releasing all the Assamese captives taken since the date of the capitu- 
lation of Rungpore, each chief being asked to provide hostages for ful­
fillment of his engagements.3 Meanwhile Neufville pressed forward, for
1 B.S.P.C. 15 April 1825, no, 3, Scott to Swinton, 25 March 1825.
2 B.S.P.C. 20 May 1825, no. 24, Scott to Swinton, 30 April 1825.
3 B.S.P.C. 20 May 1825, nos. 23-24, Scott to Neufville, 8 April 1825
and Scott to Swinton, 30 April 1825;
B.S.P.C. 27 May 1825, no. 63, Scott to Neufville, 2 May 1825.
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if the Singphos, anticipating defeat, emigrated to the hills - after 
reaping the approaching harvest - all endeavour to free the Assamese 
would prove fruitless.1 When it was realised that the sale value of 
each slave, averaging through all ages and both sexes, was from twenty 
to eighty rupees, and that each Singpho was probably possessed of forty 
or sixty captives it was scarcely to be doubted that the Singphos would 
make every effort to get them away to the markets of their hill neigh­
bours. ^
Happily Neufville received the immediate help of the Khamtis 
and when he reached Sadiya a number of Singpho chiefs also showed a 
conciliatory attitude.^ Some Singphos who had turned plunderers during 
the Burmese invasions, when the only alternatives were to plunder others 
or to be plundered, now wished to settle down.^ But Neufville was also 
aided by a sudden outbreak of hostility between two of the Singpho 
chiefs9 Beesa Gam and Daffa Gam, whom he was able to play off one against 
the other.After military operations in the territories of both these 
chiefs, Neufville*s superiority in arms and strategy led at the close of
• I
1825 to the submission of a number of leading chiefs, Beesa Gam included, 
and the liberation of no less than six thousand Assamese captives. 
Neufville had inspired the Singphos with a real dread of British mili­
tary prowess, and of the capacity of the Company*s forces "to overcome
1 B.S.P.C. 10 June 1825, no. 25, Scott to Swinton, 22 May 1825.
2 B.S.P.C. 2 Sept. 1825, no. 23, Neufville to Scott, 2 Aug. 1825.
3 B.S.P.C. 20 May 1825, no. 26, Neufville to Capt. Martin, 13 Apr.1825
4 B «S . P. C. 10 June 1825, no. 26, Neufville to Scott, 18 May 1825.
5 B.S.P.C. 20 May 1825, no. 26, Neufville to Scott, 13 Apr. 1825.
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the discouraging localities of the country.
Early in 1826 Scott visited Sadiya and entered into formal 
engagements with sixteen out of the twenty eight Singpho chiefs. The 
chiefs promised their allegiance to the Company and abjured all 
connections with the Burmese or any other foreign power; they undertook 
to act agreeably to the orders of the British government in political 
matters; promised to supply the British troops with rice and other 
necessaries, to make roads and ghats for them, and to make such re­
sistance as might be required in case of foreign invasion; agreed to re- 
lease all Assamese captives detained by them, and to arrest and deliver 
any Singpho who might seek shelter in their territories after committing 
depredations on the Assamese# They also promised to deliver into the 
custody of the political agent a son or a nephew or a brother as hostage# 
In return Scott promised British protection and freedom from revenue 
dues. They would also be left to administer justice in their respective 
villages, according to former custom, and to settle disputes among their 
dependants, with the provision that should any quarrel take place be-
I ■
tween villages they would not take recourse to arms but refer the matter
2
to the British authorities for a decision#
*yrv-. vv « -* J. V LA C* u«. V ■-*
To the twelve chiefs who had failed to attend the meeting, -I
.
Scott issued a proclamation inviting them to come down from the hills
il
within two months and to subscribe to the agreement taken from the rest
1 B.S.P.C. 14 July 1826, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 12 June 1826.
2 B.S.P.C. 14 July 1826, no. 10, Scott to Swinton, 12 June 1826.
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of the tribe* They were threatened that if they failed to do so their 
properties would be confiscated and they would be expelled from Assam 
altogether* *
The execution and strategy of the advance to Sadiya and the 
reduction of the Singpho strongholds had been Neufville*s : it was his 
energy, ability and intrepidity, aided by the efforts of the Khamti 
auxilaries and the Assamese captives themselves which had so quickly 
lifted the Singpho terror* With the restoration of order, however, Scott 
had to consider under what plan that order should in future be main­
tained*
While Neufville was subduing the Singphos, Scott in April 1825 
had been suggesting to the Calcutta authorities the possibility of 
granting stipends to some of the more influential chiefs in return for
. :r«Al OqiiH 2 Vj ■ „ *■% ; • w . • ’ *-V •
their defending the passes through the mountains to the south-east, and
in return for their prevention of any raids upon the lowlands. As an
example of what might be done he referred to the similar measures adopted
2
by Cleveland in the Bhagalpur hills. Scott also thought of settling 
various Singpho chiefs in the plains, where whole tracts were lying 
waste. With such tangible and increasingly valuable possessions he hoped 
they would reform their predatory habits. Useful employment might be 
given to the more restless part of the community by establishing a corps 
upon the same plan as that of the Bhagalpur rangers,or by incorporating 
a certain number of men furnished by each chief with the Rungpore Light
1 B.S.PoC. Ik July 1826, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 12 June 1826.
2 BoS.P.C. 20 May 1825, no. 23, Scott to Neufville, 8 Apr. 1825*
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Infantry.1
In June 1826, after his visit to Sadiya, Scott sent his re­
vised plans to Swinton. Firstly, considering the remoteness of the 
situation from the British head quarters in Assam, and the incongruous 
and conflicting interests of the petty chiefs, Scott thought that a 
European officer ought to be permanently posted in Sadiya with one other 
European assistant. These officers, who should have both civil and 
military powers, would organise and gradually increase the military 
resources of the country to prevent any recurrence of predatory in­
cursions in future. They would also have an opportunity closely to study 
the problems of the tribes.^ Scott was careful to stress to government 
that the latter object could not be effected by means of a succession of 
officers incidentally detached in command of the post. Such officers would 
necessarily be unacquainted with local politics and circumstances, and 
with the language of the interpreters, and consequently be liable to be 
misled "by the artful misrepresentations of interested persons.*1^  This 
point was a very important one, wherever sympathetic understanding of 
tribal peoples had to be achieved. A modern work on the North-West 
Frontier makes, from experiences just the same point : "what was wanted 
was that British officers should deal directly with the tribes, win their 
confidence, and inspire respect". But the author comments that even the 
successful officers "were not exempt from the possibility of a sudden
1 B.S.P.C. 20 May 1825, no. 24, Scott to Swinton, 30 Apr. 1825;
B.S.P.C. 27 May 1825, no. 63, Scott to Neufville, 2 May 1825.
2 B.S.P.C. 14 July 1826, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 12 June 1826.
3 Ibid.
transfer to a remote part Scott therefore urged long-term
appointments, and pressed the qualifications of Captain Neufville and 
Lieutenant Bedingfield for them* The former had clearly shown his 
initiative and his peculiar fitness for work with the tribes, while the 
latter, who had commanded at Sadiya, was well qualified by his knowledge
of the Assamese language and his pleasant and conciliatory manner to-
o
wards the natives.6
The other part of the plan Scott submitted to government was 
for the establishment at Sadiya of a corps of militia, six hundred
strong, to be drawn from the followers of the Barsenapati, the Moamaria
chief, and the Sadiya Khowa Gohain, a Khamti chief. These two had early 
aided Neufville, and by this time had completely allied themselves to 
the Company by deeds of allegiance and by the Company’s counter- 
recognition of their feudatory status in May 1826. Scott thought them 
much more suitable than regular troops for the frontier, particularly 
the Khamtis, a fine, muscular and active race of men, hardy and laborious 
and much superior in military habits to the rest of the Burmese. He
I
thought that if attached to the British interest by liberal treatment
h
they might prove a very useful description of soldier.
This idea of forming a native militia at once caught the 
interest and imagination of both Bedingfield and Neufville. In June
1 Sir William Barton, India’s North West Frontier, p. 61.*  — — — » ■ II— — — ■lllll llll— l i l M U M  II. W— I— W—  W -*■
2 B.S.P.C. 14 July 1826, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 12 June 1826.
3 Physical and political Geography of the province of Assam, p.71.
4 B.S.P.C. 14 July 1826, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 12 June 1826.
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Bedingfield wrote that he saw no reason why, if armed and disciplined 
properly, the natives of the country should not become more than a match 
for any tribes they might be required to contend with* Considering the 
sad effects of the climate on the Hindustani soldiers, he saw in Scott’s 
proposal the Company’s best hope of establishing an effective force on 
the frontier* Drawing his idea from the old paik system^ of Assam, 
Bedingfield suggested that as most of the militia men would be peasants, 
leave of absence should be granted to a portion of them in rotation so 
as to allow them to attend to their crops* To prevent them from develop­
ing lazy and idle habits in peacetime he proposed that they should be j
\
trained in building stockades, trenchwork, mttiking canoes and in the
2
handling of howitzers.
In August 1826, Neufville followed with his suggestions, based 
upon a rather broader view of the irtiole situation* He accepted the use­
fulness of the militia proposed by Bedingfield on the Ahom model* He 
also agreed that the Company’s regular Indian forces were quite unsuited 
to frontier conditions* But he argued that some regular force was re-
‘tinJL
quired, distinct from^local militia, to garrison a fortified post at
Sadiya. That force, five or six hundred strong, should be placed solely
under the permanent jpolitical tflgent whose appointment Scott had proposed*
Such a body, he hoped, would be fully sufficient to keep in check in-
• ™  . * 1  
ternal disturbance as well as border aggression in all upper Assam. A
1 See chapter V (1) , p. 150
2 B.S.P.C* 21 July 1826, no. 14, Bedingfield to Scott, 4 June 1826; 
B.S.P.C. 21 July 1826, no. 13, Scott to Swinton, 4 July 1826.
%
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regular garrison at Sadiya would also be "productive of the best im­
pression by convincing the people of the country in the permanence of 
our protective influence (of which they at the moment entertained great 
doubts) ... as to extinguish all hope in the minds of the refractory of 
a return to their former system of rapine and plunder."1 He thought 
that for the force no men were better fitted than the Gurkhas, recruited 
for the hill companies of the Champaran and Dinajpur Light Battalions, 
who were "proverbially brave, active and capable of enduring fatigue both 
in hills and jungles, and free from those prejudices which the Hindus of 
the regular troops were invariably accustomed to*" He proposed that the 
permanent force should comprise two hundred Gurkhas, one hundred and 
fifty Shan musketeers selected from the body at Singamari, and one 
hundred and fifty Manipuri horsemen*2
So far as the Singphos were concerned, Neufville would pursue 
a conciliatory but guarded policy particularly towards B&saGam, whose
stronghold commanded the road to Moondong and Hukawng, the only direction
/-
from which any attack might be apprehended in future. He anticipated 
that before long this would prove to be a n route of considerable traffic 
He suggested that a party from the permanent force might be stationed 
there or in Daffa Gam’s territory until the road was cleared.-'
■
Since the Supreme Government was planning to disband the corps 
of regulars operating on the Assam frontier and to move military head-
1 B.S.P.C. 10 Nov. 1826, no. 22, Neufville to Scott, 29 Aug. 1826.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
quarters to Sylhet, Scott thought Neufville*s proposals particularly 
useful# The experience at Bishnath during the monsoon, when seven 
hundred men of the 13th Regiment were unfit for duty, but the Rangpore 
Local Corps suffered only the normal incidence of sickness^, also con­
vinced him of its wisdom.^ Scott further hoped that the sHyam musketeers 
and the Manipuri horsemen might be settled as jagirdars so that the only
men to whom it would be necessary to give full pay would be the com-
'
2
panies of Gurkhas.
v ,  t  t  L- . f  > ■ -  • ' ;  r £ i  • f h
A Sadiya militia was ultimately formed in 1827 four hundred and
- i
fifty strong, each man receiving from the government land worth ten 
rupees a year and batta during the time he was being drilled.^ Any
further stay of the regular troops in Assam being thought unnecessary,
■ ■■ . • , ,  ^ ,, - 
it was decided that the Rangpore Local Corps, with the necessary addition
of the Gurkha companies should be entrusted with the regulars* military
4 *5duties in Assam under Neufville*s immediate care and command. Lt.
Rutherford was employed in Sadiya as Neufville*s assistant in lieu of
Lt# Bedingfield,^ as he supervised the constructions of a fort and
stockade at Sadiya.^7
■
Scott*s plans for curbing the Singpho menace did not end with
1 B.S.P.C. 10 Nov. 1826, no. 21, Scott to Swinton, 12 Oct# 1826.
2 Ibid.
3 B.S.P.C. 28 Sept. 1827, nos.54-55, Scott to Swinton, 3 Sept. 1827.
4 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, nos.4-8, Scott to Swinton, 2 Feb. 1828;
Swinton to Scott, 7 March 1828.
5 B.S.P.C. 2 May 1828, nos.14-16, Neufville to Scott, 15 Apr. 1828;
Sterling to Scott, 2 May 1828.
6 B.S.P.C. 17 Oct. 1828, no. 1, Neufville to Scott, 4 Sept. 1828;
no. 3, Swinton to Scott, 17 Oct. 1828.
7 B.S.P.C. 29 Jan. 1830, no. 2, Rutherford to Neufville, 7 Jan. 1830.
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the adoption by the government of these military dispositions* He 
realised that the Singphos like the Garos needed to be won over to a new 
way of life, if their predatory raids were to be stopped. Their social 
organisation was peculiar* The whole of their field work was performed 
by the women and by Assamese slaves; "the men delight in lounging about ' 
the villages and basking in the sun when not engaged in hunting or 
war".^ Proud, vindictive, improvident and hopelessly indolent^, they 
were unlikely to remain peaceful neighbours unless provided with some 
new outlet for their energies. His idea was to develop British trade 
routes to upper Burma through the Singpho territory by using the Singphos 
as middlemen. This he thought would give a profitable avocation, in­
volving little physical exertion, to the hitherto marauding race and 
their predatory activities would gradually be extinguished.-*
Though the need to civilize the Singphos gave a new impetus to 
the idea of trade across the Assam-Burma frontier, the idea itself was
not new. In 1822 the select committee at Canton, faced with a closure of
uich attention was the Hakaw^r ral lev route- by v»" ich (he Burmese had 
trade at that part - over the Topaz affair -, had written to Calcutta
pointing out how easy it was for the Canton officials to prevent their
petitions reaching Peking, and asking that the Calcutta authorities
should explore the possibility "of transmitting their representations
overland ... by way of Sylhet and the province of Yunan" in times of
\ ■ ' ! *j|
crisis.** Again in 1824, the surveyor general, Blacker, had written ent­
husiastically to Amherst about Assam : "Its interesting situation be-
1 J.Butler, A sketch of Assam, p. 8.
2 Ibid.
3 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 44, Scott to Swinton, 2 Feb. 1828.
4 See A.Lamb, op.cit., p. 48.
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tween Hindoostan and China, two names with which the civilised world
has been long familiar, whilst itself remains nearly unknown, is a
striking fact and leaves nothing to be wished, but the means and
opportunity for exploring it".^ Soon after the British occupation of
Assam, Scott had set in motion a number of surveys, carried on under his
direct supervision by officers from the surveyor-generalTs department.
Various routes were studied within and beyond Assam, with an eye to
their potential use as trade routes. While Neufville was travelling
throughout the Khamti and Singpho territories establishing law and order,
other young officers such as Captain Bedford and Lieutenants Wilcox and
Burlton were mapping the area watered by the upper branches of the 
2
Brahmaputra. Among the routes they studied was one from Assam to Tibet 
and Yunnan through the country in the extreme north of Burma inhabited
o
by the Khamti and Mishimi tribes. This ^ route however, could not be 
followed beyond the borders of the Khamtis as they feared to rouse the 
jealousy and suspicion of the Burmese.** Another route which received 
much attention was the Hukawng valley route, by which the Burmese had 
entered Assam in 1817 and in 1820, and by which they returned in 1825. 
Part of this route lay in the territories of BdesaGam* and at the time 
when Neufville was entering into engagements with him, he was informed
1 B.S.P.C. 14 May 1824, Blacker to Amherst, 22 Apr. 1824.
2 See Ma Thaung, British Interests in Trans-Burma Trade routes to China
London University Ph.D. thesis, 1955, PP* 20-54.
3 See R. Wilcox, Memoir of a survey of Assam and the neighbouring
countries executed in 1825-6-7-8. Asiatic Researches, 
vol. XVII, pp. 314-453 832.
4 M. Thaung, op.cit., p. 23*
* The Singphos bordering Assam, at this time, were said to be divided 
into twelve principal tribes or clans, designed after the names of 
their chiefs, or Gams. Every chieftain maintained his own separate 
independence and seldom united with any other. The principal clans 
were the Biesa Gam, Duff a Gam, Luttao Gam, and Luttora Gam.
W. Robinson, op.cit., p. 736.
107
that this route had both military and commercial value.*
It was on this route that Scott placed his greatest hopes of 
improving trade with Burma, and incidentally of encouraging the Singphos 
in peaceful pursuits. By April 1826 messengers from the China-Burmese 
border area brought information to the effect that there would be a 
considerable demand for woollen cloth and other European manufactures in 
their country, in exchange for which they could give horses and silver. 
Scott gave every encouragement to them to return to Sadiya at the proper 
season of the year — November or December - when he proposed to establish 
a fair at the place.^ This was approved by the government^ and silk 
goods of the value of eight hundred rupees were despatched from Calcutta, 
together with presents for the chiefs. Unhappily on their way the whole 
of the consignment was plundered. Though Scott at once applied for a 
fresh investment of goods^ the smallness of the sum granted, a mere two 
thousand rupees and the want of any officer to supervise the business led 
to the venture falling through.-* In 1830, however, Neufville took up the 
idea again.^ He recommended that the merchant adventurer Bruce, who was 
in charge of the gunboats at Sadiya, should be vested with the superin­
tendence of the whole business at a salary of one hundred rupees per 
month, with a share in the profits. Neufville suggested that a consign­
ment of English and Indian goods should be sent up to be sold at reason-
* M. Thaung, op.cit., p. 24.
2 B.S.P.S. 19 May 1826, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 28 Apr. 1826.
3 B.S.P.C. 19 May 1826, no.ll, Swinton to Scott, 19 May 1826.
4 B.S.P.C. 7 Sept. 1827, no. 17, Scott to Swinton, 18 Aug. 1827.
5 Ibid.
6 B. P.C. 14 May 1830, no. 29, Scott to Swinton, 22 Apr. 1830.
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able prices in exchange for ivory, amber, musk, man,jit, copper, daus 
and spears. Even i'f the demand at Sadiya was insufficient to take off 
the whole consignment, he was sure that the goods he specified would 
find a sale in Assam at fifty to one hundred percent profit.'*' The con­
signment he suggested for the following cold weather was this :
1000 yds, of coarse scarlet broadcloth
at two rupees per yard - Sicca rupees 2,000
150 yds of bright yellow broadcloth 
for the priest
at two rupees per yard -
100 yds of red baize
at one rupee per yard -
600 yds of chintzes
at five annas per yard -
white long cloth -
Book muslins -
coloured cotton handker­
chiefs
Lascars red caps
velvet, black and red (china) -
Kincobs, three pieces 
at fifty rupees each **
Flints
opium, red battan X?} 
blankets, eria* cloth and 
produce of Assam - 1 000
Boat hire from Calcutta and
Insurance - 312
2Total Sicca rupees 5,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- i
1 B.P.C. 14 May 1830, no. 29, Neufville to Scott, 27 Jan. 1830.
* The eri or eria cloth is one of the three varieties of silk produced
in Assam. The other two are the muga and pat. The cloth is light, 
strong, and remarkably durable, and it washes well. Kamrup is the 
largest eri-producing tract in the province. The Rabhas, Kacharis and 
Meches are expert in the cultivation of eri worm (attacus ricini).
See B.C. Allen, Monograph on the silk cloth of Assam, pp. 4-14.
2 B.P.C. 14 May 1830, no. 29, Neufville to Scott, 27 Jan. 1830.
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Neufville also thought it desirable to allow the principal 
Singpho chiefs to take merchandize for the first year on credit under 
engagements of payment at the ensuing fair. He had already lent four 
hundred rupees to the Bisa Gam upon such conditions, to test his integri­
ty. Neufville hoped that eventually this trade would extend through the 
Hutewng valley to Mogaung, on the upper Irrawaddy.1 The government 
approved the proposal and Scott and Neufville were allowed to try the 
experiment.^
This study of the tranquillization of the eastern frontier 
cannot be concluded without referring to another of Captain Neufville»s 
projects. Major S.F. Hannay tells us^ that Capt. Neufville negotiated 
with Laong, the Amat Gyee, or deputy governor of Maing Kwan with a view 
to bringing a large number of the Shan population of the Maing Kwan 
province to Assam. Unfortunately, however, the Burmese got intimation of 
this confidential negotiation and Laong was taken to Ava and executed.
Hannay writes that ”as a political measure nothing could have 
been better for upper Assam at that time, than the transfer of a large
body of the Shan race into the province, as under the able management of •
*   .----     *---- - ------ -— i
that officer, the eventual benefit to be derived from the accession of
an energetic population, with knowledge in the useful arts, and habits of
alii 4industry unknown to the Assamese of the present day, was certain”.
1 B.P.C. 14 May 1830, no. 29, Neufville to Scott, 27 Jan. 1830.
2 B.P.C. 14 May 1830, no. 30, Swinton to Scott, 14 May 1830.
3* S.F. Hannay, Notes on the Shans. part II. Shans of Assam, pp. 15-16.
4. Ibid.
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According to Hannay the benefit to upper Assam in regard to trade in 
muga* silk alone would have been great, for the Shan population of the 
middle and lower Chindwin river, together with the large Burmese popu- 
lation situated between the lower Pangam and the Irrawaddy, would have 
consumed every particle of that article which could have been produced 
by the Assamese.^ The Shan districts of the upper Chindwin lay only 
six marches although by a mountainous route from Rangpore. Had Neufville 
lived, Hannay argues, he would surely have succeeded in opening up a 
route so full of possibilities for upper Assamese trade, as also links 
with the Chinese markets of the Yunnan frontier.^
The Singpho trade, though it continued during the remaining 
period of Scott’s life, and for four years afterwards^ did not serve the 
purpose of transforming the habits of the Singphos. But the effort to 
establish a market at Sadiya was more successful, and in July 1834 the 
first four Marwari traders, from north India, appeared at Sadiya, under 
the protective wing of the newly appointed British officer there.* More­
over Scott never ceased to be optimistic about the wider possibilities 
of the Sadiya mart. Three months before his death, on 18 May 1831, he 
wrote to the government i "the evidence lately given before the two 
Houses of Parliament in regard to the obstructions offered to the intro-
* The muga silk comes from a kind of worm known as antheroea Assamoea. 
It is much lighter and handsomer than eri, and is largely worn by 
women, and as a holiday dress by men. In colour it is a brownish 
yellow, which after washing assumes a fine gloss. Sibsagar and more 
especially Jorhat, is the great centre for the production of the muga 
cloth. See B.C.Allen, op.cit., p. 14-15*
1 S.F. Hannay, op.cit., pp. 15-16.
2 Ibid.
3SteM. Thaung, op.cit., p. 21.
4 Ibid.
Ill
ductlon of British woollens from Canton Into the interior of China by 
the imposition of high duties seems fully to confirm the expediency of 
endeavouring to open other more direct channels of communication with 
the inland provinces of that empire from some of which Sadiya is distant 
little more than 200 miles”.1
The peace and order brought by Scott to the frontier of upper 
Assam continued for many years after his death, except for a rising 
in 1839 which followed the death of Salan Sadiya Khowa Gohain, the 
Khamti chief, with whom agreement had been reached on the 15 May 1826.^ 
In that year the Khamtis of Sadiya suddenly rose and murdered the po­
litical agent, ool. White and many of his guards. The Singphos, too, 
joined in the rising. Despite this incident little change was made in 
the administrative machinery for the frontier for some forty years. As 
communications were made easier, the raids of the hill tribes became
p
easier to supress, and a number of hitherto independent tribes were
A
brought under British control and were transformed into revenue-paying
ryots. Throughout these years Scott’s native militia continued to patrol
3
the roads and passes to the north.
1 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50, Scott to Swinton, 18 May 1831.
2 C.U. Aitchison, Treaties. Engagements and Sanads, vol. II, pp. 252- 
253; Physical and Political Geography of the province of Assam, p.221.
3 Physical and Political Geography of the province of Assam, p. 221.
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CHAPTER IV 
(II)
TRe question of the employment of the Assamese and the restoration 
of Ahom monarchy in Upper Assam.
Between 1825 and 1831 the establishment of a secure base at 
Sadiya for the British guardforce on the Burmese frontier had been one 
preoccupation of Scott* Another had been the creation of a new ad­
ministrative order, revenue and judicial, for l*>wer Assam, There re­
mained a third problem, which proved the most intractable of all, that 
of deciding what to do with upper Assam, the old Ahom heartlands inter- 
posed between the British frontier posts at Sadiya and settled lower 
Assam, Here Scott found his views running contrary to those of the 
Supreme Government, and though in the end his proposals were largely 
accepted he did not live to see them put into action,
Scott wished to re-establish an Ahom kingdom in Upper Assam, 
with a constitution designed to eliminate the weaknesses of the old 
regime and the need for any detailed British interference. Such a restor­
ation seemed the solution to many problems : it would relieve the 
Company of the financial burden of administering an impoverished, de­
vastated country; it would lessen tension on the frontier and contribute 
to its defense; it would establish British good faith, halt the process 
of annexation and consequent breaking down of Indian society, and above 
all it would solve the problem of providing suitable employment to the
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Ahom and Assamese officials and nobles, thereby removing a major cause 
for unrest and rebellion* How Scott came to hold and defend these views, 
and against what opposition, is the subject of this section*
It has been said that most of the problems of Assam today 
arise out of an historical fact : that "a whole host of clerks and 
petty officials from Bengal came in the wake of the British rulers, as 
Assam was not in a position for some three generations to supply 
English-knowing personnel for taking part in the administration, and 
at their instance, the British government, partly also to simplify 
matters, made Bengali the second language of the administration and the 
school in Assam”.^ The Ahom system of government was so very different 
from that of other Indian territories that in the preliminary stages of 
British administration in Assam, the Assamese could not be readily 
fitted into the regular departments of the Company*s administration*
Some high-ranking officials from the previous Ahom government were 
given high posts because of their special knowledge in the revenue and 
judicial fields, but apart from these most of the jobs in the Company’s " 
service came to be held by outsiders.
The consequences were not limited to the loss of government 
service and social prestige by the old Ahom service aristocracy. In 
Assam, as everywhere else in British India, the establishment of a
1 S.K. Chatterji, The place of Assam in the History and Civilisation
of India. p*78.
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hierarchy of new officials, operating a new legal and administrative 
machinery, through a new language opened the way to widespread exploita­
tion, social and economic, of the old society. The appearance of Bruce, 
the merchant-adventurer who reported the possibilities of tea cultiva­
tion in Assam'*', the penetration of Marwari traders to the new market at
2 o
Sadiya , the installation of Bengali tahsildars in Upper Assam were
signs of changes to come in the future*
Scott wished to soften the impact of such change, and as will
be seen he did his best to give employment to Ahom officials in the
revenue and judicial service. But an examination of the Conqpany* s
native establishment, set up by Scott as political agent on the North-
East Frontier, will show how large were the changes introduced by the
advent of the British. Scott*s establishment was comprised of three 
4
munshis , writing and interpreting Persian and Hindustani; one muhafiz-i- 
daf ter, or keeper of public papers and records; six.-muharrirs or clerks; 
two tahvildars or cashiers ; one dafturee who prepared the 
writing materials, and a few .iamadars and chuprasis inferior officers 
of police, customs or excise and their orderlies. There was also a 
staff or interpreters : four English writers and interpreters of the 
Burmese, Manipuri, Khasi and Singpho languages, together with their
1 As far back as 1826 Scott sent to the authorities of the Calcutta 
Botanic Garden, some dried tea leaves from Manipur which were entered 
in the catalogue of the Company’s botanical collection under No. 3668. 
Bentinck Papers, Pwjf 2546 a; for Bruce’s enterprise see A.C. Barua,
cto °j- TW E - c o A  ^ s.e^w\ V cJ /U 'j , p. 7 q
2 See supra, p. mo
3 See infra, p . 13
4 They were : Rajkishore Sen, Hari Shome and Kishen Kant IBose?I
BoS.P.C. 22 Oct. 1824, no. 12, Scott to Swinton, 1 Oct. 1824. ’The
statement of sums paid to the native officers employed by the Politi­
cal Agent on the North-East Frontier from Dec. 1823 to 5 Aug. 1824’.
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orderlies* The pay for the whole establishment for the nine months from 
December 1823 to August 1824 came to Rs. 5,823, individual salaries 
varying from Rs. 43 a month drawn by the munshis to less than Rs. 5 
a month for the chuprasis^. Of all these employees, only a certain 
Durga Thakur was Assamese and he was employed in a special capacity !
as * Assam Muharrir?. His salary, including his travelling allowances
2was about Rs. 20 per month .
In May 1825, Scott and Richards, the joint commissioners sub­
mitted the native establishment list^ which they proposed for the two 
divisions of Assam. The pattern of offices was closely modelled upon 
the establishments in the other districts of the Bengal Presidency, and 
like them still bore the Persian titles taken over by the Company from
their Mughal predecessors. In structure, function as well as name the
k
administration proposed was Anglo-Mughal . The designation of many of 
the posts - shumar navis, or registrar; khazanchi. or treasurer; 
tahsildar. or district revenue collector were unfamiliar to the Assamese. 
Their method of working, especially the mass of forms, returns and other 
paper work, was totally unlike anything seen under the Ahoms. Ahom 
officials had never felt it necessary to keep written records of 
official day-to-day business. For example in judicial matters the Ahom
1 They were : Rajkishore Sen, Harishome and Kishen Kant C. Bose ? H
B.S.P.C. 22 Oct. 1824, no. 12, Scott to Swinton, 1 Oct. 1824. ’The
statement of sums paid to the native officers employed by the Po­
litical Agent on the North-East Frontier from Dec. 1823 to 5 Aug. 
1824.’
2 Ibid.
3 See Appendices A and 8 at the end of the chapter.
4 B.S.P.C. 7 July 1826, no. 32, Scott and Richards to Swinton,
25 May 1825.
116
custom was to hear all complaints viva voce ; afterwards to summon the 
party complained against; and, if his statement proved unsatisfactory, 
prompt punishment ensued, without further delay for witnesses.'*' Indeed 
White reported that the ex-Raja Purandar Singh asked Scott why on earth
1t\jl-
he and his officials were always so busy in taking downAcomplaintJ-s 
deposition, and that of his witnesses, and then summoning the defendant 
and taking down his statement and then again calling for his witness.
_ tty
For him it was an unnecessary^lengthy process where the judge, who was
bound to forget everything about the case in its later stages, would
2
be at the mercy of the aralah. In justification of the practice of 
taking written depositions, Scott is recorded as replying, "Swurgo Deo, 
you are of celestial origin, and can recollect everything. We are earth- 
born, and when we go to dinner, forget what we have heard in the course 
of the day; therefore we write down what we hear”. It was inevitable 
that when the system and its officers were so unfamiliar to the Ahom 
tradition, the posts should be filled by experts, already trained in 
the Regulation system of Bengal. As a matter of fact, prior to the 
permanent arrangement of May, 1825, Scott had already appointed pro­
visionally, many people in the native establishment of the commissioners- 
office in Lower Assam. The long list of the establishment posts was 
filled with Rais, Ghoses, Sens, Mukherjis, Chakravartis, Nags, Nandis,
1 A. White, Memoir, p. 58. This explanation was said to have been 
given by the ex-Raja Purandar Singh to Scott who when the raja said 
that the oppression committed by the subordinate native officers in 
the British administration was greater than it used to be in the 
native rule, had to admit the truth of the comparison.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, pp. 58-59# Swargo deo literally means ’Lord of heaven’ and 
is the usual title by which the raja of Assam was addressed.
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Bagshis, Duttas, Pals, Ghosals and Guptas who were undoubtedly brought
from Bengal to serve in Assam,* Compared to these, the numbers of
Kakatis and Changkakatis - the Assamese officers - were mere drops in
the ocean. Their jobs were also in the lower grades, and hence ill- 
2
paid. The names of those upon the new establishment lists are not
available, but it seems very unlikely either that the trained Bengalis
previously employed were then dismissed, or that many more suitable
Assamese suddenly became available. Indeed, throughout Scott*s period
there was always a shortage of Assamese who knew the Company’s system
of government. In 1829, Haliram Dhekial Phukan3 then the revenue
saris htadar of Lower Assam, published a book on Assam called Assam 
4
Bqran.ii. The book written in Bengali was distributed freely in Bengal 
and one of its chief purposes, as the author stressed, was to invite 
people from Bengal to the Company’s jobs in Assam.' Prospects were 
always better for outsiders, who were well-conversant with the Company’s 
system of administration, than for the Assamese.
J!
*
h
1 B.S.P.C. 7 Apr. 1826, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 10 March 1826.
Account of particulars of disbursements for the public service made 
under Commissioner in Lower Assam for the year 1231 B.S. (1824/25)
2 The one exception was in the revenue administration, for there the 
help of the Assamese Qanungos was essential and so the three top 
posts were given to three Majumdar Baruas - Joigoram, Kashi and 
Bhudhar. B.S.P.C. 7 Apr. 1826, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 10 March 
1826.
3 See chapter V, section II, p.
4 The second edition of the book is published from Gauhati in June 1962 
and edited by J.M. Bhattacharya. See also Bangadut, 7 Nov.1829, pp. 
292-293; Samachar Chandrika. 22 Sept. 1831; Samachar Darpan. 30 July 
1831, p. 248; Tarachand Chakravarty’s review of Haliram’s History in 
the India Gazette, appendix C of the present edition.
5 J.M. Bhattacharya, op.cit., p.l.
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The downfall of the Ahom monarchy started in the early years 
of the nineteenth century, and with it had gone, hand in hand, a de­
cline in the influence of the official nobility* During the period of 
the Burmese invasions the nobles survived only in name and not in i
power or influence* With the removal of the central authority of the 
Ahom monarch, under whose peculiar constitution alone the official 
nobility had thrived, they received a further blow* At the time of the 
British take-over of the administration, the influence of the nobility 
was so reduced that in Assam, unlike other newly conquered territories 
in India there was no immediate political need to conciliate or destroy 
them, for the safety of the British power* The small tributary rajas 
and other malguzars of lower Assam were continued in their role as 
revenue intermediaries, and were thus satisfied* The officers more 
directly linked with the Ahom monarchy, the heads of the various khels 
and of the Ahom administrative departments, could be and were over­
thrown, the paik system came to an end. The regiments of paiks which the 
officers had once led melted back into the villages as peasant culti­
vators. Thus the British in Assam were not confronted, as they had been 
in the Deccan after the fall of Peshwa Baji Ras II, with bodies of un­
employed soldiers and with political leaders who might oppose the 
British with force**
In the Deccan Elphinstone thought it worthwhile to grant 
considerable pensions to many of the Maratha sardars. He defended the
1 See K. Ballhatchet, Social policy and Social change in Western
India. 1817-1830* pp. 77-103.
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expenditure on political grounds: ”if we had deprived the civil and 
military servants of every means of maintaining themselves we should 
have forced them to intrigue and raise insurrections against us whereas 
we now have some hold on them all from their fear of losing the little 
they have left if not from gratitude £  forj being permitted to enjoy 
itM.^ Scott, in Assam, followed Elphinstone*s example* Many members 
of the royal family, and many old Ahom functionaries who had applied 
to him for help, even for subsistence, were given small pensions, and 
allowances in money and paiks. In view of the increase in price of 
many commodities, Scott twice urged, in 1827 and 1828, that Raja Chandra
3
Kanta*s allowance should be increased. He also gave small jagirs to 
various other members of the royal family who had resided in Bengal 
during the transitional period, subsisting on the charitable donations 
of the zamindars of Soosung, and the rajas of Cachar and Tipperah. They 
had returned to Assam without any means of support*^ Again, there were 
some individuals who had helped the British in their advance towards 
Assam after the declaration of war against the Burmese. They, too 7 were
ec
given small jagirs and pensions.-^ As a humanitarian measure, a very 
nominal amount - 1 Re per month - was sanctioned to some twenty persons
1 Quoted in K. Ballhatchet, Social policy and Social change in 
Western India 1817-1830. p. 83.
2 B.S.P.C* 7 July 1826, no. 33, Scott and Richards to Swinton, 25 May 
1826; B.S.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50, Scott to the Chief Secretary,
18 May 1831.
3 B.S.P.C. 26 Oct. 1827, no. 15, Scott to Swinton, 1 Aug. 1827, 
B.S.P.C. 2 May 1828, nos. 17-18, Scott to Swinton, 8 Apr. 1828 and 
Swinton to Scott, 2 May 1828.
4 B.P.C. 4 Nov. 1828, no. 40, Scott to Swinton, 15 Oct. 1826;
B.S.P.C. 18 July 1827, no. 6, Scott to Swinton, 28 Dec. 1827.
5 B.P.C. 4 Nov. 1826, nos. 71-72, Scott to Swinton, 4 Nov. 1826.
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who had been deprived of their eye-sight by the former Ahom government.*
o
Presents were also given to several men of position.
These were all benevolent measures, but they could hardly
compensate the ex-government servants for their loss of wealth, position
and power. Scott realised that the employment of considerable numbers e
of outsiders from Bengal in the administration of lower Assam had made
their situation worse* But he was equally aware of the extreme diffi-
3
culty of obtaining local officials competent to serve the Company.
What, too, was the lot of those who did join the Comapnyt-s service ?
Scott himself reported in October, 1829, at the time of the massacre of
Nnnijkhic^ 0,upon the inadequate pay of these officers and of their entire
dependence upon it for the subsistence, not only of their immediate,
but often of a number of distant relations too. This rendered it im-
e. ii
possible for them to make any provision against unfoi^seen calamities.
Moreover, the Supreme Government made it plain to Scott that nothing
could be done either by way of increasing salaries or posts. In April,
9 /* (Jtliiu**
182$, severe retrenchment measures were taken by Lord Bentinck. The
y  k
rising debt of the Company in India and the growing public opinion in 
England against the renewal of the Company's monopoly of the China trade 
caused concern to both the Court of Directors at home and such re­
1 B.S.P.C. 21 July 1826, nos, 10-11, Scott to Swinton, 14 July 1826 
and Swinton1s reply.
2 B.P.C. 11 Oct. 1828, no. 62, Scott to Swinton, 20 Sept. 1828.
3 B.S.P.C. 25 Apr. 1828, no. 51, Scott to Swinton, 1 Apr. 1828.
4 B.P.C. 18 June 1830, no. 47, Scott to Swinton, 5 Oct. 1829. !
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forming administrators as Bentinck and Metcalfe in India.1 With the 
expectation of losing the profits of the China trade and the tea 
monopoly, which Parliament abolished in 1833» the Company had to insist 
that Indian revenues pay the cost of Indian administration entirely.
The Company could qualify for the continued government of India only 
if the finances of the Company were sound. Bentinck1s policy of re­
trenchment, however, was not designed only to preserve the Company. It 
came out of the belief that government should be as inexpensive as
possible, so that taxes might be lowered and so that money might be
2
available for progressive reforms. The measures of retrenchment were 
so severe that we find that even in the minor matter of a trifling 
boat allowance for Capt. Neufville - an officer of proved ability and 
integrity - a long discussion had to take place between Lord Bentinck 
and Swinton, the secretary to the ^overnor-general-in-^ouncil. A few 
months later, when Scott, considering the "heavy duties and responsi­
bilities" imposed upon Capt* White, requested the raising of the 
latter*s salary, he was gently reminded to cut his coat according to 
his cloth. Before any such increase could be given, "it will be necess­
ary", he was told, "that government should have before it, a complete
statement of the expenses, civil and military of the whole province of
4
Lower and Upper Assam compared with actual amount of revenue". Under
1 See Bentinck Papers PwJf 2479. Extract from Sir Charles Metcalfe's 
Minute of 11 Oct. 1829 in reply to William Bentinck*s letter on the 
subject of Lord Ellenborough*s question.
2 G.D. Bearce, op.cit., p. 166.
3 B.P.C. 8 January 1830, nos. 98-100. *"
4 B.P.C. 28 May 1830, no. 80, Swinton to Scott, 28 May 1830.
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such circumstances the inclusion of inexperienced local people in the 
native establishment became less practicable and Scott had to think of 
something else to placate the nobility and provide for the low-rank 
officials of Assam. He thought he might find a practicable solution in 
the restoration of the Ahom monarchy in Upper Assam.
Scott looked upon the restoration of the monarchy as a means 
of satisfying the local people, high and low. He believed that a 
restoration could also be made to serve the needs of frontier defence — 
though of this the Calcutta Council were not to be convinced. Scott be­
lieved that both could be achieved by the same stroke of policy, and 
that the restoration of the Ahom monarchy would not be a source of 
anxiety to the British government provided constitutional restraints 
were put upon the autocracy of the proposed monarchy.
The idea of preserving, with slight modifications, the tra­
ditional form of the Ahom government in Upper Assam led Scott to study 
the past history of Assam and to find from within the Ahom constitution 
itself the basis for constitutional checks against a despotic king. It 
appeared, and rightly so, that the aristocracy in earlier governments 
in Assam had had the right to depose the king. Scott used this as the 
basis of his idea of the government which he intended to impose in 
future#
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The most remarkable feature in the government of Assam that 
Scott found was the great power possessed by the three Gohains and 
the ministers*, who together formed the Patra Mantri. The offices of 
the Gohains were hereditary in the same families although not strictly 
inheritable from father to son* They had claimed and possessed the
e
right of electing a king and also, but in concert with a majority of the 
nobility, of deposing one* The latter power was no doubt liable to 
great abuse, of which there were several recorded instances* But, as 
Scott said, it had at the same time formed a salutary check upon the 
despotic authority of the king. Taking into consideration the serious 
evils which had arisen in many of the states which had entered into 
subsidiary alliance with the British government due to a lack of any 
constitutional check upon the ruler*s internal administration of affair^ 
Scott thought that it would be desirable, in the event of the establish­
ment of a native prince in Assam, to recognize and with certain modi-
i
fications to confirm the powers formerly exercised by the grand council 
or Patra Mantri* He also thought that means should be adopted for pre­
venting collusion between that body and the king by strictly defining 
the authority of the latter and requiring that he should not take any
i
major decision without the concurrence of at least two members of the 
Patra Mantri - one of them to be a Gohain* In order to prevent the in­
timidation or improper selection by these officers, Scott further 
suggested that for the time being at least, they ought not to be ap-
3
1 They were Burha Gohain, Bor Gohain, Barpatra Gohain, Barphurkan 
and Barbarua.
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pointed or removed without the sanction of the British government*'*'
Besides the patra Mantri or standing douncil of state, it had 
been usual in Assam in cases affecting the interests of the people at 
large, such as the imposition of a new tax, to call together and con­
sult a general assembly of all officers of government as far down as the8 
grade of saikia or commandant over one hundred paiks. Such assembly was 
called a Jgarmel. The phukans. baruas and ra.jkhowas comprising it, were 
usually connected with the noble families while the haaarikas and 
saikias. being removable by the paiks or peasantry, might be considered 
to represent the people* Scott was not able to understand whether there 
were any very precise rules for conducting the business and collecting 
votes in this assembly, but lie thought the details could easily be
arranged at the proper time. He considered it expedient that this in-
2
stitution also should be confirmed and properly organised.
The role of the protecting state, Scott suggested, should be to 
remain as the guardian of the constitution; "to assure and continue to 
maintain its proper character without on one hand abandoning the inter­
ests or people to the mere will of a weak or tyrannical JrulerJ or exer­
cising on the other an undue influence and vexatious interference in the 
administration of the internal government of the dependent sovereign". 
The latter action, Scott feared, would "deprive him [the sovereign^ of 
respectability in the eyes of his subjects and ultimately alienate him
from our interests". With this note on the future restrictions on the
. .  a
1 B.S.P.C. 14 July 1826, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 15 Apr. 1826.
2 Ibid.
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native ruler Scott suggested, in 1826, that one of the two ex-kings, 
Chandra Kanta or Purandar should be elevated to actual power.*
He argued that such a move would also be sensible from the
purely financial point of view. The expected collection of revenue in
Upper Assam was not such as to justify British administration there. The
population of Upper Assam, Scott wrote, would not exceed 300,000 of
whom about 40,000 might be paiks subjected to the capitation tax -
affording a revenue of only one hundred and twenty thousand rajamohri
2
rupees, the depreciated currency of the Ahom government.
By early 1828, the shape of the future Assam had thus formed 
itself in Scott’s mind. A portion of the Assam valley extending from 
the station of Bishnath (at the eastern end of Lower Assam) to the
,
Dihing river on the north of the Brahmaputra and from Solal chowky to 
the Buri Dihing and Barhath (where the Sadiya frontier tract began) on 
the south bank was to be assigned to a native prince on the terms just 
considered. Such an action would satisfy the discontented nobles and 
also leave no doubt or suspicion among the neighbouring states as to
3
the motives of the British government. Though Scott did not expect any
organised political move on the part of disaffected nobles against the
*
British raj, he did think it a political necessity publicly to disavow
any British imperialistic designs east of the Bengal frontier. The
—  - *- - -  - - -   ■ ■ —  - ■ ■  — ... , —  .
1 B.S.P.C. 14 July 1826, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 15 Apr. 1826.
2 Ibid.
3 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 4, Scott to Swinton, 2 Feb. 1828. In this
connection it is to be remembered that just after the conquest of 
Assam the Government proclaimed that it did not intend to annex any 
part of the conquered territory.
creation of an Ahom state would also preclude any move by the Ahom 
royal family and nobility to call in the Burmese or the frontier tribes 
in a bid to wrest Assam back from the British.1
Scott communicated these ideas to the Calcutta authorities in 
a letter of 2 February, 1828. The government replied in March. They 
made it clear that they did not consider themselves pledged by any 
engagement or declaration whatever to restore a native prince to the 
throne of Assam. Neither did they consider such a step desirable or 
expedient. Scott was also told that the opinion which other states 
might form of British proceedings in relation to the conquered territory 
of Assam was a u consideration which might safely be excluded from the 
present discussion”. So long as the policies that the government might 
adopt were in themselves just and wise, the government should not bother 
about the objections which neighbouring states might raise.2
The government then set out its positive reasons for retaining 
Upper Assam. Their first point was that the revenue of the tract had
o
been rated in Scott’s letter of 15 April, 1826, at aboutfel80,000 per 
annum, exclusive of certain public domains which supplied grain and 
other articles of consumption for the sovereign’s household, and in 
Scott’s letter of 2 February, 1828, at about one lakh per annum. The 
government argued that this would yield a surplus, even after providing,
1 The relationship of the Ahoms with the Burmese and the tribes of the
frontier tracts were not clearly known to the British, who could not
therefore exclude the possibility of such an alliance against them.
2 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 8 , Swinton to Scott. 7 March, 1828.
3 B.S.P.C. 14 July 1826, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 15 Apr. 1826.
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on a more liberal scale than at present, for Chandra Kanta or any other 
aspirant to the royal dignity and after allowing for the necessary 
administrative establishment. ( Since under any plan the British would 
be responsible for the general defence of Upper Assam, there would be 
no extra military charges if it were annexed. The Rangpore Local Corps^ 
augmented by two companies of Gurkhas and aided by the contingents 
which Scott himself had proposed to plant on the frontier were con­
sidered adequate for all purposed of internal police and ordinary mili­
tary duties throughout the whole of Assam.)
They then went on to argue that the native government which 
Scott proposed to revive would in all probability fail. It would be 
poor and have very limited resources; it would be evidently dependant 
upon the support of a foreign power; its princes in recent ages had 
shown remarkable incapacity and profligacy : such a government would 
lack respect and be all too likely to resort to oppression to supply 
its necessities. Furthermore, there would also be a perpetual hazard 
of collision and dispute between the wild intractable tribes on the 
frontier and such an Assamese government. At all events, the inter­
position of so feeble and probably ill-managed a state, between British 
territory and the frontier - the tranquillity of which was to be main­
tained by direct British control - would embarrass and complicate all 
the British arrangements and relations with the tribes in question and 
infinitely aggravate the inherent difficulties of the task of preservirjg 
order.
1 Raised in Rungpur, Scott*s Bengal district.
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As for the objections which the nobles and the hereditary 
officers of the state and other influential classes of the pure Ahom i
race were supposed to entertain against the permanent introduction of 
British government, these might be greatly softened, if not altogether 
removed, by acting on the principle of adapting the British system as 
closely as practicable to their actual wants, prejudices and conditions. 
This could be done, especially, by continuing to employ the leading men 
of the country in the discharge of the duties of their hereditary office 
subject to such control by the local European officers as experience 
might suggest.'*'
Finally the Jovernor-general-in-council drew attention to the
difficulty of selecting the right man from the number of claimants to
the throne, and pointed out that none of them had earned support by
2
any aid given to the Company during the war with the Burmese.
Yet however justified they felt in keeping the fruit of their 
conquest, the government did not like to ignore Scott’s opinion alto­
gether, an^ience the subject was referred to Scott for reconsideration.^ 
A month later, in April, 1828, Scott related his case more 
elaborately, in the light of the government’s view-points. There was 
still no insurrection or rebellion on the part of the nobles or any ob­
jection raised by the neighbouring states against the British occupation
1 The Government maintained that an example had already been shown by 
Scott when men like the Barbarua, Barphukan, Gam of Bisa, Barsenapati 
and Sadiya Khowa Gohain were vested with powers to dispense justice 
to the inhabitants of their divisions.
2 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 8 , Swinton to Scott, 7 March 1828.
3 Ibid.
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of Assam. Scott, therefore, could not stress the political necessity 
of preserving a native state on such grounds. Instead he chose to set 
out in clear and forcible terms the political philosophy which had 
underlain his proposal to create a native state in Assam. Scott made it 
plain that he deeply deplored that systematic overthrow of the local 
Indian officers of rank which had been taking place in all provinces 
acquired by the British in India. This, he said, was bound to happen 
when an alien system of administration was super-imposed hurriedly in 
expectation of quick results. He feared that his own arrangements for 
native employment in upper Assam would break down one day by the gra­
dual process of development of British administration. He went on,
”The systematic depression of the native of the country and the monopoly 
of all official situations of emolument by Europeans have so constantly
fy A i *** , Jtaa "f JL .1 M . ' Is .. i '1 , ,, A . , *',.,*■* v*. ■ | 'f “ 4 ‘"t H
followed the extension of our power that it must be anticipated by the 
Assamese as a natural consequence of the annexation of their country 
to the British territory and whatever government might resolve upon at 
the commencement of our connexion with Assam, I fear it would be in 
vain to expect that country should prove a permanent exception to a
Jl A 4 4 JI « #  a v  - «|4 H  H  Q  Ml 4 4 Htfk
practice which it is so much the interest of the ruling class to extend 
and for which grounds are never wanting in the corruption and other 
misdeeds of individual native functionaries. The reasons which now exist 
for giving respectable official employment to the Assamese nobles were
long ago urged in case of the inhabitants of other parts of our possess-
IV) Scott, to Storl'm. 26 Apr* 1828, •]
ions and although their force was there also acknowledged, no principal .
result followed, but on the contrary the chief revenue appointments
then existing have since been abolished and a very general disposition
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appears now to prevail to substitute European for natives as Saddar 
Ameens and as Seristactars of large estates”.'*' ,
Scott once again reminded Calcutta that the probable evils of 
a tributary government could be eradicated by taking recourse to the 
ancient constitution of Assam, with the right reserved of British 
interference in the internal affairs of the government* ”1 conceive”, 
Scott said ”that we might sufficiently provide for a moderate degree of 
good government in Upper Assam by stipulating in the first place for an 
absolute right of interference and by announcing deposal as the penalty
to be incurred by the prince who may persist iniBing his authority to
the detriment of his subjects”.^ Scott’s other arguments in favour of
his measure were as follows:
After this general statement of principle, Scott turned to the ' 
particular points raised by the government* They had argued that in 
any circumstance the military costs to the Company would be the same* 
Scott denied this, arguing first that it would not be necessary per­
manently to station a regular regiment in upper Assam and secondly that, 
under a native regime, the members of the militia might be cheaply re­
munerated by lands on the usual service tenure* But were the British 
authority once established, the militia would probably become discon­
tented unless admitted to the usual advantages of the services under the 
British government*
1 B.S.P.C* 27 June 1828, no. 115, Scott to Sterling, 26 Apr. 1828.
2 Ibid.
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Scott also pointed out that the extent and the probable po­
pulation of Upper Assam was such that the cost of Company administration 
would be as high as that of any other similarly situated Bengal zillah - 
Sylhet, for example. The officer currently performing civil duties in 
Assam had been drawing an inconsiderable salary and Scott saw no good 
reason why this disparity should continue after annexation. Moreover 
under a British administration, officials would expect to be paid their 
allowances in cash, but in Upper Assam there was a great deficiency of 
coined money, the people were unaccustomed to money payments, and native 
officers were usually paid with land and paiks. The more general con­
sequences of shifting to a monetised economy in Upper Assam was des­
cribed by Scott thus: "unaccustomed as the Assamese have been to the 
payment of taxes the lower order would probably look upon any consider­
able increase in that department as the greatest of all evils while it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the members of the royal family, the 
nobility, the public functionaries and the religious orders would view 
with dislike the introduction of our authority founded as it seems to 
me, it must ultimately be upon the destruction of their own"!
Scott next proceeded to discount the government's fear about 
the development of hostile relations between a native administration in 
Upper Assam and the peoples of the north eastern hill tracts. The Nagas 
of the southern hills appeared to be particularly quiet and well-dis­
posed. The boundary between the districts of the Singphos, the Barsenapati.
i
and the Sadiya Khowa Gohain would be so clearly defined that no cause of 
contention could arise in that quarter. The only possible trouble might 
come from the northern mountaineers, but since they generally held some
t 6.5-P.C. 2.7 Juoe no. 7 Scott to Sterling » 26 Af>?.
r*
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of the lowlands adjoining the hills, the Assam government had in its 
hand a tangible security for their peaceable demeanour.
For Scott, therefore, the only important point of difficulty 
in a restoration of the Ahom monarchy was that of the future military
defence of the Sadiya frontier. The question was whether the establish-
of
ment by such a foreign authority between two directly British-administer­
ed areas would weaken that military defence. As in 1826, Scott held 
that the problem of security and the defence of the country would be 
better provided for under a native administration. The creation of an 
Ahom state would save the government from defence expenditure, such as 
fortifications, since these would be paid for by that state. Indeed, 
such a state, whose revenues consisted chiefly of the labour of its 
subjects, was peculiarly capable of undertaking defensive works. Scott 
further argued that the climate of Assam was proved by experience to be 
so hostile to the constitution of the Company’s Indian troops and so 
destructive to the commissariat cattle that it seemed impossible with­
out a very preponderating superiority of force successfully to carry 
on military operations there against an enemy not subject to the same 
causes of inefficiency. Scott, therefore, argued that such measures 
should be adopted as would enable the local people of the country to 
defend themselves and reduce within the narrowest practicable limits the 
employment of the Company's up-country Hindustani troops in Assam. A J
body of trained local troops and a system of fortifications would help
life n e e  R fit H tr f ® i * 'k" * > iftcMvJ' O »v V-! ’ STifJv' *
the Assamese greatly in the case of any future rupture with the Burmese. ‘ 
It would place them more upon a par with their opponents and render them 
at least capable of holding out until a force of a better description
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could be furnished for their assistance. Considering the miserable 
equipments of the Burmese soldiers and their total want of artillery, 
Scott wrote that ”it would seem, that in no part of the world would 
this artificial superiority be given upon easier terms than in Assam”.*
Scott wrote his comments in April, and by June the government 
had reviewed them and prepared its rejoinder. This showed that the 
government still held that an arrangement interposing ”an ill-governed 
native state between the British frontier detachment and the head 
quarters of the British force in Assam would prove very awkward and in­
convenient in practice” . The problems of a non-monetised economy also 
did not alarm Calcutta : ”in Assam, as elsewhere when tranquillity has 
been long established, commerce promoted and agricultural industry 
cherished under a judicious and liberal system of administration capital, 
will accumulate and resources not be found wanting for the payment of
, TIAJL
a fair and moderate money assessment whatever may beApresent deficiency
2of previous malctts in the province”.
The rejoinder clearly failed to take account of all the pecu-
liarities of Assam and the Assamese problem with which Scott was so
well acquainted. Nevertheless, such was the enormous regard for Scott*s
judgement and local knowledge that, being unable to convince Scott, the
government preferred to follow a policy of procrastination ”as a further
postponement of its decision will not be attended with any material in-
3
convenience after the delay which had already occuKed”.
1 B.S.P.C. 27 June 1828, no. 115, Scott to Sterling, 26 Apr. 1828.
2 B.S.P.C. 27 June 1828, no. 116, Sterling to Scott, 27 June 1828.
3. Ibid.
From June 1828 to May 1831, there was no further discussion 
on the question of restoration but events during this period showed 
how correct Scott had been in his expectation of troubles from the 
disaffected nobles of Upper Assam*
At the beginning of British administration in Upper Assam,  ^
Scott*s policy had been to employ more and more Assamese nobles in the 
Company’s service. He was aware of the unfittedness of the nobles for 
such tasks'^, yet he thought that, as a restoration of the native 
monarchy was bound to take place at a near date, at least some purpose 
might be served by grooming the future monarch and his nobles for their 
role* Thus, so far as the collection of revenue was concerned, efficien­
cy was considered "a matter of secondary importance, which could not 
be put in competition with the superior considerations of conciliating 
the good-will of the most influential classes in society**.^ But the 
government’s indecision about restoration - which prolonged British 
supervision of the area - and the coming of a vigorous officer in the 
person of Capt. J.B. Neufville to handle the affairs of Upper Assam,
in 1828, brought a change in this policy. Neufville believed that the
chances of a restoration were remote, and he therefore wished to re­
organise the administration* The indolence and incapacity of the 
nobility, the impossibility of making them account for the revenues
they collected without the use of duress, led Neufville to introduce
3 •'
tahsildars, who were all natives of Bengal* Neufville also removed
1 The most important complaint were: their irregularity in the trans­
mission and preparation of their accounts and that they were unused 
to writing*
2 BoP.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 18 May
1831.
3 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 58, Neufville to Scott, 29 Apr. 1830 and
also n o . 50, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 18 May 1831*
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from office not less than a hundred kheldars, who were in charge of :
revenue collection, and in their place employed various foreigners or
Assamese clerks of inferior rank who, he thought, would be real "men
of business”.^ Neufville declared that he could find no nobleman in
the country, capable of conducting the business of a tahsildar entrusted
with the task of collecting and regularly accounting for even 30,000 
2
rupees * When Neufville translated his ideas into action, discontent 
arose among the nobles who waited for the opportunity to come forward 
in an organised resistance movement.
The Singpho insurrection of 1830, following a Khasi Rebellion 
in 1829, which we will discuss in cq 3 Lottet* chapter, created a situation 
which these disgruntled nobles of upper Assam utilised to try to restore 
their former power and position. Their first venture was made after 
Gomdhar Konwar, a prince of the royal blood, aspiring to become the 
King of Assam, had arrived in upper Assam from Burma towards the end
o
of 1828. The prince at first appeared as a suitor to the British 
authorities, and addressed a letter to Captain Neufville, praying that 
he might be allowed to receive the country as a raj from the Company.^ 1
1 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 58, Neufville to Scott, 29 Apr. 1830 and 
also no. 50, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 18 May 1831.
2 Ibid.
3 This pretender claimed to be a nephew of Raja Chandra Kanta and a 
relative of ex-Raja Jogeshwar Singha and traced his descent from 
Susengpha, or Buddhi-swarga Narayan who had reigned in Assam from 
1603 to 1641. He and his father 'Dhutoowa Gohain* accompanied in 1818^  
their female relative 1 Atan Neengh Timense, Bar Kunwari* who was sent 
down as a present to the Burmese prince by the then Raja Jogeshwar 
Singha. See B.S.P.C. 12 March 1830, no. 12, Neufville to Scott,
14 DeCo 1828.
4 B.S.P.C. 12 March 1830, no. 13 (I), Gomdhars letter of 23 Oct. 1828.
136
But this was a mere artifice on his part, for at the same time he was 
instigating the Sepoys to rise against the British. A little later 
Gomdhar declared himself Raja of the country, and excited the people 
to rebel against the Company’s Raj. He also collected a small armed 
force. The disgruntled nobles thus got an opportunity to exploit the 
situation created by Gomdhar.'* But their hopes were chimerical for the
o
plot was suppressed in no time. No sooner had it been suppressed tkcu*
another was prepared in 1830, under the leadership of a new pretender
called Rupchand.-^ Rupchand too was supported by the nobles^ many of
whom were the remnants of the previous conspiracy.^ The leaders of
this insurrection, the ex-Bar Gohain; the Barphukan, Haranath, Rupchand
and Jayram were quickly apprehended. They were tried before a Sadr
Panchayat which found all of them guilty of high treason and sentenced
them to death in conformity with the custom of the country.** Capt*
Neufville referred this case to Scott for review and the latter con-
£
firmed the death sentence at least in two cases.0
1 B.S.P.C. 12 March 1830, no. 12, Neufville to Scott, 14 Dec. 1828.
2 Scott to Swinton, 14 March 1829; Proceedings of the Criminal Court 
held by the agent to the governor general on the N.E.F. and 
commissioner in Assam on the 14 March 1829 at Gauhati; Neufville to 
Scott, 27 Dec. 1828; and Swinton to Scott, 12 March 1830.
B.S.P.C. 12 March 1830, nos. 15, 16, 17, 34.
The patra mantri or the grand panchayat who tried the charges against 
Gomdhar gave death penalty to him. Capt. Neufville, the presiding 
officer, recommended a mitigated punishment with banishment from 
Assam for seven years on the ground that he was a mere tool in the 
hands of other conspirators among the nobles. Scott approved 
Neufville*s judgement. The other conspirators who were also sentenced 
to death by the original Court received lesser punishments.
3 B.S.P.C. 30 Apr. 1830, no. 5 A. Neufville to Col. C. Fagan, Adjt. 
Genl. of the array, 30 March l830i B.P.C. 16 July 1830, no. 49.
4 B.P.C. 24 Sept. 1830, no. 76, Scott to Chief Secretary, 7 Aug. 1830.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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The action taken against the culprits in the second rebellion 
was severe compared to that taken against the conspirators of the 
earlier plot* The execution of the sentence was also significantly 
quick* In fact, Scott did not wait for the final confirmation of the 
Supreme Government* The reason was this ; At this time Capt. Neufville 
suddenly died and Scott who was far away from the actual scene of in­
surrection feared that the removal of Neufville*s strong hand might 
encourage the nobility to start a fresh insurrection. He therefore 
decided to make a public example by directing the immediate execution 
of the sentence passed on the Barphukan and Jayram.^ In his view, the 
leniency, shown on the earlier occasion^, had had no effect other than 
to produce another revolt. But although Scott took vigorous action to 
put down the second rebellion, he never considered severity to be the 
ultimate solution* Rather the insurrections and rebellions of the 
period led him to open the question of restoration once again.
The primary cause of the outbreaks had been the systematic
removal from offices of the ** indolent nobles** by the strong hand of the
British. Scott now reported that if the Supreme Government desired to
retain that part of the country under its direct authority he believed
that more Assamese would have to be removed and more Europeans brought
3
into the administration. The time had come when the British government 
could no longer recede from its responsibility for a proper European
1 B.P.C* 2h Sept. 1830, no. 76, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 7 Aug.
1830.
2 See above, p. , n^.
3 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 18 May 
1831#
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administration on the weak ground that the revenue realised from the
people were not sufficient. If it was really so, he argued, they
should immediately restore that portion of Assam to an Assamese prince
for in his opinion "an imperfect British administration must be worse
than a native one, which, even if it wants in integrity, at least
possesses a perfect knowledge of the laws, customs and prejudices of
its subjects and an intimate acquaintance with their peculiar revenue
system".* The installation of a native prince in upper Assam would
put an end to the frequent plots and intrigues of royal pretenders, and,
said Scott, "we should without any loss of net revenue worth mentioning
avoid the odium necessarily attached to the exclusion of the royal
family, the Repression of the nobles, the neglect of the national
religion and the disgust that is likely to be occasioned by frequent
o
executions for criminal offences of a popular character". Scott 
further remarked that "it would be contrary to reason^ to expect" that 
"the members of the late dynasty whose ancestors have reigned for up­
wards of five hundred years and the noble families which have enjoyed 
distinction for the same period should at once give up all their hopes 
of future greatness upon the appearance amongst them of a handful of 
strangers, ... we must therefore be prepared if we retain the country 
in our own hands, for a succession of petty conspiracies such as have 
already occulted and which I do not believe would be prevented by the 
allowance that it is proposed to make to nobles, of whom many must still
1 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 18 May, 
1831®
2 Ibid.
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remain unprovided for".^ Scott also made it clear to the government 
that if the decision to restore a native monarchy in Upper Assam were 
taken, the execution of it should be as quick as possible as "the 
elective nature of the former government has also had the effect of 
multiplying the number of eventual claimants to the Regal office ... ... 
and we have lately witnessed that in little more than a year the party 
late in rebellion in Upper Assam brought forward two different aspirants
p
to the government"*
The chief objection of the Supreme Government against Scott’s 
plan of a restoration had been that the intervention of a tributary 
territory would make it difficult to move soldiers up river in the event 
of another Burmese war* Scott, therefore, now put forward a new suggestioi 
that the territories on the northern bank of the Brahmaputra should be 
retained by the Company and the southern bank only be restored to the 
king and the nobility. He divided the Brahmaputra valley into four 
divisions and suggested that the Jorhat division, extending from Barhat 
to the Dhansiri river, covering an area of 3,500 square miles and con­
taining a population of 2,20,000 souls, with an income of one lakh of 
rupees, should be handed to a native king* As before, Scott was of the 
opinion that the power of deposition in the event of gross misgovernment 
should, however, be retained by an explicit declaration. This time he 
also stipulated that a certain potjion of the revenue should be applied
1 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 18 May 
1831.
2 Ibid.
3 Post-script to Scott’s letter to the Chief Secretary, 18 May 1831, 
B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50.
no
for the military defence of the country under the direction of the 
British government; that the old criminal law authorising the barbarous 
system of mutilation should be modified and that the tfaja should make 
for gradual emancipation of the paiks by the substitution of money 
payment for personal service#1
The Vice-president-in-Council this time wanted to give serious 
consideration to Scott’s suggestion. But the council, looking at the 
problem from the economic point of view, could not arrive at an immedi­
ate decision# The question for them was why the British government 
should be spending so much money to protect an unprofitable and isolated
portion of land around Sadiya when the more profitable and populous
2
parts of upper Assam were to be given over to a native monarch. They 
therefore called upon Scott to report whether the defence of the eastern 
frontier could be safely left in the hands of the Singpho chiefs or even 
be handed over to Gambhir Singh of Manipur. Their chief objection 
actually remained the same : the inability to see how a foreign govern­
ment could be installed in the intervening tract if the eastern frontier
3
was to be retained in British hands. The matter was again referred to 
the Agent, but meanwhile Lord Bentinck had expressed his views on the 
question0 Regarding the most controversial point, the retention of the 
Sadiya frontier, he supported the views held by Scott and declared that 
though "the maintenance of the Suddeya station would be purely one of
1 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 18 May
1831.
2 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 59, Swinton to Scott, 10 June 1831.
3 B.P.C. 2 Sept. 1831, no. 2, H.T. Prinsep to G. Swinton, 1 Sept. If St.
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expense” it was nevertheless desirable. He feared that once the British
, ir y~'rn7iiu:i T h ^ - t - r v fi - ‘ 1 ‘ L .. ' I, , * il.'7 1? , V ^ -  V_+. J  It «•' MgJiJLjs
control was withdrawn from that tract the province would be overrun by 
the surrounding wild tribes. So he definitely laid down that Sadiya 
must be maintained* The Council’s suggestion of handing over to Gambhir 
Singh the defence of the eastern frontier, he turned down as fantastic, 
contending that the new chief and his adherents would be looked on by 
all parties with jealousy. Coming to the actual question of restoration, 
he observed that it was "purely one of policy”. As the country had been 
conquered from the Burmese without the slightest assistance from the 
expelled rajas or from any other party, there could not be any moral 
claim for services rendered by anyone. He doubted any good administration 
resulting out of the miserably defective constitution of the Ahom 
monarchy but still he did not overlook the fact that "their continuance.., 
for a period of time almost without example in History would seem to
A  MU 1 pb C j i • • ;  j
indicate something intrinsically good in the original constitution and s
at all events that it is deeply rooted in the feelings of the people".1
He therefore came to the conclusion "that the native government may be
established, aided by the support and advice of a British officer".
Scott was therefore directed to furnish a specific plan for the in-
2stitution of a native monarchy. Scott did not live long enough to see 
the final restoration in 1833; hut, before he died, the restoration was 
clearly within sight^. The securing of this object was thus Scott’s 
final achievement for Assam.
1 B.P.C. 2 Sept. 1831, no. 2, H.T. Prinsep, secy, to the Governor- 
General, Simla, to G. Swinton, Chief Secretary to Government, Fort 
William, 18 July, 1831.
2 B.P.C. 2 Sept. 1831, no. 2, H.T. Prinsep to G. Swinton, 18 July 1831.
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Appendix A
The native establishment for Lower Assam proposed in May 1825**
Judicial Revenue
Sarishtadar mm 100
Ru-bakar Navis - 60
♦Muhafiz - 40
3 Muharrirs - 90
2 Assamese do - 50
♦Nazir - 40
♦Muharrir - 20
♦Jamadar - 12
♦15 Peons - 90
♦Daftari - 6
♦Gangajaliya - 6
♦Mullakurani - 6
♦Interpreters - 30
♦Assam Pundits - 30
Boats for records and 
Amlas mm 70
Do for Nazir and prisoners 70
stationery 20
Total Sicca Rs. 740
Jail establishment
Darogha - 35
Muharrir - 20
Jamadar - 12
2 Dafa-dars - 16
A guard of 30 militia men 60
Total Sicca Rs. 143
Sarishtadar 
Peshkar 
♦Depy .Muhaf i z 
4 Muharrirs 
2 Assamese do 
♦Treasurer 
♦Muharrir 
♦Poddar
♦English writer 
♦Daftari 
office boat 
stationery
100
60
25
120
50
40
20
10
100
10
70
20
Total Sicca Rs. 625
♦ To act in both departments.
Sadr Police
Darogha - 60
2 Muharrirs - 45
Jamadar - 12
2 Dafa-dars - 16
8 Chaprasis - 48
20 militia men 
additional pay -
40
contingencies - 10
Total Sicca Rs.231
Total 1739
1 B.S.P.C. 7 July 1826, no. 32, Scott and Richards to Swinton 
25 May 1825.
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Barphukan - 300
Ru-bakar Navis - 60
♦Muhafiz - 40
2 Muharrirs - 60
2 Assamese do - 50
♦Nazir - 40
♦Muharrir - 20
♦J amadar - 12
♦15 Peons - 90
♦Daftari - 6
♦Gangajaliya - 6
♦Mul lakurani - 6
» , . j t  t v |  < j l  J .A. f, - 4  > 1, I j j y
♦Interpreters - 30
♦Assam Pundits - 30
Boats for records and 
Amlas - 70
Do for Nazir and prisoners 70
stationery - 20
Total Sicca Rs. 910
Jail establishment
Darogha
Muharrir
Jamadar
2 Dafa-dars
30 militia men 
additional pay
Total Sicca Rs. 143
1
60 
25 
90 
50 
40 
20 
10
200
10 
70 
20
Total Sicca Rs. 595
* To act in both departments. 
Sadr Police
Darogha - 60
2 Muharrirs - 45
Jamadar - 12
2 Dafa-dars - 16
8 Chaprasis - 48
20 militia men - 40
contingencies - 10
Total Sicca Rs0 231
Appendix B
The native establishment for Upper Assam proposed in May 1825
Judicial Revenue
Peshkar 
Depy. Muhafiz 
3 Muharrirs 
2 Assamese do 
♦Treasurer 
♦Muharrir 
♦Poddar
♦English writer 
and accountant
♦Daftari
office boat
stationery
35
20
12
16
60
Total 1879
1 BoS.P.C. 7 July 1826, no. 32, Scott and Richards to Swinton 
25 May 1825«
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CHAPTER V
THE EVOLUTION OF A NEW ADMIN IS TRATI ON FOR ASSAM
The development of British administration in Assam, during
Sgott's time, had three stages. From 1824 to the early period of 1825
the whole of Assam, including the British-occupied western portion,
was considered enemy territory under British military possession.
Martial law was declared in June 1824* and a clear distinction was
drawn between the respective duties of the officer commanding and those
of the political agent of the gfovernor-general. The latter was vested
with the general management and conduct of all political transactions
and negotiations with the Assamese and other native chiefs friendly to
the British interest. He was also required to treat with the enemy but
to take care not to interfere with matters of a purely military nature,
though Scott was required freely and unreservedly to discuss all
o
questions of general interest with the commanding officer.
The management and collection of revenue of those western parts 
of Assam which were actually in British possession, Scott was asked to 
undertake either in person or through his assistant, Capt. Davidson, 
without calling in the aid of the military power.^ So far as the ad­
ministration of civil and criminal justice was concerned, the territory
1 B.S.P.C. 4 June 1824, nos. 57-59, Swinton to Scott, 4- Tune , I
2 B.S.P.C. 2 July 1824, no. 16, Swinton to Scotty Z TuLy , 1224-
3 Ibid*
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of Assam was not considered tranquil enough for any regular system* The
government thought it advisable, therefore, that punishment of offenders
should be left entirely to the commanding officer.^ The political
agent was instructed to attach much importance to the maintenance of
friendly relations with the people of Assam and the various frontier
2
tribes of the neighbourhood*
In April, 1825, there began a new stage of development. The
whole of the kingdom of Assam having being now occupied by the British
forces and the Burmese completely expelled, it became necessary to
devise some plan for the temporary administration of its internal
affairs pending a final decision regarding the disposal of the country.
The government resolved to appoint Scott - the agent of the governor-
general-in-council, and Lt.-Col. Richards, the commanding officer in
Assam as joint commissioners, Scott being recognized as the senior 
3
commissioner. In questions which might fall under the joint delebera-
tion of the commissioners Scott, as senior member, would exercise the
casting vote. In his capacity as the governor-generalTs agent, he
would also be responsible for negotiating with the native princes of
the country and the tribes and people bordering upon or living beyond
Assam. But in such matters, when not personally present in Eastern
4
Assam, he was expected to act through Lt.-Col. Richards. It was 
desired that the commissioners should communicate freely and constantly
1 B . S . P . C .  2 July 1824, no. 16, Swinton to Scott. 2  July 1824.
2 Ibid.
3 B . S . P . C .  5 Apr. 1825, no. 26, Swinton to Scott, 5 Apr. 1825.
4 B . S . P . C .  5 Apr. 1825, no. 24, Swinton to Scott, 5 Apr. 1825.
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with each other, even on local questions, and so endeavour to preserve 
as much conformity as circumstances would permit in their systems of 
administration.'*’
The new title of commissioner added little to the existing 
powers of Scott and Richards. What was important in the new system was 
the government’s decision to begin a provisional administration in both 
divisions of Assam. Scott reported the settlement which he intended to 
make in the field of revenue collection in Kamrup, Darrang, and Naduar 
and other parts of Western Assam. The government introduced a provi­
sional system of police and rules for the arbitration and adjudication 
of civil disputes. Jails were built in each division and the necessary 
establishment of guards and police peons were allotted. The pacifi­
cation and settlement of the wild tribes of Assam and the protection 
of the inhabitants of the lowlands from their inroads also caught 
governments^ immediate attention. In the department of criminal 
justice, the senior commissioner was allowed to take cognizance of 
cases not involving capital punishment, in the western division of 
Assam. Each commissioner was made competent to receive complaints and 
take cognizance of offences in the first instance as well as to award 
such punishment as they judged consistent with the demands of public
justice.3
Scott’s responsibility was gradually increased. In August, 
1825, Lt.-Col. Richards resigned from the job as he was to proceed to 
Calcutta to make application for a furlough to Europe on "most urgent
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr* 1825, no. 25, Swinton to Scotty 5 Apr.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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private a f f a i r s S o o n  after Lt.-Col. Sargent was appointed to the
command of the troops in Assam, but on his declining to decept the post
Lt.-Col. Cooper was appointed, on Col* RichardsT recommendation, in
November 1825, both as commander and joint commissioner of Assam. In
sanctioning the temporary appointment of Lt.-Col. Cooper, the government
observed that it would be unnecessary to maintain the present system of
two commissioners after the return of complete peace, when Lt.-Col.
Cooper1 s corps would no longer be required. The govemor-general-in-
council proposed, therefore, to abolish the situation of junior
2
commissioner after Lt.-Col. Coopers term was over.
The beginning of the year 1828 saw further changes. On 7 March 
the Government declared : ”The nomination of Lt.-Col. Cooper to the 
civil management of Upper Assam having been from the beginning pro­
fessedly a temporary arrangement, the Governor-General-in-Council con-
Wi&
ceives that the period has now arrived whenAreference both to con­
siderations of economy and to the forward state of measures in progress 
for the final settlement of the country it is expedient and proper that 
the charge of administration should be transferred to the civil authori­
ty”.^ Scott*s eagerness to bring about a settled administration in 
Assam, however, had been greater than government’s. Despite the augmen­
tation of his powers he had been handicapped in executing his ideas by
1 B.S.P.C. 23 Sept. 1825, nos. 13, 15-16, Richards to Scott, 27 Aug. 
1825, and Swinton to Scott, 23 Sept. 1825.
2 B.S.P.C. 16 Dec. 1825, nos. 26-27, Richards to Scott, 9 Nov. 1825, 
Swinton to Scott, 16 Dec. 1825*
3 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 8, Swinton to Scott, 7 March 1828.
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the government's indecision about their ultimate aims in Assam. In 
February, 1828, Scott had forced the issue by producing a plan for 
Assam and inviting the government to discuss it. He outlined the objects 
thus :
1) The realization of a sufficient revenue for the future
defence of the country.
2) The restoration of a native prince in Upper Assam to his
former dignity but with such curtailment of his ancient
territory and revenue as might be necessary.
3) Thetranquillization of the eastern frontier of the kingdom
which for the last forty years had either been in a state
of open rebellion or merely nominal subjection to the 
Assamese monarchs.*
In the past while pursuing his forward policy Scott had not
forseen that any part of Assam should come into direct British possess- 
2
ion. His sole idea had been to help the Assamese to drive their 
Burmese invaders out, and to install an effective king on the throne of 
Assam, bound by a subsidiary alliance to the British. But the complete
J
demoralisation of the Assamese and the corruption in the ruling 
authorities disillusioned him ; and soon after his arrival in Assam he 
began to urge that the best possible solution for the protection of the
fc
eastern frontier of British India would be to annex Lower Assam and 
restore a native monarchy in the upper part of the province. But 
annexation involved the creation of an administration,especially revenue 
and judicial; and the question of restoration was linked with two major 
issues, the tranquillization of the north-east frontier of Assam and <
1 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 4, Scott to Swinton, 2 Feb. 1828. 
Y  2 See chapter III, p.
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its future defence and the winning of Assamese co-operation and good- 
will. In the following pages the attempt is made to discuss Scott’s 
ideas and the government’s policies on revenue and judicial matters.*
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(l)
A land revenue policy for Assam.
No sooner had British forces occupied Western Assam in 1824 
than Scott began to investigate the revenue possibilities of the area, 
even though no decision had yet been taken at Calcutta about the future
disposal of the territory. Some action, as he said, was essential if
2
the future defence of the country was to be provided for.^
3$ thB T*y Y‘ : X'Y ri.iK£I jLX* i & TIjSI ' * •Although initially Scott did not think there would be much 
difficulty in the assessment and collection of revenue, the system of 
land revenue in Assam was not a simple one. More important, it bore 
little resemblance to the Bengal system. When in the first half of the 
seventeenth century Assam was invaded by the Mughals, Kamrup was con­
quered and for some time held by them. In that part of Assam the pargana 
system which the Mughals introduced took root and was retained unchanged
■ I ... I-M- I—  . ... - .!■ ■— •- - I ....      ,
1 The question of the north-east frontier’s tranquillization and of 
restoration of an Ahom monarchy to which Scott gave his attention as 
soon as the conquest was complete, has already been treated in 
previous chapters.
2 See supra, p.
150
during later Ahom rule. But even here the British found the system much 
less regular than in Bengal, some of the parganas had talooks scattered 
throughout the division and the parganas themselves were very unequal 
in size.'*'
The system in the rest of Assam was linked with the paik or 
2
t,*ie khel system. which was the nucleus of all Ahom administration. The
revenues of the state were, for the most part, realized on articles of
produce and personal labour, for not only the soil, but the subject was
the property of the state. Every adult male or paik worked for the
benefit of the state for three or four months a year. In return for this
he was given two puras (nearly three acres) of rupit or first class
cultivable land. This land was called gamati or bodyland and was free 
4
of rent. For his homestead plot or bari also a paik paid no rent. In 
practice, the bari lands were permitted to be dealt with as hereditary 
and transferable; but the two puras of gamati. rice land, were con­
sidered the property of the state, neither hereditary nor transferable.^
Three, or less often four, paiks were formed into a gote or 
squad. When one of the gote was away on his three or four months service 
the remaining members cultivated not only their own fields but also 
those of the absentee member of the gote. Thus all the members of a gote 
could be employed in rotation upon public work during the year without
1 F* Jenkin's report, 13 Nov. 1849, Memorandum on the Revenue Ad­
ministration of the Lower Provinces of Bengal, p. 62. «
2 The system is said to have been invented during the reign of Raja
Pratap Singh (1603-1641) by Muraai Tamuli Barbarua. G. Borooah,
op.cit., p. 104.
3 Memorandum on the Revenue Administration of the Lower Provinces.p.6In
4 Ibid, p. 60.
5 Ibid, p. 6ln.
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hardship to their families, Paiks were also grouped into khels or 
guilds according to the nature of their duties, each khel ranging in 
strength from three to six thousand men,
Not all paiks were required to render manual labour for their
gamati, There were some who paid a tax in money in lieu of manual
labour, though this was very rare and only a few khels comprising men
of superior birth or caste had this privilege. They were called chamuas.
meaning independent, and they comprised a higher order of subjects.
Those who rendered manual labour belonged to two types. The majority
were kari-paiks who in wartime had to fight, and, in peacetime, were
employed in building and repairing roads and bridges, in excavating
3
tanks and in other works of public utility. The other main group of 
paiks were not field labourers but artisans - smiths, weavers, oil- 
pressers, gold-washers and the like whose skilled labour was applied
f
by the state to the production of the goods of their craft or trade.
They received their gamati lands in return for the products of their 
skills.4
Above the various paiks and khels there was a hierarchy of ad- * 
ministrators and officers. High officers such as phukans, baruas 
ra.ikhowas were the heads of the khels and the paiks were under their
1 S,K, Bhuyan, Anglo-Assamese Relations, p, 530,
2 Haliram Dhekial Phukan in his book, Assam Buran.i i (first published
in 1829) mentions the following khels as chamua khels : Kataki,Kakati, 
Boragi, Dalaiganak, Jyotishiya, Changkhataniar, Sabhapandit, Bej,
Strutiparha, Pharsiparha garia. I
J.M. Bhattacharya, (ed.) op.cit,, pp, 52-55.
3 S.K, Bhuyan, Anglo-Assaroese Relations. p„ 529,
4 Memorandum on the Revenue Administration of the Lower Provinces of
Bengal, p. 60
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command# These officials presided, too, over meIs - a kind of panchayat 
where minor civil and criminal disputes were settled. Under these 
officers were junior officers - hazarikas. saikias. and boras in charge 
of one thousand, of one hundred, and of twenty paiks#^
It can be seen from this brief review, that, the Ahom state 
drew little of its revenues in money : the Ahom economy was a barter 
rather than a monetised economy. Persons cultivating land in excess of 
the usual allotment used to pay a nominal cash revenue par pura of such 
ubar or katani land.^ Again, some non-cultivating khels. like the 
gold washers, paid a high tax in money. Further, defaulting crown paiks 
had to pay a fine in cash. Moreover, the farming of the dues levied at 
haths or markets, and in the chowkies, or custom houses also brought 
a cash revenue to the state exchequer. The tribute from the vassal 
chiefs was yet another source of money income. Furthermore, during the 
period of civil strife and on the eve of the Burmese war, when money 
was required for war purposes the Ahom government introduced a capi­
tation tax. This tax was variously named and imposed. The British found 
on their arrival in Assam, that in Kantrup it was a house tax, kliari- 
katana, in Nowgong and Upper Assam, it was a body or poll tax, gadhan 
of one rupee for each paik of full age, and in Darrang a hearth tax
Icharukar) or a tax upon every family or person cooking separately again 
3
of one rupee. Even so the Ahom government could not pay cash salaries
1 For the power and position of the various Ahom officials 
see Sir Edward Gait, A History of Assam, pp. 235-239.
2 J.M. Bhattacharya, op.cit., p. 52; Memorandum on the Revenue Ad­
ministration of Lower Provinces, p. 61.
3 Ibid, pp. 61-62.
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to its officials. Hence there sprang up another distinctive feature of 
the Ahom society - the payment of the official nobility in labour 
services. Officials were allotted the services of a number of paiks 
called likchows. in lieu of salary. They were also given certain rent- 
free lands nankar or maunmati land, and were also allowed to occupy 
vast tracts of khats or waste lands. On both of these types of land they 
could employ their likchows and slaves.* This then was the system 
which Scott had to learn to understand, and to use or modify for 
British government.
From May, 1824, though his powers had not yet been defined, 
Scott began a search for revenue documents of the former government, 
and made his first estimate of possible revenue yields. In view of the
WMHlW .. —I.Hi.tuT.,--*.. -
devastation latterly caused by the Burmese, he pitched the demand at »
about one-fourth of the rate of land revenue levied by the zamindars of
Goalpara and of the adjoining Company territories. Even so thanks to
the fact that Burmese damage proved on investigation to have been less
extensive in Western Assam than anticipated, Scott hoped that with the
custom duties from the Kandahar chowky he might secure revenues of up
2
to one and a half lakhs of rupees from Lower Assam, up to Kaliabar.
For the Bengal year of 1231 (1824/5) Scott1s actual total 
demand from Lower Assam was Narayani Rs. 1,48,112. The areas on which
1 See infra, p.14-1
2 B.S.P.C. 28 May 1824, no. 19, Scott to Swinton, 12 May 1824;
B.S.P.C. 2 July 1824, no. 15, Scott to Swinton, 15 June 1824.
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revenue was assessed were Kamrup, Darrang, Naduar (situated at the foot 
of the southern hills between Habraghat and Gauhati) and land occupied 
by rajas of Dimarua, jeltola and Rani (lying to the south of the Kalang 
river). The settlement was made with a variety of persons. That with 
Raja Vijayanarayan of Darrang was for a total .jama of Ny.Rs. 42,000 and 
1500 paiks to be furnished for the use of the army.^ From nineteen 
chaudhuries and other malguzars of the various mahals of Kamrup some 
69,086 Narayani rupees was demanded. The assessments made with Uttam
Singh of Dimarua, Balukan Singh of Rani and Sambadari Singh of Beltola
ma ha2d o
were fixed at 6,349; 4,000; and 2,000 Narayani rupees respectively.4"
Naduar The Raja & ? jyj 3
Lakhiraj* lands were assessed at 12,100 Narayani rupees and
jOLSLQ A G f i  1  &  "I 1*0 U   ^ 3  f  2  9  ^  i  m f ^ 5
the rest came from the unsettled mahals of Kamrup entrusted to sazawals
and from the raja of Naduar. These assessments concluded, Scott hastened
3
to make the first half-yearly collection. The account of the revenue
1 The amount charged upon the raja of Darrang was thought by the people 
to be an over assessment and Scott proposed to make a revenue survey ' 
which would afterwards be extended to the pargana of Kamrup also. 
B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1828, no. 27, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1825.
2 These three chiefs ”in former times were merely tributary to the 
Assamese if not to the Moghuls, but having frequently rebelled they 
were latterly reduced to complete subjugation. There were no accurate 
accounts of the assets of their estates, some of which are very 
productive and adverting to the expediency of conciliating persons so 
situated the settlement was made in a great measure, with reference 
to what individuals in possession voluntarily offered to pay”.
Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1828, B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, no. 27.
* The lands granted by the Ahom rajas to temples, religious institu­
tions and pious and meritorious persons in Lower Assam were known as 
Nisf-khira.i or half-revenue-paying estates, as distinguished from 
Khira.j or full-revenue-paying estates. In course of time these lands 
were held revenue-free, and the owners called themselves Lakhira.jdars 
denoting total exemption from payment of revenue. See 
W.E. Ward, Note on the Assam land revenue system, p. 69.
3 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, nos. 27-28, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1825.
c
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collection for the first six months of the Bengal year 1231 (1824/5) 
was the following1:
Mahals Malguzars Demand Collection Recoverable
balance
Darrang Raja Vijaya- 
narayan
21,000 12,831 8,168
Assessed 
pargana of 
Kamrup
The Chaudhuries 34,149 21,531 13,510
Unsettled
mahals Sazawals 2,188 2,188
-
Naduar The Raja 6,180 2,133 3,547
Dimarua,
Rani, Beltola The Proprietors 5,089 3,294 1,795
Devalay 
£  Lakhiraj H
The Managers 1,461 692 769
.
Total Ny. Rs • 76,244 48,255 28,881
Sicca Rs, (after deducting a 
batta of 37% ) 48,033
30,400 18,195
I Tif )t i <4 HP* %
After this first half-yearly collection, thoughi a sum of
Narayani Rs. 28, 881 or over one third of the demand still remained to
be collected, the demand for the rest of the year was much increased.
The demand for the second six months was pitched at Rs. 106,255 and the
collection was pushed up to Rs. 123, 569, though this evidently in-
eluded arrears 2from the first half year. Scott explained the increase
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr* 1825, nos. 27-28, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1825.
2 B.S.P.C. 20 Jan. 1826, nos. 
Comparative Statement of the
23-24, Scott to Swinton, 
Settlement for the Land
14 Dec. 1825. 
Revenue of Lower
Assam for the Year 1231 and 1232 Bengal style or 1746 and 1747 
Assam style*
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as being due to the bringing of new areas such as the mahals near Raha 
chowky under collection.1 The total received in the year came to 
Rs. 171,824.2
The basis of Scott’s new assessment was the documents which he 
got from Majumdar Barua the head qanungo of Kamrup.^ But they were of 
so ancient a date that they offered little real insight into the existing 
state of the country. It was too late in the season, as Scott said, to 
undertake any effective but lengthy scrutiny into the assets of the 
different parganas. He therefore acted upon "the best information 
immediately obtainable" in assessing the specific amount due from the 
different malguzars.**
The principle followed by Scott in the settlement in Kamrup 
district was to double the assessment on inalienable land which was 
found to have once been paid by the malguzars according to the old 
documents. An additional amount was also charged on account of the 
House tax, first imposed by Raja Chandra Kanta in Lower Assam. This 
Scott continued as a useful way to equalizing the burden of taxation, 
from which many "of the lesser order of the inhabitants" had been pre-
5
viously exempted on account of their caste or class.
■—  ■ I- — — — — — I...... - ......... -- —  - ■ ■ - - ■   —  .... . .    —
1 B.S.P.C. 20 Jan. 1826, nos. 23-24, Scott to Swinton, 14 Dec. 1825.
Comparative Statement of the Settlement for the Land Revenue of 
Lower Assam for the Yea£ 1231 and 1232 Bengal style or 1746 and 1747 -
Assam style.
2 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 5, Scott to Swinton, 2 Feb. 1828.
3 The orign of these documents goes back to 1678 when after the death
of Raja Pramatta Singh the first revenue settlement in Kamrup was 
made on the basis of a survey. These settlement papers were known as 
perakakats. J.M. Bhattacharya (ed.), op.cit., p. 41.
4 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, no. 27, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1825.
5 Ibid.
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The settlement was made with the hereditary chaudhuries who 
were on the same footing as the chaudhuries of Bengal before the con­
clusion of the decennial settlement# That is, they were officials, not 
owners of land, or rent receivers, and were liable to be removed at the 
government’s pleasure. When in office, they enjoyed nankar lands called 
maunmati and the service of a certain number of paiks. Their nankar 
lands varied from two hundred to one thousand Bengal bighas# and 
similar but smaller assignments were made to the patwaris - their 
assistants# Scott made no alteration in this arrangement#*
To widen the tax base Scott also started collecting revenue 
from lakhira.i paiks and lands# These lands were classified as debottar - 
lands granted for the maintenance of temples; brahmottar - lands for
Brahmins; and dharmottar - lands granted for religious and charitable
2
purposes. Scott imposed a tax on these lands using as a precedent that 
levied by the Buragohain Purnananda who had been the prime minister 
during the Burmese invasion nine years previously. The fact that the 
lands of this description in Kamrup were equal in extent to those cul­
tivated by the paiks strengthened him in his decision. To prevent dis­
tress to the poorer class of Brahmins and other holders of such lands,
Scott directed that it should not be collected from holdings smaller
3
than two puras or about seven Bengal bighas.
r i.
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, no. 27, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1825.
2 Sir W.E. Ward writes that "these lands had been assessed at five 
annas a pura (four bighas) by the Assam Rajas themselves. Scott 
therefore fixed their assessment at this rate, and subsequently in­
creased it to 7 or 8 annas a pura by imposition of a tax known as 
Barangani. Sir W.E. Ward, op.cit., p. 69.
3 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, no. 27, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1825.
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Scott, reporting on the country’s agricultural capabilities, 
stated that the land throughout the division was fertile and produced 
far more luxuriant crops than any part of Bengal, A greater amount of 
capital was also applied by individuals to agricultural improvement in 
Lower Assam than he had witnessed in any other British provences. This 
capital was also more profitably laid out than was usual - people taking 
great care in rearing the muga silk worms and the lac insect, both 
sources of considerable wealth to the inhabitants.*
Thus from his actual inspection of the country and the in­
formation derived from the records of the Ahom and Mughal governments 
Scott felt that government might reasonably expect that within a few 
years Lower Assam up to Bishnath would be yielding an annual revenue of 
from four to six lakhs, exclusive of custom duties but including an 
abkari tax on opium and profits from the elephant hunts or khedas.
Mughal records, Scott stated, exhibited a revenue of upwards of 
Rs, 300,000 from this area. An annual revenue of over five lakhs would 
provide an ample allowance for the profits of an intermediate class of 
agents between the government and peasantry. Since Scott also thought 
that it should be possible quite soon so to monetise the economy as to
permit these revenues to be collected in cash, he now strongly urged
«n(t rAvimiA in this older B ritish T1; « wru? I2
that government should annex,the recently occupied areas of Lower Assam
The prospects for revenue in Upper Assam were by no means so 
encouraging. Owing to the very great devastation committed by the
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, no. 27, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1825.
2 Ibid.
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Singphos, Scott did not expect it to yield more than fifteen thousand 
Sicca rupees for the revenue years 1824/5. Nor did he feel that a 
greater sum was urgently required for civil purposes in that part.* The 
actual demand made in Upper Assam for this year however was Sicca 
Rs. 52,695. The amount actually received was Sicca Rs. 28,057.2
In 1825, when they were planning their provisional administra­
tion, Scott and Richards had made it a principle to make as little 
alteration in the existing institutions of Upper Assam as possible. 
Accordingly in Upper Assam the collection of revenue was left in the 
control of a tahsildar. to which office Janardan Barbarua, a person of 
rank and substance and connected by marriage with the late Raja 
Gaurinath, was appointed. At the request of the various officers of 
state responsible for the revenue of the area, arrangements were also 
made for a piyal„ or fresh enumeration of paiks and a reallotment of 
land. Three natives of rank, with the requisite establishment of 
muharrirs etc. were appointed to perform this duty, three thousand
3
rupees being awarded to them for the completion of the task.
In the administration of Lower Assam, however, it was thought 
expedient to keep more closely to the rules observed in the judicial 
and revenue departments in the older British possessions. This was 
essential because of the possibility that this part of the country might
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, no. 27, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1825.
2 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 51, Estimate of the actual demand of
Revenue in Upper Assam for the year 1747 A.S. or 1825/26 
E.S. Scott to Swinton, 18 May 1831.
3 B.S.P.C. 7 July 1826, no. 31, Scott and Richards to government,
25 May 1825c
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be retained by the British. It was facilitated, too, by the fact that 
the area had been long under Muslim rule* and its inhabitants did not 
differ so substantially from those of the neighbouring parts of British 
territory, previous to the introduction of the decennial settlement. 
Scott argued that the methods introduced by the Ahoms had been unpro­
ductive and were disliked by the people. He therefore transferred the 
Barphukan, who had been ruling Kamrup as the viceroy of the Ahom raja, 
assigning him to a judicial post in Upper Assam, and allotting him a 
monthly salary of three hundred rupees^ as compensation for the loss of 
the large emoluments of his viceregal office. The revenue establishment 
of Lower Assam Scott then placed under a native sarishtadar. Since 
Duaria Barua* family had been particularly helpful ever since his 
arrival in Assam, Scott appointed one of their members, named Haliram,
who was given the title of Dhekial Phukan by the raja, to this new 
2
office.
* During the period of their rule (1612-1627) the Mughals remained in 
Kamrup like an army of occupation, the basis of their rule being 
essentially military* Collection of revenue, suppression of local in­
surrections and the conduct of khedah operations seem to have been 
the main aims of Mughal government. Kamrup was made a Bengal subah 
and not a sarkar by itself. The parganas became the real governmental' 
units. See S.N. Bhattacharyy^, A History of Mughal North-East 
Frontier Policy, pp. 163-168.
1 See infra, p. n 2-
+ "The Duaria Barua or Baruas received the goods of the Assam merchants, 
and exchanged them for Bengal products. They realised the duties on 
all exports and imports. The ratesequitably fixed by the government 
of Assam underwent fluctuations at the hands of different Duaria 
Baruas".
See S.K. Bhuyan, Anglo-Assamese Relations, pp. 50-51; see also 
G. Borooah, The Life of Anandaram Dhekial Phukan (in Assamese) for 
the duties of the Duaria Baruas, pp. 13-15.
2 G. Borooah, The Life of Anandaram. p. 30, and also pp. 9, 13-15,
26, 28. Anandaram was the son of Haliram.
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In 1825-26, the Bengal year 1232, the ,jaia was again increased 
to a total of Rs. 245,361, which was an increase of over sixty thousand 
rupees upon the previous yeai*s demand. Once again the demand proved 
difficult to realise, and in February, 1827, Scott had to write to 
Swinton for permission to write off about ten thousand rupees as not 
recoverable, from parganas which had proved to have been much over 
assessed. In 1828 government approval was finally given to Scott*s 
request.^
The existence of these large balances made it clear that some
CL
revision and reappraisal of the revenue resources of Lower Assam was 
required. In mid 1825 therefore, Scott proposed that a proper survey 
of the area should be undertaken. A considerable number of native sur­
veyors had already been taught the use of the compass, and Scott now 
asked government for the services of a Mr. Mathews, lately employed on 
the Cachar frontier, and of a native draughtsman to direct a scientific 
revenue survey. The establishment for which he sought sanction was to 
consist of ten native surveyors, one draughtsman, one Bengali muharrir 
and ai writer of English, at a cost of not more than six hundred rupees 
a month. Such were the number of interesting subjects of enquiry, Scott
1 B.S.P.C. 20 Jan. 1826, nos. 23-24, Scott to Swinton, 14 Dec. 1825.
2 B.S.P.C. 23 Feb. 1827, no. 12, Scott to Swinton, 13 Feb. 1827;
B.S.P.C. 8 *eb. 1828, no. 34, Swinton to Scott, 8 Feb. 1828;
B.S.P.C. 28 May 1830, no. 92, Scott to Swinton, 6 May, 1830.
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pleaded, that a scientific survey^ on the lines originally planned by 
the surveyor-general of India was surely needed. He estimated that it
p
would take the team some fifteen months.-
Though not all that Scott had asked for was granted, a pro­
visional survey was conducted, under a Lieutenant Bedingfield, in 
1825—1826* The measurement survey showed that there were some 529,735 
p.uras* or about 1600,000 bighas of cultivable land in Lower Assam, of
which 112,858 puras or 480,000 bighas were held under rent free grants
3
or otherwise exempted from the payment of revenue.
Though the survey did not reveal a larger area liable to
J K  l ^  v U  I/O I J * T  *5 C* i
taxation than had been previously known, it proved impossible to enhance 
the demand to any but a very minor degree. The fact was that Scott had 
been very anxious to collect the maximum revenue possible, so as to 
cover military costs and so convince the Supreme Government of the de­
sirability of annexing Lower Assam permanently. He had therefore levied 
taxes on every source which had ever been taxed by the Ahoms or Mughals, 
and though he had intended to make the British assessment a light one,so 
making allowance for the difficulties which the people had undergone in 
the transitional period, he had in practice taken all, or more than the 
country could afford. The collection for 1233 (1826-27) at 2,90,457 Naia-
yani rupees was therefore greater only by 42,774 rupees than the pre- 
4vious year.
1 See sttpra, p. *06
2 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, no. 27, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1825.
3 B.S.P.C. 28 Dec. 1827, no. 48, Scott to Swinton, 2 Dec. 1827;
B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 5, Scott to Swinton, 2 Feb. 1828.
4 B.S.P.C. 9 March 1827, no. 19, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1827;
B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 5, Scott to Swinton, 2 Feb. 1828.
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Moreover, recognizing a degree of over assessment in the past,
Scott agreed to certain deductions upon the gross produce being made in
the settlement of 1826-27# These were:
1) Five percent upon the cultivated portion to provide for
mistakes or deficiency of assets from the flight of ryots.
2) From seven to ten percent according to the extent of the 
parganas for the expense of the mufassal collection, in­
cluding the pay of the patwaris. gomasthas and other 
mufassal revenue and police officers.
3) Ten percent on the remaining assets for the malguzars
(which in some few cases, principally of the hill chiefs,
was increased to fifteen and twenty percent) where local
circumstances and the lightness of the assessment under
the former government appeared to render such indulgence 
1necessary.
Scott felt it necessary to explain to government why such in­
dulgences were necessary, and to excuse the smallness of the revenue 
secured from so large an area of cultivation. He therefore pointed out 
that under the Ahom government the pargana rate had been as low asj-Ye*n 
Rs 1 - 8 annas to less than 4 annas per pura or four bighas of the very
‘ ■ 1 ' ' . I
best quality land. Inferior soils had either been exempted from taxation 
altogether, or had been assessed at one third of the rates for good 
land. He had begun by doubling these pargana rates, in commutation of 
fines levied on the paiks. and other irregular cesses. Even so the new 
rates still averaged less than three annas per Bengal bigha or twelve
1 B.S.P.C. 9 March 1827, no. 18, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1827#
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annas per pura. Furthermore, Scott, in surveying the sources of revenue, 
had to indicate that some were likely to disappear.^
One source of revenue which he wished to discontinue was pro­
vided by the receipts from the Kandahar chowky. at the frontier between s 
Lower Assam and Bengal. The duties from this custom post had yielded 
only Rs. 14,324 in 1825-26, and not only did they offer little hope of 
increase, but they had obviously become anomalous once Lower Assam was
occupied by the British, for since Warren Hastings* day internal
p
customs had been swept away.
The second resource which he wished to relinquish was the tax 
on certain rent free lands, which he had introduced in 1825. The total 
yield from these lands had been 26,465 Narayani rupees, of which 2,533 
rupees had been collected from the paiks and lands attached to the
Hindu temples, and 2,032 rupees from dharmottar lands, granted to
3certain monasteries or satras. It was these two small items which Scott 
now wished, for social and political reasons to give up. The curtail­
ment of temple rites occasioned by the former tax had caused very 
general regret among a population whese superstitions invariably led 
them to ascribe sickness, drought and other accidents of the seasons 
thereto. The loss to the satras of revenues devoted to the invocation 
of deities and provision for the mohants or supervisors of such
♦ 'hist 02* V o£ ■* ft'*} fr, $'* * * | afh i i *3 j \*» * \ V-t - ’ * • n
monasteries, had much influence amongst the people and, therefore, he
1 B.S.P.C. 9 March 1827, no. 18, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1827*
2 B.S.P.C. 16 Aug. 1828, Scott to Swinton, 15 July 1828.
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thought that it would be both popular and desirable to sacrifice 
the tax* *
The remaining portion of the collection for the present year
amounting to 21,899 rupees was derived from the nankar and brahmottar
lands, the extent of which was unusually great in Assam* Scott reported
2that he had no wish to show leniency in taxing these.
Scott had explained why the revenue yield was low. He set out
free lands ft o® f b* I* . .  ^ |
measures which he hoped would arrest any further decline. It was obvious
i&JLy Here
that however lowAaccording to the standards of Bengal, Scott*s assess-
I* <8 SI H  Rgd to  ^ % 1 \ f. 9 \ ’» • 't-Ofa *. * ;• *7 r*'? ■ 0
ment rates in Assam represented a high figure in comparison with Ahom
demands, and the increase had been sudden. He had therefore assumed the
discretionary power to remit the interest nominally claimed upon arrears
of revenue - anaction approved by government - and he proposed that a
reduction of five percent be allowed upon the revenue due, to all who 
- r 3paid in good time. He also set out ways in which he hoped it might be 
raised. He did not wish, for example, to forgo all revenue from the 
lakhira.j lands. He therefore turned to the Ahom government’s practice 
of levying a tax called barangani* from rent-free lands whenever the
1 B.S.P.C. 9 March 1827, no. 18, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1827.
2 Ibid.
3 B.S.P.C. 18 Apr. 1828, nos. 3-^, Scott to Sterling, 27 March 1828;
Sterling to Scott, 18 Apr. 1828.
* The history of the barangani tax is worth noting. "In 183^, when
Capt. Jenkins had become Commissioner, the Lakhira.jdars* objected to 
pay this tax on the ground that Mr. Scott had only imposed it tempo­
rarily and had promised to remit it. The question having been re- 
fered to the government of India, the government replied that there 
was * no reason to believe that Mr. Scott intended to give up any of
the lands claimed to be held rent free which he brought under his
immediate assessment, and if he did, he could not have done so with­
out the sanction of government previously obtained1 .11 
W.E. Ward, op.cit., p. 69.
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expenses of the state exceeded Its ordinary receipts. The holders of 
such property, therefore, Scott proposed, might be called upon to con­
tinue their share towards the support of the army and other establish­
ments maintained by the British government in Assam. Since, however, 
there seemed to be a general expectation that this source of revenue 
would ultimately be relinquished Scott thought it might be advisable to 
follow a middle course. Without entirely exempting the holders of rent- 
free lands from the payments of tax, Scott proposed to reduce the 
amount of the assessment somewhat and to appropriate the entire sum 
realised to purposes of obvious public utility, such as the education 
of youth and construction of roads, bridges and bunds.^
Scott also sought new heads of taxation and methods of de­
veloping the country so as to increase its tax paying capacity. One 
measure Scott proposed was a tax of twenty rupees per pur a upon opium 
poppy cultivation. The opium produced in Assam was entirely consumed 
in the country and the number of the inhabitants who used the drug was 
vast. Scott therefore conceived that a serious mortality would result 
from putting an entire stop to the cultivation, or frpm introducing 
material reduction was made in the retail price of the opium. For that 
reason he proposed his moderate tax on. cultivation. Scott estimated 
that throughout the country the cultivation of poppy might extend to
two thousand puras of land, which were not separately assessed, and that
2
the net yield of the tax might be estimated at Rs. 25,000.
1 B.S.P.C. 9 March 1827, no. 18, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1827.
2 Ibid.
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As another measure for ultimately augmenting the revenue, 
while meanwhile promoting the convenience of the public and facility 
in trade, Scott proposed the withdrawal of the Narayani currency from 
circulation and the substitution of the Company’s Sicca rupees* The 
measure would result in an initial loss to the government of 150,000 
Sicca rupees, but he pointed out that if the existing revenue was there­
after made payable in Sicca rupees, instead of in Narayani, an annual 
profit of about 50,000 Sicca rupees would be derived after the end of
t w o  Y V  ";:if ' +  1- , j o
the second year.
Finally Scott sought to broaden the tax base and to secure an 
influx of much needed capital by a generous policy of grants of waste 
lands* The grant of waste lands of* khats at a nominal revenue had been
a normal way of remunerating high officers during the Ahoms* rule. Scott
i n -t to "of.<5 im i •Todgjt? is*cot*f. 0 f f&of* liv6 I
now, in September 1827, put forward plans which he hoped would increase
AAV(t f<K
the cash revenues^ provideAthe want of capital in Assam. He proposed 
that waste lands be granted to anyone who would engage to bring waste
land under cultivation and to pay revenue under the following con­
ditions.
>e less than Rs« '{00,000 — the sum at the mordent mder t b fl
1) That the grantee bring one fourth of his allocation into 
cultivation by the expiration of the third year; an^ 
additional fourth on the expiration of the sixth year; 
another fourth on the expiration of the nineth year; 
after which period the grantee should be entitled to 
hold the land in perpetuity on paying the pargana rates 
upon % of the whole.
1 B.S.P.C. 9 March 1827, no. 18, Scott to Swinton, 28 Feb. 1827.
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2) That the tenure created should be liable to be trans­it I Infill l j. " 1 '? ■. '■•i the
ferred by sale or otherwise, subject to the conditions 
of the grant, and that where the revenue ultimately 
assessable amounted to fifty rupees or more or the 
holder voluntarily agreed to make it up to that sum,
he should be entitled to pay it direct into the public
h i  S t o r V  O f  A ft IMfcillT f  fLdl f  V A  r  fi a t m ]  ■£ m v Y A T A V ' f  ! 1 I f
treasury, (and thus assume the status of a zamindar).
3) That applicants for lands on the above terms should be
required to deposit or give security for the first
two years revenue, to be forfeited to government and 
the land resumed if the terms were not complied with
on the expiration of the fourth year, after which period 
the land-holding should be liable to sale for arrears 
of revenue in the usual manner**
What is of interest to note is that though Scott did not live
to put these plans into action, his proposals were implemented not long
• * 
after his death by the large scale grant of waste land on such terms.
In February, 1828, Scott was able to assure the government that 
in no case would the gross revenue derivable from Lower Assam in future,
be less than Rs. 300,000 - the sum produced at the moment under the
provisional system - and that rather it would considerably increase 
under a regular system, with money more abundant and the inhabitants
  ---—-------------: -—       - 2
more accustomed to the fiscal arrangements of the Mughal British type. 
Thus reassured as to the revenue possibilities of Lower Assam, and that 
they would cover the costs of a regular British administration, the
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Oct. 1827, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 12 Sept. 1827.
2 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 4, Scott to Swinton, 2 Feb. 1828.
Supreme Government finally decided, in that same month, upon the 
permanent annexation of Lower Assam. In April, the government approved 
Scott’s plan for a full regular survey and review of the former revenue 
measurements.'*' These two decisions inaugurated a new era in the revenue 
history of Assam, for henceforward ad-hoc and temporary collections 
were gradually reduced into a regular system of revenue administration. 
Scott, however, could only pave the way for this new stage of develop­
ment, for he did not live to supervise the full implementation of his 
measures in Lower Assam.
1 B.S.P.C. 25 Apr. 1828, no. 52, Sterling to Scott, 25 Apr. 1828
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CHAPTER V 
(II)
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Administration of Justice and Police.
During the days of the Ahoms civil and criminal disputes were 
decided in mels — the Assamese equivalent of panchayats. They were 
presided over by the chaudhuries or by the heads of the khels. Important 
cases in Lower Assam were tried at the Barphukan’s court at Gauhati and 
in upper Assam at the king’s court in the capital. The Barbarua was the 
highest judicial officer in the Ahom kingdom and he was helped by 
Brahman pundits. Capital punishment involving shedding of blood could 
only be ordered by the king} but the powers of the ministers was such 
that they could authorise a criminal’s death by other means such as by
p
drowning.
The years of conflict between the Ahoras, Singphos and Burmese, 
and the uncertain days after the suppression of the Ahom administration, 
when a British occupation army was installed and martial law was pro­
claimed, naturally saw a great increase in crimes of every description* 
In January, 1825, Scott reported that dacoity particularly had become 
a regular nightly occurrence. Gang robberies had also become five times 
as numerous in some parganas of Lower Assam as they had been in most
1 S.X. Bhuyan, Anglo-Assamese Relations 1771-1826. p. 568.
2 Capt. Welsh’s Report on Assam 179^. Incorporated in A. Mackenzie’s 
North-East Frontier of Bengal, appendix A, p. 378.
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parts of Bengal twenty years earlier. Scott reported that an opinion 
had gained ground among the public that such crimes were treated very 
lightly by the British government and that a short imprisonment and a 
few stripes with a ratton were considered sufficient for an offence 
which the native authorities had only been able to keep down by the 
frequent infliction of mutilation and capital punishment. Scott 
commented that nthe consequence of this hitherto uncontradicted error 
has been the establishment of a system of violence and plunder attended 
by outrages of the most revolting kind".1
In the very beginning Scott lacked the means and authority to 
remedy this evil. Though the evident need led him, early in 1824 to 
issue a proclamation declaring the authority of the British government 
duly established in the country as far as it was then occupied by 
British troops, and though he warned all the inhabitants of the strict 
punishment that would be inflicted on offenders, his judicial jurisdict­
ion, at this time, was not properly defined. He did not know whether 
he was competent even to take cognizance of the more serious descriptions 
of crimes. In response to his enquiries Scott was informed in May 1824 ^ 
that until the Burmese were effectually excluded from all further inter­
ference with Assam, whether by negotiations or by arms, the country 
would be considered enemy territory merely occupied by the British army. 
This meant that it was not subject to the ordinary rules of civil and
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, no. 14, Scott to Swinton, 7 Jan. 1825.
2 B.S.P.C. 28 May 1824, no. 19, Scott to Swinton, 12 May 1814.
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criminal justice as administered in other settled British territories,
and that Scott's presence in Assam as the supreme civil authority
would not affect Brigadier McMorine's administration of martial law*1
In October, 1824, however, Scott was vested with police power* His
immediate exercise of this power resulted in the prosecution of twelve
persons in seven cases of dacoity, two of which were attended with
murder, of twelve persons in two cases of murder, and of three persons
2
in one case of burglary and theft attended with wounding* With such 
evidence of violent lawlessness before him, and Assamese comments on
»
the reasons for its prevalence, Scott urged the government to more
i
vigorous action. "I would beg to submit the expediency” he wrote, "of 
such rules being laid down as may insure some consistency of practice 
and dispel the baneful illusion to which the past laxity of our ad­
ministration and the ill-understood character of our government have 
unhappily given rise.”^
In April 1825, after the whole of Assam had been occupied by 
the British forces and the Burmese expelled, it became necessary to 
devise some temporary judicial, police as well as revenue administration 
pending a final decision as to the fate of Assam* At this time Lt. Col. 
Richards was furnished with a warrant to organize a tribunal capable of 
passing sentences of capital punishment in cases of heinous crimes* The 
government also authorised Scott - who was now Senior Commissioner -
1 BeS*P*C* 28 May 1824, no. 20, Swinton to Scotty 28 May 1824.
2 B.S.P.C* 5 Apr* 1825, no* 14, Scott to Swinton, 7 Jan. 1825.
3 Ibid.
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to receive complaints and take cognizance of offences in the first 
instance as well as to award punishment not exceeding five stripes, 
hard labour, and imprisonment with or without transportation for life, 
in conformity with the general spirit of the Bengal Regulations. But 
it was specifically declared that his sentences should not extend to 
capital punishment.* It was thus made clear that the emergency powers 
requested by Scott were not considered necessary and that the appoint­
ment of commissioners signified that the administration was to be 
assimilated, in spirit, if not in detail, to that of Bengal. In May, 
1825, therefore, Scott and his junior commissioner Lt. Col. Richards 
submitted joint proposals for the regular judicial administration of 
Assam.
In Upper Assam Lombodar Barphukan, a man of talents, character 
and considerable wealth, the brother-in-law of Raja Chandra Kanta, was 
to be employed as their co-adjutor in judicial matters. For the decision 
of civil suits, it was proposed to constitute standing committees com­
posed of officials and of the state pundits who had always been in 
attendance upon the supreme authority and who were now little employed. 
Criminal cases of minor importance were to be decided either by the 
junior commissioner in person or by reference to the Barphukan. Where 
the crimes were of greater magnitude the trials were to be held before 
juries, with the Barphukan as the president and the junior commissioner 
as superintendent of the court. The decision as to the guilt or innoc­
ence of the parties was to be left to the jury, while the choice of
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Apr. 1825, no. 15, Swinton to Scott, 5 Apr. 1825.
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punishment would be made by the superintending commissioner. In order 
to preserve consistency in the commissioners proceedings, it was de­
cided that they would be guided in fixing penalties by the laws in 
force in other British territories. They would also follow Bengal pre­
cedent in all cases in which a judge of circuit would be required to 
refer his proceedings to the Nizamat Adalat. It was also decided that 
if sitting separately, the commissioners would refer their proceedings 
one to the other. As a temporary safeguard, until the ability of 
Assamese jurors had been proved, the two commissioners reserved to 
themselves the right to reverse verdicts, \diere they were unanimous in 
wishing to do so.*
For Lower Assam Scott had similar plans. In the development 
of the judicial system in Lower Assam especially, the impact of his 
ideas and of his energy is visible. The outcome was the creation of 
native courts not only for criminal but also for civil justice, an 
experiment of particular interest.
Scott*s first concern was with criminal justice. In March, 
1826, Scott reported the serious inconvenience experienced through the 
want of tribunals competent to take cognizance of capital offences. The 
setting up of a court martial at Gauhati was impossible with the troops 
disposed as they were - and such courts were notoriously unfit for the 
trial of criminals in what would often be complicated cases. About 
seventy persons already had been committed for capital crimes and some
Y VI *1V  *1H  QrL . A i 4 1 a  Q M  | A n
of them had been nearly two years in jail without trial. Many of those
1 B.S.P.C. 7 July 1826, no. 31, Scott and Richards joint letter to 
Govt., 25 May 1825.
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so committed, Scott regretted, had died in confinement.* Because of 
this Scott suggested that either the authority of the Nizamat Adalat 
be extended to Lower Assam or that a temporary court be constituted to 
deal with capital offences. Such a court should be composed of natives 
who had held high judicial office under their own government. There 
were several persons in Lower Assam, he reported, who were well quali­
fied for such a trust. He himself could not devote sufficient time to 
civil suits and such a court, Scott considered, would be helpful in 
giving urgently required decisions in civil cases also. Besides dis­
patching judicial business to the satisfaction of the natives, Scott 
felt that it would be politically desirable. It would make some pro­
vision, through their employment, for the support of ex-officers of the 
state, some of whom were already in financial distress. Scott therefore 
proposed that in conformity with Ahom practice the court should be
composed of three members as judges, of two pundits and six assessors,
o
at a total monthly expense of seven hundred sicca rupees.
Nothing was done immediately by government to establish such 
courts either for criminal or civil purposes. On 30 December, 1826, 
Scott reported a progressive increase in crime in Lower Assam, which 
he attributed to the abolition of capital punishment. He also reported, 
with alarm, that since the arrival of the British some 226 prisoners 
had died in jail in 1825 and a further 221 in 1826, despite the fact 
that there had never been more than four hundred persons in confinement
1 B.S.P.C. 7 July 1826, no. 25, Scott to Swinton, 2 March 1826.
2 Ibid.
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at any one period.* A considerable backlog of civil suits had also
built up at Gauhati. Due to heavy business in the faujdari department,
Scott’s assistant Capt. White had found it impossible to clear the
constantly increasing number of outstanding cases, which at that date
o
exceeded five hundred. No less than fifteen hundred petitions, almost
T t i n  C O G 4 D o s  1  It i o n  o f  a n  d  t h f i  H  1 y  a x d ®  y m I i  t {'v oti t h ® 3 f i  c o u r t s
all relating to matters cognizable by the civil courts, had been pre­
sented to Scott himself during his stay at Gauhati.'*
Such an enormous increase of civil suits rendered the estab­
lishment of native courts indispensable. Scott therefore without 
waiting for the government’s approval, established three native civil 
courts at Gauhati, following his earlier plan. One of these was to 
exercise the powers vested in a munsif in the Bengal province, another
was to exercise the powers vested in a sadr amin for the purpose of
original suits and deciding appeals from the munsif and a third, with 
similar powers to the second, was to decide in criminal cases of minor 
consequences and to hear appeals from the rajas, chaudhuries and other
malguzars all of whom, in accordance with the custom of the country,
k
exercised judicial powers in their respective parganas.
These three courts were to be presided over by a judge, an 
Assamese official with judicial experience under the old regime. Scott 
also decided to adopt the original Assamese custom of appointing 
assessors, three to each court. He argued that although not absolutely
1 B.S.P.C. 7 July 1826, no. 25, Scott to Swinton, 2 March 1826;
B.S.P.C. 16 Feb. 1827, Scott to Swinton, 30 Dec. 1826.
2 B.S.P.C. 16 Feb. 1827, nos. 2-3, Scott to Swinton, 30 Dec. 1826.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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necessary, this would operate advantageously by placing a check on the 
chief judge and by speeding business. He proposed that one should be 
permanently employed in each court in conducting the details of mis­
cellaneous business, while the other two, with the judge, would form a 
court for the decision of suits.
The composition of and the monthly expenditure on these courts 
was as follows j
Court No# 1 A rajkhowa* - 60 rupees
Three assessors - 102 it
Establishment and 
contingencies - 72
t»
234 rupees
Court Not 2 A barphukan* - 150 rupees
Three assessors - 102 n
Establishment and 
contingencies
m 72 ti
324 rupees
Court No, 1 A barphukan - 150 rupees
Three assessors - 102 »»
Establishment and 
contingencies -
72
324 rupees
A Bengal muharrir 
Two sarishtadars for 
preparing monthly -
72 tt
reports
A nazir and peons - 25 n
Total 979 Ny rupees
or 616 sicca rupees.
* The barphukans and rajkhowas were ordinarily governors of particular
territories and heads of the levies raised from their jurisdictions, 
Like feudal lords, they joined the war with their respective contin­
gents. They also administered justice in their allotted districts. 
See S.K. Bhuyan, Anglo-Assamese Relations, p. 10.
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Scott reported that the salaries of the native judges were somewhat 
less than had been paid to the munsifs and sadr amins in his juris­
diction in Rnngpur^. But the expense of the establishments of muharrir 
etc* was greater than usual on account of the difficulty of obtaining 
natives of the country trained in court proce^dure.^
Scott had great hope of these courts. The jurisdiction of 
these courts extended to suits under five hundred rupees., and Scott 
mentioned that considering the number of such suits in Assam, and the 
great division of landed property, these three courts would not be more 
than sufficient* But he was sure that they would render enormous service
to the land where almost a total interruption of regular administration
'
2of justice had taken place during and after the Burmese invasion.
In March, 1828, Scott was able to inform the government of the 
success of the native courts for civil suits established in 1826 : such 
a success as might reasonably be expected considering the previous 
official habits of the country and ’’the extreme difficulty or rather 
impossibility of substituting all at once a system of purity for one of 
gross corruption”. Scott submitted the statistics of appeal from 
original decrees as evidence of the satisfactory working of the courts :
OB vi'V;. 4*® .‘./.w i X -1 ? .  fit J i t8 \ O T -^0 Or pthr '.>onsj.
Courts Decrees in Appeals
original suits
No. 1 142 16
2 167
1Er To the Commissioner 
15
3 447 19 To Court No. 1
1 B.S.P.C. 16 Feb. 1827, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 30 Dec. 1826.
2 Ibid.
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Of sixteen appeals from No. 1 Court decided by Scott nine 
decrees had been confirmed, five amended and only two reversed.* The 
key to this success was not only that the business was in the main 
conducted by person of the greatest ability but also that the presence 
and frequent opposition of colleagues had formed a considerable check 
upon malpractices. Judging from the tenor of their decision Scott
commented that their orders, generally speaking, had been correct in
* ■ • o  > $  2
essential and agreeable to the customs of the country.
The bringing of Kaliabar, Nowgong and Charduar under British 
revenue administration in 1826  ^ enlarged the field for the administra­
tion of justice also. Scott, therefore, found it necessary to establish 
panchayats in addition to the above native courts. Their members, 
chosen by the local inhabitants, did not receive any salary but agree­
ably to former custom they were allowed a certain number of attendants 
from amongst the paiks and some other trifling immunities involving
altogether an expense or loss of revenue to government of about fifty
L
five rupees per month. In the older Bengal territories the judicial 
reform of 1793 had introduced ’native commissioners1 such as the am in 
or referee; salis or arbitrator; and munsif or native judge to hear and 
decide on commission in the first instance, suits for money or personal
1 B.S.P.C. 2 May 1828, no. 11, Scott to Sterling, 29 March 1828.
2 Ibid.
3 See ctiqnra, p.«56
k B.S.P.C. 16 Feb. 1827, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 30 Dec. 1826.
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property not exceeding in amount or value a sura of fifty sicca rupees.1 
The need of some such courts was felt for this extended territory of 
lower Assam, but as the decision about the establishment of a higher 
order of courts in Assam was still pending, Scott found it more con­
venient to take the help of the existing panchayat system for trifling 
cases than to appoint arbitrators. He said that this system of ad­
ministering justice was not without its inconveniences^but upon the
whole in the existing state of society in Assam, it seemed preferable
2
to the introduction of munsifs. The authorisation of such panchayats
to hear and determine certain suits was however, in line with that new 
pattern of augmentated Indian agency in the administration of civil 
justice which had been brought about by Munro in Madras and Elphinstone 
in Bombay in the second decade on the nineteenth century.
Scott had at first planned to employ native courts in
connection with the trial of capital offences. But when such courts were
formed, he found government reluctant to entrust such authority to them.
Nor was government prepared to extend the authority of the Nizamat
Adalat to Assam. Later in 1826, therefore, Scott wrote to Swinton
suggesting that capital cases might be referred to his newly formed
4
civil courts at Gauhati.
1 See B.B. Misra, The Central Administration of the East India Company 
1773-1834. p. 249.
2 B.S.P.C. 16 Feb, 1827, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 30 Dec. 1826.
3 See B.B, Misra, op.cit., pp. 269-270; Bentinck Papers, Pwjf 2455, 
minutes by Sir Thomas Munro on appointment of ASative Judges, 6 Apr. 
1827.
4 B.S.P.C. 2 May 1828, no. 11, Scott to Sterling, 29 March 1828.
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Fifteen months later, in March, 1828, Scott wrote to Sterling, 
Swinton1s successor as the secretary to the Political Department, 
asking why the government was still hesitating about giving the native 
courts jurisdiction over capital offences. The native civil courts 
seemed to him to be quite competent to use such powers. With an argu­
ment, strikingly resembling that of Macaulay1 in a later period, Scott 
pointed out that in his experience it was generally easier to come to 
a decision in cases of murder than in less serious cases, in which the 
parties might have stronger reasons for attempting to conceal the 
truth.2
Scott, however, made it clear that he considered the extension 
of the jurisdiction of the Nizamat Adalat to Lower Assam the best 
solution. It was only until this could be done, that he was proposing 
to make use of the native civil courts. The latter were undoubtedly 
preferable, he said, to the less satisfactory tribunal of the native 
court martial which had not met in Western Assam for nearly four years. 
It had been so idle, he commented bitterly, at a time when "the fre­
quency of murder and offences of the most heinous description loudly 
called for a vigorous execution of the law by good and unobjectionable 
means, if available but by any means rather than not at all". Scott
1 In questioning "the necessity for having four classes of judges to 
try four classes of causes", graded according to a pecuniary scale, 
Macaulay said "the largeness of the sum at stake has no more connexion 
with the difficulty of trying the cause than the largeness of the sum 
at stake on a game at cards has to do with the chances of the game .. 
... it is generally much less difficult to get at the truth res­
pecting them £  those involving large sums]} than respecting claims 
arising out of petty contracts or wrongs".
C.D. Dharkar, Lord Macaulay*s Legislative Minutes, Minute No. 16;
25 June 1935, PP* 103 and 205-6.
2 B.S.P.C. 2 May 1828, no. 11, Scott to Sterling, 29 March 1828.
summed up the immediate inconveniences and the future advantages in 
extending the jurisdiction of the Nizamat Adalat to Assam thus : "As the 
case now stands there would no doubt be some temporary inconvenience 
in bringing the pending trials before the Nizamat Adawlut, both on 
account of their number which has now accumulated to thirty four, and 
because the whole of the voluminous papers must be translated into the 
Persian language by persons who will in many cases labour under the 
additional difficulty of having to translate from the Assamese original 
through a Bengalee version# These objections do not ho^wever appear to 
me to be sufficient weight to justify in this particular instance, so 
wide a deviation from the ordinary course of law as that contemplated"#* 
He recommended, therefore, that those parts of Regulation X of 1822 
that related to the administration of criminal justice should be ex­
tended to Lower Assam.2
Scott*s letter of 29 March crossed with a letter of 7 March
from government, but although his latest arguments for the use of native
judges were thus not heard, his earlier correspondence had evidently
convinced the government of the necessity of such a step# The acting
3governor general at this time was Butterworth Bayley , who throughout 
his Indian career had been known for his liberal views, views which 
dominated the judicial reforms of William Bentinck.^ Under his influ­
ence the government in 1828, had already come to believe that "the ad­
1 B.S.P.C. 2 May 1828, no, 11, Scott to Swinton, 29 March 1828.
2 Ibid#
3 William Butterworth Bayley was interim Governor-General in 1827-28. 
k B.B. Misra, op#cit., p. 83*
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ministration of Civil Justice will be promoted and improved by enlarging
the powers at present exercised by the native judicial officers”.* The
government however thought that in augmenting the powers of the native
functionaries, a gradual extension would be a better procedure than
any "violent innovation on the established system which might suddenly
elevate the native judge to the possession to the full extent of juris-
o
diction which before had only been entrusted to European officers".
It was a government already moving in Scott*s direction which now
agreed to Scott’s plan to use the native civil courts at Gauhati for
the trial of capital offences, but with the following *essentialt
provision : that the sentences of the native courts should be submitted
3
for Scott’s revision and sanction. Before deterrainj!*'j| however, whether 
the jurisdiction of the Nizamat Adalat should be extended to Western 
Assam, under Regulation X, 1822, the government desired to give a full 
and fair trial to Scott’s own plan which they considered "novel and 
interesting". In May, 1828, the government came to a more downright 
decision, announcing that, after the fullest consideration the governor- 
general-in-ciouncil had concluded that in the present state of the 
country, it would be premature and inexpedient to introduce the authori­
ty of the Nizamat Adalat into Lower Assam under provisions analogous
to those of Regulation X, 1822. An efficient system for the dispensa­
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Bentinck papers, PwJf 2736, memorandum on changes in the administra­
tion of civil justice.
■ !
2 Ibid.
3 B.S.P.C. 7 March 1828, no. 8, Swinton to Scott, 7 March 1828.
4 Ibid.
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tion of criminal justice in Assam, generally,would be best provided for 
by using to the full those tribunals and institutions which Scott had 
"very judiciously revived and put in action, subject to the central 
revision and superintendence of the British officers vested with the 
administration of the province.’1 The etovernment believed that there 
was nothing in Scott’s plan essentially at variance with the course 
pusued in other lately conquered territories. The .ovemment reminded 
Scott that neither Arakan, the Tenasserim provinces nor the older 
possessions of Delhi and the Narbadda territory were subject to the
TVjl ,
jurisdiction of^Nizamat Adalat.
The basic provisions of the plan were, first, that Scott's 
assistant, Capt. White, staaldL apprehend and commit offenders, and 
exercise generally the authority and function of a magistrate; secondly 
that all criminals so apprehended should be tried by the native courts 
created by Scott; thirdly, that these courts should give their verdict 
as to innocence or guilt of the parties accused, and should avard punish­
ment not involving imprisonment beyond three years and with the right 
of appeal to Scott; fourthly, in cases of graver and more heinous 
criminality, the proceedings should be transmitted to Scott together 
with the opinion and finding of the court. Scott was empowered to pass 
sentence of death for the crimes of murder and of robbery attended with 
murder. It was also decided that in determing the quality of offences 
and the punishment to be awarded, Scott should be guided by the spirit 
and principles of the regulations in force within the Company's terri­
tories. It would be competent to Scott to cause his own sentences to be
1 B.S.P.C. 2 May 1828, no. 13f Sterling to Scott, 2 May 1828.
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carried into execution, without previous reference to government, but 
he was to submit periodical returns and statements of all trials held 
and judgements passed under the above orders.^
The hope was expressed that this plan would take care of the 
heavy arrears of criminal cases, and prevent such arrears in the future. 
Meanwhile, where prisoners had long been awaiting trial, government 
urged that capital punishment should only be inflicted where crimes had 
been particularly atrocious.2
The government, however, was less sanguine than Scott about 
the native courts’ effectiveness, and stressed the necessity for 
European control over the native criminal courts. White, Scott’s assis­
tant in Lower Assam, was even less convinced of Assamese ability, 
honesty and reliability, though he cloaked the downrightness of his 
distrust, in part, by stressing administrative difficulties. Referring 
to "the demoralised state of society in Lower Assam" he declared his 
conviction that "improvement would not be effected without very rigid 
control on the part of the magistrate superintending the trials’*. Under 
the new arrangements five or six individuals would be called upon to 
decide upon the criminality of an action. Divison of opinion would lead 
to lengthy discussion and exposition of their different views, and de­
lay would be further aggravated since a European superintending the
3
trial would have still other sentiments and habits of thought.
1 B.S.P.C. 2 May 1828, no. 13, Sterling to Scott.
2 Ibid.
3 B.S.P.C. 25 July 1828, nos. 2-3, White to Scott, 5 June 1828.
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That was inevitable, but he admitted that no better solution 
offered for the time being. He strongly recommended, however, the 
appointment of additional European officers - and with power to check 
and control the members of the native courts so that their erroneous 
or corrupt verdicts might not defeat the ends of justice. Then, with 
the voice of Cornwallis, White went on to consider the Assamese 
character : "In point of morality", he said, "I should regard it as 
inferior to that of the inhabitants of the Upper and ILower provinces 
of the Bengal territory, nor in my opinion has the moral feeling of 
what is due to justice been cultivated in an equal degree".^ White 
therefore suggested that to guard against erroneous or corrupt verdicts 
by members of native courts, in cases coming within the jurisdiction 
of the magistrate the latter should be empowered to refer doubtful 
cases to the circuit judge. Should the circuit judge agree with the 
magistrate the grounds of their opinion should be explained to the 
members of the native court, who should be called upon to revise their 
proceedings. If they failed to do so or refused to alter their opinion
then their verdict should be set aside, and that of the circuit judge
2
carried into effect.
^ In June, 1823, Scott, while supporting Capt. White’s proposal
of employing more European officers in judicial affairs, forwarded his 
final plan. He recommended that for the present the officiating
magistrate should exercise the usual powers and that the commissioner
1 B.S.P.C. 25 July 1828, nos. 2-3, White to Scott, 5 June 1828.
2 B.S.P.C. 25 July 1828, nos. 2-3, White to Scott, 5 Juhe 1828.
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should try commitments as heretofore, both officers being authorized 
to call for the assistance of the native courts in any trial, as might 
seem desirable. Scott proposed that capital cases should be tried be­
fore the commissioner and a native court of three or five members and 
should the commissioner concur in the verdict of the majority of 
assessors the commissioner should pass the sentence prescribed by the 
Regulation. But the governments hesitation and White*s evident dis­
trust of the character of Assamese men of rank led Scott to reconsider 
the procedure for revising decisions. His own doubt was lest the gap 
between a court composed of nobles and members of religious orders and 
those members of the lower classes using the courts might not lead to 
the return of biased verdicts, contrary to evidence. To safeguard 
against abuse, Scott proposed that where the commissioner disagreed 
with a verdict of guilt by the panchayat he should be authorized to 
ignore it and to discharge the prisoner at once. When, on the other 
hand it was an improper verdict of acquittal that was given, then, 
where the case warranted, it should be referred in the way prescribed 
by the Nizamat Adalat when there were differences of opinion between 
the judge of circuit and his law officers. Scott*s idea was that the 
native court’s knowledge of the existence of such a power of revision 
would, to a great extent render its exercise unnecessary. Scott also 
agreed with Capt. White that it would be a further improvement if a 
somewhat more popular character were given to the jury by the admission 
of some qualified persons, not members of the civil courts.1
1 B.S.P.C. 25 July 1828, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 25 June 1828.
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The establishment of native courts for both civil and criminal justice 
in Lower Assam was, for Scott, a killing of many birds with one stone. 
Besides forcing the British government to accept certain direct res­
ponsibilities, the measure also partially solved the problem of pro­
viding native employment.
The immediate necessity for securing a system of courts had 
been the growing increase of cases in both civil and criminal depart­
ments and Scott’s inability to attend to all of them personally. During 
1827 two hundred and forty-eight criminal trials, of the description 
cognizable bp a court of circuit, had been brought before Scott in 
Lower Assam. He considered it would be impossible for him to find time 
for a careful revision of the criminal trials from Upper Assam, if all 
in which a sentence of more than 3 years was called for were referred 
for his orders - unless of course, another assistant were appointed.'* 
The same reason compelled Scott to delegate greater power to the poli­
tical agent in Upper Assam when a thought was given also towards the 
administration of justice in that part of Assam. For Upper Assam, since
the number of criminal trials was not so great, Scott recommended that
0
the political agent should decide or refer to the Barphukan all cases 
cognizable by a magistrate in Bengal. He should also try more serious 
offences with a panchayat. and if he concurred with their verdict, pass 
the sentence prescribed by the Regulation, up to seven years imprison­
ment and thirty nine stripes. Trials in which he might differ from the
1 B.S.P.C. 25 July 1828, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 25 June 1828.
2 Lombodar Barphukan was empowered to give punishment up to a fine of 
fifty rupees, thirty stripes, or six months imprisonment. He was 
given fifty likchows and a monthly salary of three hundred rupees. 
Kashinath Phukan, Assam Buranli Puthi (in Assamese), p. 52.
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panchayat he should refer to the Commissioner who would be guided by 
the rules in force for the reference of cases of a judge or circuit to 
the Nizamat Adalat. He would also be invested with the same general 
powers of revision and control as were exercised by the Nizamat Adalat. 
In trials of offences of greater magnitude the political 4gent should 
submit his proceedings with the findings and opinion of the court to 
the Commissioner who would then pass sentence as in cases referred to 
the Nizamat Adalat.'*'
Police
In British India it was not until after the annexation of
Sind in 1843 that Sir Charles Napier undertook the first measures for
"the organization of a regular police force” as a ”separate self-con-
2
tained organization”. Elsewhere the Mughal system of zaraindari res­
ponsibility for police was adopted as the basic system. Like other 
British territories in India throughout Scott’s period of administration 
the management of police in Assam was left in the hands of the rajas, 
chaudhuries and considerable malguzars who were primarily revenue 
officers. Only where in any particular pargana there was a marked in­
crease in crime, or an evident failure on the part of the person charged 
with police control to discover and apprehend criminals, did government 
interfere. Then Scott’s practice was to depute police officers to the 
pargana to strengthen the local police - the cost of their establishment
1 B.S.P.C. 25 July 1828, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 25 June 1828.
2 Ram Gopal, British Rule In India, p. 142.
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being recovered by an additional cess levied on that district. Vigilant 
and capable malguzars rendering particular help were praised and 
officially honoured.*
One danger was that police authority might be abused. Scott 
hoped that as the malguzars. or native collectors of revenue, were in 
most cases men elected by the ryots, they would be unlikely to render 
themselves unpopular by abusing their police powers. As a precaution 
against police corruption, Scott introduced several novel processes.
One was to use certain police functionaries as agents provocateurs, 
encouraging them to accept and report bribes. If those who offered 
bribes or those who took them without reporting the fact were convicted, 
the informer received the whole or part of the bribe passed. Adam 
White - Scott*s judicial assistant in Lower Assam claimed that though 
the plan failed to extirpate bribery completely, the system made every­
one exceedingly cautious either in giving or receiving bribes.** Against 
corruption amongst the superior arolas. Scott employed a rigorous system 
of espionage, of which Capt. White gives us a vivid description : In
the judicial departments Scott had several unknown individuals entirely 
devoted to him, who reported the peccadilloes of their brethren. These 
men had literally sold themselves to him, having being guilty of de­
linquencies themselves and having compounded their penalty by the pro­
mise of giving information. Scott thereby collected information
1 On 30 December Scott recommended Government to present Raja
Vijayanarayan of Darrang with a khelat worth five hundred rupees for
keeping the Bhutia robbers in check.
B.S.P.C. 16 Feb.1827, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 30 Dec. 1826.
2 A. White : Memoir, p. 18.
3 Ibid, p. 19.
4 Ibid
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on suspected individuals and when proof was complete he used to pounce 
upon them. Capt. White described the result thus : "Undoubtedly these 
informers played false at times, where large sums were at stake; but 
it was necessary to do something and occasionally valuable information 
was given, which operated as a general check".1 J
Scott stressed three important features of his administration 
of justice and police in Assam : the free communication between the 
governors and governed; the employment of natives; and the blending of 
the British with the native system, so as to attain the best of both in 
a non-regulation system.
To achieve the first object Scott admitted the most complete 
access possible. White gives the following description : "His Kutcherry 
was at all times crowded, indeed to a degree which would have rendered 
it impossible for persons of an ordinary strength of constitution to 
have transacted business at all. The most unlimited freedom of peti­
tioning was allowed, without expense to the complainants. A large box 
was placed in the kutcherry, into which the petitions could be thrown.
To ensure despatch of business they were limited to 25 or 30 lines, but
no stamp tax or other restriction existed. All proceedings were written
ft 2
in the Bengali or Assamese language.
1 A. White : Memoir, p. 19.
2 Ibid, p. 17.
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The facility of petitioning was much abused at times, and 
White reports that people complained about very petty and trifling 
matters. Sometimes, he says, even unfounded accusations of the most 
serious nature were given against individuals, while disappointed 
suitors often gave vent to their malice in most offensive anonymous
I
remarks upon the amlas and European authorities.1 But, though this was 
so, Scott’s stand against levying taxes on institution of suits - an 
influence of Benthamite ideas'^ - was not without its benefits. White 
himself writes that "good was mingled with evil —  various murders, and 
other offences, were brought to light; the rogueries of the amlah were 
often exposed; a free vent was afforded to the spirit of grumbling, 
inherent in our nature; and above all, the most complete check was 
imposed upon his European subordinates, as the slightest complaint 
against them was listened to1, and referred to these functionaries for 
an answer”*^ There was no wonder that people crowded round a ruler 
who showed an eagerness to listen to them, after a long period of mis­
rule* Here was the paternalist tradition at its best in action - as it 
had earlier been seen in Munro1s tent in the Baramahal in 1795 , or was 
to be seen in Henry Lawrence’s in the Punjab at a still later date,
1 A. White, Memoir, p. 17*
2 See C.D. Dhakar, op.cit., p. 206; Minute of 25 June 1835, no. 16.
3 White has perhaps given this example from his own experience for it 
is said that he was once reprimanded by Scott for his misbehaviour 
towards Haliram Dhokial Phukan the then revenue sarishtadar of Lower 
Assam -
G* Borooah; Life of Anandaram. pp. 30-31; see also 
Indibar Barua, Jivanadarsa (in Assamese), p.
4 A. White, Memoir, p. 17,
5 Munro while settling the revenue affairs in the ceded south Indian 
district of Baramahal in 1795 - see P. Woodruf, Men who ruled India, 
vol* I, p» 186.
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when each in turn sought to set right a countryside lately ravaged by 
war and misrule* The real way to prevent unjust suits or frivolous and 
vexatious actions was, for Scott, as Macaulay would have put it : ’’to 
take care that there shall be just decisionsM.^
But it was Scott’s persistent effort to employ the local people
in the administrative system which was perhaps the most distinctive
feature of his judicial administration. He sought to employ Assamese
not only so as to keep the disaffected nobles in good humour, essential
though that was, but also from a belief that many of them were really
very capable. Unlike Capt, White he never generalised about the moral
failings of the Assamese nobles of the transitional period. On the
contrary he praised their great ability and competency to administer
not only civil but also criminal justice. In fact only a few days prior
to his death Scott wrote to a friend, a correspondent of the Bengal
Hurkara. that "on the liberal and extensive employment of the natives
depended the result, whether the judicial system could or could not be
2
rendered efficient ...". Capt. White recorded Scott’s views on the 
natives thus : "Mr. Scott entertained a high opinion of the intellec­
tual capacity of the natives. About a year before his death, he re­
commended that a native should be appointed as assistant to the Euro­
pean officer in charge of Lower Assam, with full powers of a European 
mufassal magistrate in criminal cases viz, of passing sentence of two
1 C.D. Dharkar, op.cit., p. 116.
2 Appendix 39, White’s Memoir, pp. 127-30, "N.S." in the Bengal 
Hurkara and Chronicle, 15 September 1831#
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years imprisonment”.* The most advantageous mode of employing natives
on criminal trials was found by Scott in making them jurymen super-
2
intended by the commissioner as judge.
< t be i t ••roc*-" 
offer any o 
habitant s of 
The Khas i s , 
marauders ,
1 A. White, Memoir, p. 20.
2 B.S.P.C. 2 May 1828, no. 11, Scott to Swinton, 29 March 1828, 
postscript.
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CHAPTER VI
into the plains jf Sylhet, was, how
DAVID SCOTT AND THE KHASI HILLS
The first British contact with the Khasis took place after 
the acquisition of the district of Sylhet by the East India Company by 
the grant of the Diwani in Bengal in 1765.* The Khasis thereby became
;i
the Company’s neighbours to the north; while to the north-east the
state of Jaintia, which marched with Sylhet, was also ruled by a chief
2
of Khasi lineage. The Khasis possessed quarries which could supply
i
3
lime for the whole of deltaic Bengal, and were not averse from trade.
In the grand mart at Pandua, on the Sylhet border, they traded in
not easy lo r  tft© » n t ls n  t o l is fn  much about the In te r io r ,  i • i© *'■ l* stff
t
silk, iron, wax, honey and ivory and employed many Bengalis to keep
ri. i
k
their accounts. All these business transactions, however, did not
had. be*- w t-' e p -jsi « 1 ■ •, <yr >f \ • ••♦... .(n • r < « . * , '%
offer any opportunity either to the British government or to the in-
t t  lS M P gft l O r i U f l t t  t t y  K a. fJc-St IS 1x^86 I T  * # M© Gfa ’£ C T i  R ft 'X vtfH'’
habitants of Bengal to know much about the Khasis of the interior hi11^
The Khasis, as a whole, were known to the British as troublesome
5
marauders, whose raids were a terror to the inhabitants of the plains.
1 Sir Charles Lyall in P.R.T. Gurdon*s The Khasis. p. XIV.
2 This chief’s capital Jaintiapur, was situated in the plain between
the Surma river and the hills.
3 P.R.T. Gurdon, op.cit., pp. XIV-XV.
U Letter to William Carey by a missionary from Sylhet 11 May, 1813,
M.C.L.R.M., vol. VI, 1813, pp. 107-8.
jZ  a* V #  J L l f e  !CT»$  J w l ' | j  V  ^  X . . #  » * | |  J L ..  &  j? y ? |  V  •
5 Their ravages between 1780 and 1790 were mentioned as specially
severe. Physical and Political Geography of the Province of Assam.
p. 86.
The reason behind the occasional incursions by the Khasis
into the plains of Sylhet, was, however, not far to seek* The advance
of the British in Bengal compelled the Khasis to retire to their
native fastnesses and to leave the town of Sylhet, the villages of
Pandua,Chhatak and many others which were once their possessions, in
the hands of their powerful neighbour.'*' The Khasis were also annoyed
with the fraud and deceit of the Bengali traders, especially of those
whom they employed as accountants. Eventually, they were driven to
exasperation, and started carrying some of them off to their hills,
where their victims were threatened with starvation if they refused to
2
refund the embezzled money.
The relation thus between the Bengali inhabitants of the 
British territory and the Khasis were far from friendly, and it was
not easy for the British to learn much about the interior. The earliest
d 3
British account of the Khasis was perhaps, that of Robert Linsay who 
had been the Resident and Collector of Sylhet about 1778, and had made 
a large fortune by working the Khasis lime quarries. He described the 
Khasi as "a fair man in his dealings, and, provided you treat him 
honourably, he will act with perfect reciprocity towards you". He, 
however, cautioned the foreigners : "but beware of shewing him the 
smallest appearance of indignity, for he is jealous in the extreme, 
cruel and vindictive in his resentments".^ in the second decade of the
1 A.B. Lish, A brief account of the Khasis. C.C.O., March 1838, 
pp. 129-U3.
2 M.C.L.RoM., vol. VI, 1813, pp. 107-
3 See Lord Lindsay, Lives of the Lindsays, or A Memoir of the Houses 
of Crawford and Balcarres, vol. Ill, pp. 163, 176-8.
k Ibid, pp. 177-8.
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nineteenth century, the missionaries of the Serampore Mission began to 
take an interest in the Khasis* Their account agrees entirely with that 
given by Lindsay some thirty years previously. In May 1813, a missionary 
from the Sylhet station wrote to Carey thus : "The real Khasis possess 
two great characteristic virtues, viz., truth and honesty. They spurn 
the little meannesses practised by the Bengalees, whom they despise.
They are however very revengeful, and seldom forget injuries".'*' How­
ever, there was no significant progress in the missionary activities in
2the Khasi hills until Scott opened up the hills. Dr. Buchanan I
Hamilton, who in the early part of the nineteenth century, had been 
touring on a botanising excursion in the north and on the north-eastern
3
border of Bengal attempted to give some information about the Khasis.
The account which he wrote about the Khasis, while staying at Goalpara
Ki
in the Brahmaputra lalley, wasNthoroughly inadequate and in many cases
.
Buchanan confused the Khasis with the Garos.
The importance of a friendly relationship with the Khasis was
thus for the first time realised by David Scott at the time of the
Burmese war, when the need to establish a dak or postal service across
the hills from Sylhet to Assam was urgently felt. From Pandua, a border
4
village in the Sylhet district, Scott contacted the Khyrim raja who at
1 M.C.L.R.M., vol. VI 1813, p. 107, A missionary’s letter to Carey, 
Sylhet, 11 May, 1813.
2 The first missionary station in the Khasi hills was opened at 
Cherrapunji by the Serampore Mission in 1832 with A. Lish in charge 
of the station. Periodical Accounts of the Serampore Mission. 1832, 
pp. 30-33.
3 M.C.L.R.M., vol. II, 1809, p. 22, W. Robinson to William Carey,
11 April, 1809.
4 This chief’s territory was situated to the west of Jaintia and it 
extended from Pandua to Assam.
B.S.P.C. 2 Apr. 1824, no. 10, Scott to Swinton, 24 March 1824.
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the time was master of the foothills from which the road was to start*
The raja exhibited much less jealousy than Scott had expected and in
March 1824 he agreed to Scott*s proposal to establish a road across
his country from Assam to the plains of Sylhet on being paid for it. He
also undertook to improve the road at his expense provided a small
lowland estate was restored to him by the British.1 The land desired
by the raja was not considered of much value and Scott therefore ad-
2
vised the conclusion of the bargain.
Besides gaining a passage for the dak, and later on for troops, 
Scott anticipated further advantages if he could make similar agree­
ments with other hill chiefs. Such engagements would ultimately bring 
the Khasi chiefs into frequent and intimate communication with the 
British; the grant of land in the plains would render the hill chiefs 
more dependent and obedient; and the cool, salubrious climate of the
-?/'■"H* .S,0 VtMTi'1 '( ' * X ' i
hills could be profitably used by the Company for cantonments or
3
sanatoria. Scott was very impressed with the climate of the Khasi 
hills and his very first journey to them though "rather fatiguing was 
on the whole a pleasant trip". Indeed the march proved a voyage of 
discovery. He found that within six hours journey of Pandua there was 
a climate probably superior to that of the Cape of Good Hope in point 
of coldness, and healthiness; the mountains were full of green short 
grass and the elevation was upwards of five thousand feet. The local 
people informed him also that "throughout the months of December and
1 B.S.P.C. 2 Apr. 1824, no. 16, Scott*s private letter to Swinton,
21 March 1824.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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January the running streams are fringed with ice; that snow frequently 
falls; and that it is necessary every morning to break the ice in the 
water pots standing in the house". "It is a great pity", Scott wrote 
to the government, "that the Cassya country is not better known, and 
that we do not avail ourselves of the obvious advantages it offers".*
au
The route which Scott proposed to open from Sylhet began with 
rugged ascent through territory belonging to the petty chief of 
Cherrapunji*, known as Dewan Raja. His territory, two days march in
j.. * . , i
length and one in width was mostly tableland, 5 to 6,000 feet above
sea level* The natural beauty and splendid climate of the place moved
Scott so much that he early pressed his idea of exchanging "a portion
+
of the bold and sterile highlands for a slice of the fertile plain 
2
below". He proposed to improve the road to Assam by Cherrapunji at
the government’s expense, and to conciliate and secure British influence
over the chief by conferring upon him in zamindari tenure a small
estate near Pandua. The chief was very desirous of possessing this land
which Scott understood might be purchased for a very trifling sum. The
remainder of the road he planned lay through the territories of Mylliem
chiefs, formerly dependent upon Khyrim but who had lately separated
3
themselves from that petty state.
1 B.S.P.C. 2 Apr* 1824, nos. 16 and 10, Scott to Swinton, 21 and
24 March 1824.
* Cherrapunji, celebrated as the place which has the greatest measured 
rainfall on the globe, long remained a popular station, and the dis- ■. 
covery of coal there attracted to it many visitors.
+ Scott explained later on that he was wrong in calling it sterile.
2 B.S.P.C. 2 Apr. 1824, no. 16, Scott’s private letter to Swinton,
21 March 1824.
3 B.S.P.C. 2 Apr. 1824, no. 10, Scott to Swinton, 24 March 1824.
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Scott, however, could not secure engagements with the chiefs
quickly enough to use the road on his march towards Assam with the
23rd Native Infantry.* Since a cordial understanding already subsisted
2
with the raja of Jaintia , the route through the latter1s territory 
was considered more practicable. Moreover to ensure the steady ad­
vancement of his future plans in the hills Scott was cautious enough 
to avoid any sudden measures that might create distrust or jealousy
3
on the part of the hill people.
More than two years later when the war with the Burmese was 
over, Scott resumed his plan. On 30 November, 1826, the opportunity
came to him to extract a major concession from another powerful Khasi
4 t
chief - the raja of Nongkhlao. It was a disputed succession which
gave Scott his chance. Since June and July 1824 when the route to Assam
via Jaintia ceased to be available after the reoccupation of the
country about Nowgong and Raha chowky by the Burmese, Scott had been
5
trying to open a route via Pandua and Barduar. But though Chattar 
Singh, the Nongkhlao raja, who held the lowlands of Barduar was ready 
to agree to this, his relative Tirut Singh, whose power lay in the
1 See supra, p.26
2 The following was the ”separate article” of the treaty concluded 
between the Company and Raja Ram Singh of Jaintia on March 10, 1824: . 
”Raja Ram Singh engages, that to assist in the war commenced in 
Assam between the Honourable Company’s Troops and those of the King 
of Ava, he will march a force and attack the enemy to the east of 
Gowhatty; and the Honourable Company agrees, upon the conquest of 
Assam, to confer upon the Rajah a part of that Territory proportion­
ate to the extent of his exertions in the common cause.” ^
C.U. Aitchison, Treaties Engagements and Sanads. vol. II, p. 165.
3 B.S.P.C. 25 June 1824, no. 27, Scott to Swinton, 4 June 1824.
4 B.S.P.C. 2 March 1827, no. 20, Scott to Swinton, 30 Nov. 1826.
5 B.S.P.C. 2 March 1827, no. 20, Scott to Swinton, 13 Jan. 1827*
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hills, contested Chattar Singh*s authority over Barduar and prevented 
the use of the road. In 1826, however, on Chattar Singh*s death, Scott 
announced that he would not grant the investure of the Barduar to any 
person whose authority was not fully recognised in the hills as well 
as in the lowlands, and who was not prepared to grant the same facili­
ties of communication through his territory as the Khasis enjoyed in 
British Assam and Sylhet. It was at this time, when the question of 
succession brought about continued disputes between the parties of 
Tirut and the successors of Chattar, that Scott was invited to mediate. 
Since Scott had also to discuss the settlement of revenue for certain 
lands which the raja held under the Assam government^, he accepted the 
invitation. It was then unanimously agreed that the pretension of 
Rajjan Singh - a child of only five years - the brother and the direct 
heir of Chattar Singh should be set aside on the ground of minority and
that Tirut Singh the next heir should be elected to the raj, to be
2
succeeded at his death by Rajjan Singh. In return for Scott*s support 
for his claims, Raja Tirut Singh agreed to become a British protege 
and to give a free passage for British troops through his territory.
He also agreed to furnish materials for the construction of a road, 
against payment, and after its completion to keep it in repair. The 
raja agreed that in the event of the Honourable Company carrying on 
hostilities with any other power he would serve with all his followers 
as far as to the eastward of Kaliabar in Assam. The raja also promised
1 B.S.P.C. 2 March 1827, no. 20, Scott to Swinton, 13 Jan. 1827*
2 B.S.P.C. 26 June 1829, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, 30 May 1829.
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to rule his subjects according to the laws of his country, keeping 
them contented and to seize and deliver any criminal from British 
territory taking refuge in his country. In return the British govern­
ment undertook to protect the raja’s country from foreign enemies and 
to support him against any unjust act or violence of any neighbouring 
chief.1
kaJ.
Scott had achieved his object, but he had alsoAthe chance to
observe the toughness of the hill tribes and the distinctive character
of their social organization. They had shown themselves very touchy >
about their independence, and the raja’s assembly, customarily Ma more
genuine power" than the raja himself, as Scott observed, had been
extremely reluctant to grant such favours to the English. Scott found ^
that the meeting which he attended was conducted throughout "with a
degree of independence, coolness and propriety which could not have
been exceeded under similar circumstances by the inhabitants of the
2
most civilized countries". It was due to the strict vigilance of the 
sardars and people, and the latter’s alarm at what they had heard of 
the seizure of bazars in Sylhet district to serve the British army in 
1825, that the raja refused to bind himself to provide workmen for the 
road. He did undertake partially to make the road and to construct
1 B.S.P.C. 2 March 1827, no. 20, Articles of agreement with Tirut 
Singh, Scott to Swinton, 30 Nov. 1826;
C.U. Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 185-186.
2 B.S.P.C. 2 March 1827, no. 20, Scott to Swinton, 13 Jan. 1827;
A. White, Memoir, pp. 3^-37. White attended this meeting along witl 
Scott.
3 B.S.P.C. 2 March 1827, no. 20, Scott to Swinton, 13 Jan. 1827.
the bridges beyond Nongkhlao as far as his territories extended towards 
Assam* Scott, realising the raja*s difficult situation, urged the 
Calcutta Council to believe that the concession given by the raja was 
not an inadequate exchange for British protection*1
The hopes of advantage through peaceful penetration into the 
Khasi hills that Scott had cherished in the early part of 1824 seemed 
to be more realisable after the treaty with Nongkhlao. Scott reported 
in January, 1827, that by the establishment of British influence in the 
Khasi hills the petty chiefs, whose raids disturbed the Sylhet frontier, 
would be completely overawed and that since the remaining independent 
Khasi territory was split in two by the recently obtained portions of 
Nongkhlao, the recurrence of hostilities and feuds between the different 
chiefs would be necessarily lessened. The improvement of the country 
itself was also an evident British interest since it would help to 
promote the properity of the districts of Sylhet and Assam, the produce 
of the hills being traded for the manufactures of the plains. Con­
sidering all these advantages Scott urged the government to approve his
agreement with Tirut Singh and give consent to his immediate plan of
2
building a few bungalow at Nongkhlao. The government was pleased to
I
approve Scott*s measures, although it commented that the settlement
Cf a* Ct .ft*. k*j & 4 j- ty v . 41’ t t t J 1
would have been more satisfactory if Tirut had contributed more
3
efficiently to the completion of the road. Tirut was honoured with a 
— — — -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 B.S.P.C. 2 March 1827, no. 20, Scott to Swinton, 13 Jan. 1827.
2 Ibid.- a a I
3 B.S.P.C. 2 March 1827, no. 22, Swinton to Scott, 2 March 1827.
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state palankeen - called kekuradola - the gift which used to be given 
to persons of superior rank during the Ahora reign.^
Despite this seemingly auspicious start, Scott’s plans did
1*0 t*b® nm "1 js to b® i3' T tf ft** Hill Y* & o o \ r lt\ ^ their m  of
not go smoothly, troubles coming one after another. Soon after the
Nongkhlao agreement he found himself involved in the "intriguing
tactics" of the hill chiefs. What Scott was pleased to call "intriguing
tactics" was really the assertion of claims by the Khasi chiefs over
foot-hill villages on the Assam side of the hills. These claims were
disputed by the British appointed malguzars of Lower Assam. One typical
case was the claim by the chiefs of Mylliem and IChyrim over certain
2
parts of Dimarua , including all the lowlands up to the river Kallang
in Kamrup district. Their claim was resisted by the sazawal who was
collecting the revenues for the British government, and the chiefs
therefore, in August 1828, sent a body of their dependants to stop the
sazawal’s collection, toi&uy contributions of grain from the villages
3and to carry off to the hills those inhabitants who opposed them.
Scott’s response to such attacks upon British revenues and
British subjects was to send a party of Rungpore Light Infantry and
Goalpara sibandi sepoys to expel the Khasi gangs from Dimarua district. , 
Messengers were also sent to Barmanik, the chief of Mylliem warning him
... .;/* ;.(j " , , . • ;• J ■. | , . lift
1 B.S.P.C. 13 Sept. 1827, no. 16, Scott to Swinton, 8 Aug. 1827.
2 Scott reported that about thirty yearsprevious to the present dis­
pute, in the same district of Dimarua a pretender to the chieftaincy 
of Dimarua had been introduced by the Khasis who had been finally 
expelled by the Assamese after a few weeks, and that since then the 
latter had been enjoying quiet possession of the land. We do not 
know what was the Khasi version of the story.
B.S.P.C. 5 Sept. 1828, no. 11, Scott to Swinton, 8 Aug. 1828.
3 Ibid.
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of the consequences of his conduct and requiring him to withdraw his 
people and state his claims through the proper channels. Scott was 
secretly informed that this chief of Mylliem had also sent messengers 
to the neighbouring hill rajas requiring their assistance in case of 
major strife against the British.1
Although Scott had witnessed the political skill and expertise 
of the Khasis in their tribal assemblies, and had found many of them 
friendly disposed, he had the lowest opinion of the hill tribes’ be­
haviour towards the plains dwellers. All the hill tribes, he held, 
were equally cruel and barbarous. Referring to the past history of 
Assam Scott mentioned that under the Assam government revolutions of
f
the present nature had been common occurence in the estates bordering 
on the hills and murders, the putting out of eyes, and other cruelties 
were ordinarily practised with impunity upon each other by the petty 
contending factions. The ruling power had seldom possessed sufficient 
means to vindicate its authority by penetrating into the hills and
"y
securing the persons^of such offences. The long continuance of this 
state of things had naturally generated a spirit of intrigue in local 
officials and chiefs which could not be at once eradicated and which 
still induced them to look to the old means of regaining their situ­
ations when dismissed, by endeavouring to displace the raja and secure
the favour of his successor.2______________________________________________
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Sept. 1828, no. 12, Scott to Swinton, 8 Aug. 1828.
2 Ibid.
j}|0 « r •
3 B.S.P.C. 5 to v Aug. 1828.
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Scott was for bold action. Experience having so frequently 
shown the impolicy of allowing the border tribes to make any encroach­
ment, since this merely led them to commit still more flagrant misdeeds, 
he recommended a formal demand upon the chief of Mylliem for the 
amount collected by his people from the pargana of Dimarua. If that 
failed, Scott suggested that it should be followed up by a closure of 
the markets, and if that too should fail, by the march of a party of 
troops to his principal village which was situated one long day’s 
journey south of Nongkhlao. The country of Mylliem chief being quite 
open and the inhabitants numbering only four to six hundred fighting 
men with no better arms than bows and arrows, Scott thought that a 
single company would be quite sufficient to bring him to reason. If 
need be he proposed to call upon the raja of Jaintia and Nongkhlao to 
furnish their contingents in support in accordance with the treaties 
they had entered into with the British government."1 The Government 
believing in his judgement and discretion, on account of his "long
experience of the ways and habits of the border tribes”, authorised
2
him to carry out his measures.
Scott obviously minimised the power of the Khasis and treated
the incident of Dimarua as an outcome of the natural evil propensities 
3
of "savages”. No sort of organized rebellion was ever expected from 
the Khasisland the existing trouble was considered as merely local. In 
the remaining few months of the year 1828 therefore, Scott busied
1 B.S.P.C. 5 Sept. 1828, no. 12, Scott to Swinton, 8 Aug. 1828.
2 B.S.P.C. 5 Sept. 1828, no. 24, Swinton to Scott, 5 Sept. 1828.
3 B.S.P.C. 5 Sept. 1828, no. 12, Scott to Swinton, 8 Aug. 1828.
himself advising his assistants on the various administrative 
problems which had cropped up in the newly annexed territory of Assam. 
Capt. Neufville gave him information about the assembly of a body of 
insurgent ex-nobility in Upper Assam* and in the autumn of 1828
Capt. White of the troubles given by the Bhutias in the Buriguma
2
duar. In April 1829, after supervising the construction of buildings
3
at Nongkhlao , Scott went in person to Cherrapunji, to make arrange­
ments with Raja Dewan Singh about the grant of land in his territory
4
for the road , and to supervise its construction by prisoners from
5
Assam. It was while at Cherrapunji that on 7 April the news came of 
the massacre at Nongkhlao of two Europeans, Lt. Bedingfield and Lt. 
Burlton, along with several natives, killed by the Khasis.^
1 B.S.P.C. 4 Dec. 1828, no. 10, Neufville to Scott, 22 Oct. 1828.
2 B.S.P.C. 4 Dec. 1828, no. 12, White to Scott, 28 Oct. 1828.
3 On 24 March 1829 Scott informed Calcutta that a bungalow consisting 
of six small and one large room, affording accomodation for two 
families or four bachelors, had been built at the cost of Sa.Rs. 
3,923. He also reported that there was an adjoining house of an in­
ferior description, which if necessary might be fitted up for the 
reception of an equal number of visitors.
B.S.P.C. 18 Apr. 1829, nos. 55-56, Scott to Swinton, 24 March 1829.
4 The three points arrangement with the raja was thus:
1) The raja would receive as much land in the plains near Pandua as 
might be taken by government in the hills, and that he would be 
allowed to establish a bazar, which should be under his authority.
2) The raja would help in every direction towards the building of 
the road.
3) Natives of Bengal committing offences within the limits of the 
sanatoriam, would be tried by British government; if beyond, by 
the raja, but severe punishment would be given only after con­
sultation with the Agent of the governor-general.
B.S.P.C. 1 May 1829, no. 38, Scott to Swinton, 19 Apr. 1829.
5 B.S.P.C. 17 Oct. 1828, nos. 4-5, Scott to Swinton, 22 Sept. 1828.
6 B.S.P.C. 25 Apr. 1829, nos. 9-14, White to Swinton, 8 and 25 Apr. 
1829.
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Contemporary Englishmen in Assam described the massacre of 
Nongkhlao as an incident arising from a stupid remark made by a 
Bengali chaprasi. In a dispute with the Khasis, prior to Scott’s 
coming up, the man had threatened them with his masters ver%js^nce and 
had plainly told them that it entered into his master’s plans to 
subject them to taxation,'1' Scott certainly was at a loss to find any
more serious reason behind the outbreak, which he declared was ’’not
2
easy to comprehend” since he thought Tirut was friendly to the
British. However, he admitted that no sooner had he settled the
difference between the parties of Chattar and Tirut than ’’fresh schism
broke out", the inhabitants of one of the principal villages, called
Lungbri, taking the part of Rajjan Singh, the minor brother and direct
heir of Chattar Singh, and seceding altogether from Tirut’s authority.
The aggrieved party had also gone so far as to stop travellers on the 
3
road. Tirut had his own grievances too. Scott reported that on ob­
taining possession of the lowland estates granted in return for the
<K>
site for^road and sanatorium, Tirut found "his unreasonable expecta­
tions of enjoying a large profit and arbitrary sway over his ryots 
disappointed". Because of his complete ignorance of the British system 
of revenue collection, and "his obstinacy in refusing the assistance
offered to him by an experienced agent", Tirut failed to raise suffi-
4
cient money even to pay the government dues.
1 A. White, Memoir, pp. 41-42; A.B. Lish, op.cit., p. 130.
2 B.S.P.C. 26 June 1829, nos. 2-3, Scott to Swinton, 30 May 1829.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid*
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Tirut*s own version however, was very different. He complained 
that at the time of the agreement the understanding was given that he 
would not be asked for the revenue of the land given to him. But Scott 
argued that "although no regular annual rent in money was levied under 
the Assam government from his (Tirut*sj predecessors, they were liable 
to perform service to the state with the whole of their paiks. They 
had, besides been invariably obliged to pay a fine to the Barphukan to 
obtain the investiture of the estate”. The amount raised in former 
times under these heads had "exceeded the whole revenue at which duar 
was now assessed".'*'
Whatever the truth of Scott*s assertions the chief certainly 
felt that he had been deceived. He also felt betrayed in another inci­
dent. The raja of Rani, a border area in the Kamrup district of Lower 
Assam, who was in dispute with Tirut, had threatened to retaliate upon 
Nongkhlao people passing through his territory to the markets in Assam. 
Tirut had thereupon turned to his new British ally for help - only to 
be told none would be given "unless he first made what reparation was 
in his power for the murders and robbery he had committed on the Rani 
people". Moreover, when Tirut decided to take matters into his own 
hands, and assembled a force apparently to attack the lowlands of Rani,
he found that at the request of the Rani raja Captain White had sent a
2
body of sepoys to keep the peace. No wonder that to Mahidhar Barooah,
3
an honoured prisoner captured along with Lt. Bedingfield, Tirut
A -5 -A Iki 1
1 B.S.P.C. 26 June 1829, nos. 1-2, Scott to Swinton, 30 May 1829.
2 Ibid; B.S.P.C. 25 Apr. 1829, no. 9, White to Swinton, 8 Apr. 1829.
3 From Mahidhar Barooah’s deposition it is clear that Tirut treated 
this Assamese officer with respect.
211
Indignantly exclaimed : ”Booroowah Mr# Scott formerly made friendship 
with me saying ’your enemy is Company’s enemy, and that he would re­
linquish the Barduar revenue both in money and paiks# He has not done 
it and he has the wish to give troops to my enemy the Rani Raja to 
assist him against me’
Thus it is clear that Scott’s plan to exchange portion of 
"the bold and sterile land in the hills for slices of fertile plain 
below” was most untactfully handled. The supposed bargain offered to 
the hill tribes proved not in the least advantageous to them, their 
newfound ally deserted them in their hour of need, and rumour had it, 
intended to subjugate and tax them. While Scott was hearing of con­
spiracies by Mylliem chief, White was informed that Tirut had engineered
a large-scale plan to drive the English from Assam, and had invited
2
the ex-raja, Chandra Kanta to co-operate in the enterprise.
British retaliation began immediately after the massacre of 
Nongkhlao, Capt. White with forty sepoys of JRungpore Light Infantry
t- till m   ^t, t * t' h  A  i T* Q  1 1
marched for the hills in the early morning of 7 April, 1829. A few days- 
later Scott was planning to fix a strong military post at Nongkhlao or
1 B.S.P.C. 26 June 1829, no. 3, Scott to Swinton, 30 May 1829.
Mahidhar Barooah’s deposition taken on the 17 May, 1829, in the 
Fauzdari Adalat of Gauhati.
2 To counteract this design of Tirut White summoned Raja Chandra Kanta 
and others to Gauhati. White wrote that on their arrival he would 
suggest to the raja that ”as a well wisher to the Company and to 
prevent his name being abused, it would be desirable for him to 
proceed to Goalpara”.
B.S.P.C. 8 May 1829, nos. 9-10, White to Swinton, 1h Apr. 1829.
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some other place to teach the "savages’1 "to feel that the British
power, unlike the feeble and distracted government which preceded it
in Assam, is both able and determined to maintain its authority and
punish with promptitude those who offend against it".1 He administered
2
"retributive justice" by capturing and destroying the Khasi villages 
one after another, at the same time seizing their grain. The strong­
holds of such ring leaders as Barmanik, were burnt down completely.^
A force of Garo mountaineers, chosen for their hardiness and ability 
to withstand the arduousness of a hill campaign were sent in under 
Mirza Bandula, a party of the Sibandi corps and forty armed Shyame,
K
and a sura of one thousand rupees was offered for the capture of Tirut.
The vigorous policy of reprisals, including the ruthless des­
truction of villages, ordered by Scott, received the approval of the 
Supreme Government. They commented that "whatever the original sources 
of Raja Tirut*s enmity may have been, that attack was not provoked by 
any act of violence or oppression on the part of the unfortunate 
sufferers" - and they expressed the righteous hope that "the display 
of our ability to punish those who have ventured to offend against us 
to set our power at defiance will have awakened these rude and bar-
i « »
barous tribes to a proper sense of their own weakness and the danger 
they incur by provoking our just resentment".^
1 B.S.P.C. 25 Apr. 1829, no. 13, Scott to Swinton, 14 Apr. 1829.
2 B.S.P.C. 15 May 1829, no. 11, Swinton to Scott, 15 May 1829.
3 B.S.P.C. 1 May 1829, nos. 40-43, Scott to Swinton, 17 Apr. 1829;
B.S.P.C. 15 May 1829, no.10, Capt. Lister to Scott, 26 Apr. 1829.
4 B.S.P.C. 26 June 1829, nos. 2-3, Scott to Swinton, 30 May 1829.
5 B.S.P.C. 5 June 1829, nos. 6-7, Scott to Swinton, 21 May 1829.
6 B.S.P.C. 15 May 1829, no. 9, Scott to Swinton, 27 Apr. 1829;
B.S.P.C. 26 June 1829, no. 4, Swinton to Scott, 26 June 1829#
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The result of Scott’s measures was speedy* In the beginning
of May Capt. Lister with his detachment succeeded in subduing many
villages including such strongholds as Lunggrin, Mairong and Nongkhlao
and Tirnt had to move from one hiding place to another.'*' By September
many rebel leaders, including Barmanik of Mylliem and Jabbar Singh of
2Ramri wished to come to terms , agreeing to pay to the government a
fine of four thousand rupees and to cede the right of quarrying lime
3
stone on any part of the course of the Bogapani river. By April 1830
U a A  teen £ n J x tc ie .c L
a vast tract^ stretching up the Assam valley, which included the whole
of Mylliem, and its dependencies of Ramri, Marriw and Nongkhlao, except
4
for a pocket lying between Nongkhlao and Mylliem. They had also
occupied certain small areas on the southern or Bengal side of the
5
mountains, Momlu, Lylanchu, Mosmy, Superpunji, and Byrong. For the 
administration of all these occupied parts of the Khasi hills Scott 
proposed that the former chiefs should be reinstalled, but under sanads 
granted by the government. The chiefs should be liable to punishment 
for treason or resistance to British authority and to removal in the 
case of continued opposition. In such an event the leading persons in 
the country would be required to assemble and elect new chiefs, subject 
to the approval of the British government. The restored chiefs were to '
1 B.S.P.C. 22 May 1829, no. 1, Scott to Swinton, 5 May 1829.
2 B.S.P.C. 28 Aug. 1829, no. 21, Scott to Swinton, 14 Aug. 1829.
3 B.S.P.C. 18 Sept. 1829, no. 1, Scott to Swinton, 5 Sept. 1829.
4 These lands belonged to twelve different lyndows or confederated 
chiefs of Sohiong ect. who remained neutral during the last distur­
bances.
5 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 49, Scott to Swinton, 9 Apr. 1830.
be entrusted with the administration of justice for all but capital 
offences. These he proposed, might be tried before an assembly of 
chiefs to be held twice a year when he went to hold the circuit at 
Sylhet. He proposed that in the present state of the country they 
should not be subjugated to the payment of any revenue. Instead he pro­
posed to impose upon them fines equivalent to the expense and trouble 
they had occasioned, five thousand rupees from Barmanik, three thousand 
from Jabbar Singh and two thousand from the raja of Marriw. The 
Nongkhlao district was restored to the minor Rajjan Singh upon the same 
terms. Finally some of the most elevated and fertile spots were set 
apart, under direct British control, for future use.* Scott’s measures 
were whole heartedly supported by the government, the greatest reliance
being put on his local knowledge and experience in regard to the
2
character, disposition, habits and usages of the hill tribes.
The complete subjugation of the refractory Khasis was achieved 
3
only in 1833 when the long and harassing war was brought toaclose. 
That, of course, was two years after David Scott’s death. But Scott 
had succeeded during his life time, in bringing peace to almost all the 
hills.** The outrages, murder and depredations which occured in the 
last year of his career (1831) were restricted to the duars, such as
5
Pantam, Bogy and Bongaon, where the Khasis were joined by the Garos.
1 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 49, Scott to Swinton, 9 Apr. 1830.
2 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 50, Swinton to Scott, 7 May 1830.
3 P.R.T. Gurdon, op.cit., p. XVI; Physical and Political Geography,
p. 87.
4 Bengal : Past and Present, vol. XI, 1829, p. 108.
5 B.P.C. 11 Feb. 1831, no. 27, Scott to Swinton, 12 Jan. 1831.
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The cause of these late troubles was the strict control now exercised 
over the duars by the British, who thereby deprived the Khasis of the 
illicit emoluments they had been in the habit of levying under the 
Assam government in the form of ceremonial and other illegal cesses.^
The only course which Scott thought could advantageously be
pursued in such cases, was that of reducing to subjugation the tribes
bordering on the duars who had been perpetrating the outrages and who
were at present independent of British authority. Scott proposed the
establishment amongst them of the same sort of internal government as
had been maintained amongst the Garos of the North-East parts of
2
Rungpur since 1817* Scott was pretty certain that the duars would 
pay double the existing revenue, about a thousand rupees if they were 
secured against the aggression of the hill tribes. He therefore em­
ployed shyam musketeers, under the command of Ensign Brodie who 
succeeded by April 1831 in subduing the marauding tribes of the duars.
1 B.P.C. 11 Feb. 1831, no. 28, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 17 Jan, 
1831.
Under the Assam government the estates forming the duars had not 
paid any regular annual revenue but large sums were extracted on the 
occasion of a new chiefs’ accession, raised by levies on the people, 
while the tribes were bound to furnish paiks for the public service. 
These labour demands were commuted to a money payment, a few working( 
paiks only being retained for local purposes. But although the 
revenue was fixed at a very low rate and reductions made in favour 
of the chiefs in some cases amounting to nearly fifty percent upon 
the jama, few of them had been able to fulfil their engagements 
owing to their total incapacity for business and the roguery of 
their servants. Their failure led to the temporary attachment of 
several of their estates, a proceeding which ultimately led to 
catastrophe.
2 B.P.C. 11 Feb. 1831, no. 28, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 17 Jcui, 
1831.
3 B.S.P.C. 20 May 1831, no. 35, Scott to Swinton, 29 Apr. 1831 and 
Brodie* s report, 6 Apr. 1831.
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The reduction of the whole of the principal chiefs to the westward of 
Nongkhlao was thus accomplished after a lightning three weeks campaign^
p
and although the death of the man who had struck them with such terror 
might tempt some of them to break their agreements, Scott was sure that 
in the main they had a sufficient lesson not to repeat the act* The 
successful conduct of the campaign by Brodie with a few irregulars 
convinced Scott of the suitability of his similar measures on the
_ J#
Sadiya frontier* He wrote to Swinton thus : "With a party of forty 
two men Ensign Brodie had infact, nearly accomplished in three weeks, 
what several companies of Sepahees were unable to attempt in two
1 B.S.P*C# 20 May 1831, no. 36, Scott’s private letter to Swinton,
29 Apr* 1831.
2 Brodie died in the last stages of this campaign. About his character, 
courage and determination Scott wrote thus: "... *.. It is a 
grievous thing to lose such a noble spirited officer in such a way. 
But he may be truly said not to have died in vain, since he has 
clearly indicated the means that we should in future adopt in the 
petty warfare that may be expected occasionally to take place with 
the rude tribes encircling a frontier of one thousand and five 
hundred miles in extent ••• ••*
••• ••• I am inclined to count the high character, that he has 
established amongst our Cassya friends and foes of European courage, 
activity and perseverance, qualities which they are naturally led 
to value very highly and which when conjoined, as in the present 
instance, with a kind and conciliatory demeanour, would have given 
this young man a most powerful influence over their minds and 
rendered him a very efficient instrument for their ultimate recla- . 
mation* This loss could not indeed be adequately supplied were the 
whole Army picked for the purpose since they were united in him in 
an extraordinary degree of personal activity, a complete contempt 
for privation of every kind, and an enthusiasm in favour of the 
mountaineers and high esteem for the bright part of their character, 
that would have enabled him completely to win their hearts".
B.P.C. 20 May 1831, no. 36, Scott’s private letter to Swinton,
29 Apr. 1831*
3 Ibid.
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months; and it appears to me, that the successful result of this small 
expedition becomes of no trifling consequence, when it is considered 
that we have on this frontier a boundary line of about one thousand 
and five hundred miles in extent, the whole of which is subject to 
similar depredations to those that led to the late military operations 
in Assam, while owing to the unhealthiness of the climate and other 
local circumstances it may fairly be considered indefensible by means 
of our regular troops".*
Use of the Khasi Hills : Plan of European military colonies.
+ka ss i Air ® \ 111 Hi rd *= • $ * h j t  *j H v r* rs? * &  t • n c€&. wr ■. o
The insurrection and rebellions could not suppress Scott’s 
indomitable zeal for developing the Khasi hills. Indeed, he went beyond 
his original ideas for developing sanatoria for invalid European 
soldiers in the Khasi hills, to the grandiose imperial vision of 
planting European military colonies therein.
When Scott had first drawn attention to the cool, healthy
climate of the hills, he had thought of them as useful for sanatoria
2
but otherwise barren. But by the beginning of 1830 they had been
1 B.P.C. 20 May 1831, no. 36 > Scott’s private letter to Swinton,
29 Apr. 1831.
2 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 49, Scott to Swinton, 9 Apr. 1830.
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found suitable for growing many European crops, and larger uses began
to suggest themselves.1 An agreement had already been reached with
the Dewan Raja of Cherrapunji in September 1829 by which the raja
agreed to cede a portion of his territory, east of Cherrapunji, for
2building houses by the Company and meanwhile three houses were built
there, capable of being converted, at little expense, into barracks
for forty European invalids. The friendliness of the people of 
.3
Cherrapunji had much impressed him, and he therefore hoped that he
might also be able to canton a company of European troops there, though
the land had been given on the understanding that it was for the
4
reception of invalids.
For this rather underhand move Scott gave two reasons - that 
by the presence of a European company "an impression would be made upon 
the mountaineers, in regard to further resistance, which could not 
perhaps be produced by any other means", and that "it would restore a 
more complete degree of subordination and discipline amongst the native
5
troops on this frontier than has hitherto prevailed". In further ex­
planation of the importance of the latter reason Scott cited the 
symptoms of disorder among the sepoys in Assam, displayed at various
1 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 49, Scott to Swinton, 9 Apr. 1830.
2 C.U. Aitchison, op.cit., p. 172.
3 Scott had special respect for the people of Cherra. The Khasis of
Cherrapunji saved his life and he was so grateful that he never vio­
lated the compact then arrived at that "the independence of the
Khasis of Cherra should always be respected".
G. Bertrand, Secret Lands Where Women Reign, p. 157.
4 B.P.C. 18 June 1830, no. 52, Scott to Swinton, 4 June 1830.
5 B.S.P.C. 16 Apr. 1830, no. 34, Scott to Swinton, 12 March 1830.
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times in the last few years. The conduct of the 46th Regiment at
Rungpur in 1825^; of the Assam Local Corps in August and September of
1828, and that of the detachment of the 54th under the command of
Lt. Comie in May 1829, had made the matter so serious that this second
2point could not be overlooked.
More detailed plans soon followed in swift succession, and 
meanwhile Scott’s ideas were strongly advocated by Secretary Swinton 
to the governor-general-in-council. Stressing Scott’s idea of teaching 
the native soldiers the. lessons of discipline and obedience;Swinton 
observed "our only force in Sylhet is composed of Manipurian^ These 
men have always behaved well and on one occasion in particular gave 
strong proof of their fidelity when t^npered with by a chief of their 
own tribe. But it may not he prudent to trust too implicitly to this 
feeling of loyalty".
Scott had also detailed to Swinton his proposals for a sana­
torium. Cattle might economically be purchased in the breeding dis­
tricts and then driven in large herds up into the hills, "where in 
addition to the advantages of good pasturage for the cattle the manure
produced would render it practicable to raise abundant crops of
4
vegetables for the use of the troops". To take charge of this
1 On 15 October, 1825, about 37 men of the Grenadier Company of the 
46th Regiment stationed at Rungpur approached the pay havildar and 
stated that if they were ordered to march towards Assam they would 
refuse, because of the mortality from sickness there. It was only 
through Col. Richards* personal influence that the sepoys agreed to 
march and it was also due to him that the death sentences against 
the ringleaders were not executed. See A. Barat, The Bengal Native 
Infantry, pp. 221-222.
2 B.S.P.C. 16 Apr. 1830, nos. 3-4, Scott to Swinton, 12 March 1830.
3 B.P.C. 18 June 1830, no. 57, Swinton’s note, 15 June 1830.
4 B.P.C. 25 June 1830, no. 44, Scott to Swinton, 11 June I83O.
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operation he recommended a certain Fenwick, who was already accustomed 
to dealing with the hill peoples* These measures, too, Swinton pressed 
upon the Council, urging that there should be "no obstacles for a fair 
trial of the experiment and a steady officer in command of 20 or 30 
invalids with an assistant surgeon should be sent up in boats to the 
foot of the hills from which they would reach the sanatorium in one 
day’s march”. *
A few days later on 2k June, 1830, Swinton placed before the
Council all of Scott’s correspondence, public and private, regarding
his plans for the hills* Scott had assured him that forty European
2
soldiers could easily be kept supplied at Cherrapunji : provisions 
could be brought by boat from Sylhet for no more than five annas a 
maund, while black cattle in excellent condition could be bought on the 
spot for eight to ten rupees a head, and cattle of an inferior des­
cription for much less at the foot of the hills. Scott also reported 
that potatoes, turnips and beetroot could be produced in such abundance 
in the higher regions that they could be profitably used for feeding 
cattle during the winter months. Wheat was found to thrive and judging 
from the results of some experiments the land was considered probably
capable of producing opium at a cheaper rate and of a better quality
tS tiw r or young Kroon
3
than in any other part of the Company’s territory.
1 B.P.C. 18 June 1830, no. 57, Swinton’s note of 15 June 1830.
2 In Scott’s letter of 9 April 1830 to Swinton he described Mylliem as ' 
yet another healthy place. The tract comprised about twenty to 
thirty square miles of the most elevated portion of the country. This" 
he thought would be a most advantageous site for a cantonment for 
European troops ’’the ground very tolerably level and the soil appa­
rently capable of producing the European grains, fruits and vegetab­
les as well as of affording good pasturage for the cattle.
B.P.C. 2 July 1830, no. 2, Swinton’s note of 2k June 1830*
3 Ibid.
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It would seem that these assertions about the agricultural 
capabilities of the hills were based upon experiment, for Scott had 
privately established a farm at Mairong, run with government convict 
labour, to ascertain, upon a larger scale what could be grown. This 
venture he had begun without government’s sanction, for on 4 June,
1830, he applied for the waiving of the restriction upon land holding 
by British officers and for retrospective approval for his use of 
convict labour,*
Scott also suggested that experiments should be undertaken 
to discover whether horses suitable for military purposes could be 
bred in the Khasi hills more cheaply than was practicable elsewhere. In 
the Nongkhlao and Mylliem districts he saw several hundred square miles 
of good pasture land, unoccupied and likely to remain so, which al­
though not rich, were quite suitable for breeding black cattle and 
horses, ’’The object of the experiment would not be” Scott said ”to 
breed horses of the best description since such will bear the expense 
of housing and constant attendance, but to ascertain whether cattle 
fit for military service could be bred at a much cheaper rate than is 
elsewhere practicable”. He proposed that a stallion and a sufficient 
number of young brood mares should be sent by water to Sylhet so that 
they could be kept in the neighbourhood of Mairong where after being
L t l ©  t j | gt
acclamatised they could ”be turned loose in parks or even without en-
2
closures with a few sheds for shelter during rainy weather”. In a
1 B.P.C. 2 July 1830, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, h June 1830;
B.P.C. 13 Aug. 1830, no. 65, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 17 July 
1830.
2 B.P.C. 2 July 1830, no. 2, Scott to Swinton, h June 1830.
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private letter to Swinton Scott observed : "The object of being inde­
pendent of foreign supply for horses is one of such consequence that 
I should suppose Government would be disposed to try any experiment
*fi
that holds out a reasonable chance of effecting it, and I must say 
that of all the countries I have seen in India including the Tirhoot 
and present stud districts I think this by far the most promising".
Scott was so eager for the experiment that he even promised to under­
take four superintending visits a year to the place if the plan were 
authorised.1
Swinton was also able to report certain practical steps taken 
by Scott. He had not only built accommodation for forty invalids, but 
had also put up two small cottages, to be hired by officers or by 
private individuals. To most of Scott’s measures Government approval 
was granted. Mr. Fenwick was appointed superintendent, surveyor and 
commissariat agent for the invalid centre, at two hundred rupees a 
month. The Bengal commissariat was instructed, in conjunction with 
Fenwick, to provide a supply of rum, tea, sugar and other necessaries 
for forty European invalids. By a resolution of 29 June, 1830, these 
were ordered to be selected from the artillery at Dumdum and sent by 
water, without delay, to the sanatorium at Cherrapunji. The officer 
commanding the party was placed entirely under the orders of Scott,who • 
was to guide his conduct towards the chief and people of Cherrapunji.
i
With the party was also sent a medical officer, Assistant-Surgeon
Rhodes, who was to keep a regular meteorological journal, and to watch
1 B.P.C. 2 July 1830, no. 2, from Swinton’s note on Scott’s letter,
24 June, 1830*
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and report on the effects of the climate on the health of the men under 
his charge.* Lord Bentinck approved of Scott’s plan to establish a 
stud farm in the hills, and he also sanctioned the leasing of further 
houses to private individuals. But though whole-heartedly behind the 
invalid station, he ignored for the time being, the question of posting 
a European force in cantonment at Cherrapunji. Rather he pinned his 
hope of establishing control and discipline upon the presence of the 
European invalids and the belief that "unshackled by the prejudices of 
caste, the Cossya Highlanders may readily amalgamate with their Euro­
pean commanders and their physical temperament may better qualify them
2
to serve in the same ranks".
In all this Bentinck was supported by his councillors Bayley 
and DalhousieV) But Charles Metcalfe, also of Council, took a diametri­
cally opposite view. He thought most of Scott’s proposals were prema­
ture, except for his plans to station a native force at Sylhet and to
3
establish a European cantonment in the Khasi hills. Metcalfe had been 
thinking seriously since 1829 about the fate of the British empire in 
India. In October of that year he reminded the government of the dis­
parity between the Company’s native and European army and its conse­
quences : "Our whole real strength consists in the few European Regi­
l
ments, speaking comparatively, that are scattered singly over the vast ■
1 B.P.C. 2 July 1830, no. 1, Minute^by the Governor General W.C. 
Bentinck concurred and signed by^uaihousie and W.B. Bayltfy, 26 June ■; 
1830; Bentinck Papers, PwJf 2791, Swinton to Scott, 29 June 1830.
2 B.P.C. 2 July 1830, no. 1, W.C. Bentinck’s Minute, 26 June 1830; 
Bentinck Papers, PwJf 2791, 1830.
3 B.P.C. 2 July 1830, no. 3, Metcalfe’s Minute, 2 July 1830.
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space of subjugated India. That is the only portion of our soldiery
whose hearts are with us, and whose constancy can be relied on in the
hour of trial. All our native establishments, military or civil are the
followers of fortune. They serve us for their livelihood, and generally
serve us well ... but in their inward feelings they partake more or
less of the universal disaffection, which prevails against us, not from
bad government, but from natural and irresistable antipathy”.* Metcalfe
therefore, commenting that he would rather see "efficient soldiers sent
to that country than invalids”, argued that a cantonment would be
"entirely unobjectionable and highly desirable for the purpose of
giving confidence to our well affected subjects on that frontier, where
considerable alarm prevails apparently from the want of sufficient
force”. He could think of only one drawback in pushing a European force
into the Khasi hills : that ”if a force of that description be posted
for the purpose of overawing the native inhabitants the withdrawing of
it, when required for service elsewhere might become the signal for 
2
insurrection”.”*
But the demonstration of such practical details were only the
preliminaries to the unfolding by Scott of views of ”a more general and
extended nature”. What Scott set out was nothing less than a review of
the essential basis of British power in India, a review of ”the peculiar
3
circumstances, military, political and financial, of the Indian empire.”
1 Bentinck Papers PwJf 2479. Extract from Sir Charles Metcalfe’s
Minute of 11 Oct* 1829 in reply to W.B.’s letter on the subject of
Lord Ellenborough’s questions.
2 B.P.C. 2 July 1830, no. 3, Metcalfe’s Minute, 2 July 1830.
3 B.P.C. 13 Aug. 1830, no. 72, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 21 July
1830,
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Scott began from the basic position that the British had so 
weak a hold on their Indian possessions that its strengthening should 
at all times be receiving serious consideration. In particular, serious 
consideration should always be given to their double edged weapon the 
native sepoy army, at once their main strength and weakness. About the 
sepoy army, he argued, there were two opinions current. One was that 
the sepoy army was a match for any enemy, capable of making a competent 
defence even against a major western power : those who held such a 
view based it upon parade performance and the brilliant success of the 
Indian array in the past. The second view was that the sepoys were un­
fitted for such a task and incapable of withstanding the rough treat­
ment they would receive at a western powers hands : to this attitude 
the evident disorganisation into which much of the native army had 
fallen contributed, and the evidence provided by the Burmese campaign 
that neither the Bengal nor the Madras sepoy could be depended on to 
carry an entrenchment in face of any show of resistance.*
Whichever attitude was correct, the situation was full of 
danger. If the sepoys could meet Europeans on equal terms then they 
were, injfact, masters of the country and government. They would soon 
come to know their power from the liberal press and other instruments 
adopted to enlighten the people. If those who believed the sepoys to be 
a broken reed were right, then they could not be relied upon for de­
fence against foreign attack, and even for ordinary service they must
1 B.P.C. 13 Aug. 1830, no. 72, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 21 July
1830.
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in reality be less efficient and more expensive than European troops.
The remedy for either situation was an expansion of the European 
portion of the army until it was more equal in number to the native 
force.1
The stumbling block in the way of such a plan was, as Scott 
saw, the financial cost. It was as a means of surmounting the financial 
obstacle therefore that Scott put forward his plan for European settle­
ment in the Khasi hills. He asked whether "it might not be practicable 
to substitute for regular troops, European military colonies which
after a comparatively trifling outlay of not exceeding 100 Rs. per man
2
would be able to maintain themselves". Considering the existing 
state of the population of Great Britain and Ireland Scott felt that 
the means of procuring men lay ready to hand s many would come willing­
ly if offered easy terms. The colonists could be promised an ample 
supply of all the necessaries of life, and even luxuries, in return for 
working three hours a day for the state. They would be provided with 
land and stock, which would remain the property of the state, but from 
the produce of which they would support themselves and provide in part 
at least for the maintenance and payment of their officers. During the 
period of their engagement they would be subject to strict military
V
discipline, but after the expiration of this period they might be en­
abled to receive a certain portion of land and a small stock of cattle. •
1 1 ■ — ■ ■ - i i i  . . ■ , -  , -
1 B.P.C. 13 Aug. 1830, no. 72, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 21 July 
1830.
2 Ibid.
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Further hints on the organisations of the colonies might be drawn, 
Scott suggested, from the practice of the Russian government#*
The colonies, he made clear, should be of a purely military
character and ordinary settlers should not be admitted unless they
became subject to military law. The sole object in view should be "to
provide at a small expense a large body of European troops for the
defence of the British Indian Empire and no inferior considerations
should be allowed to interfere in any way with its accomplishment in
2
the most certain and perfect manner”. Were one such colony provided 
in the Khasi and another in the Nilgiri hills, places where five to 
ten thousand men might readily be located, it would be quite possible, 
he believed to dispense with the whole of the regular European force 
then posted in the Bombay and Madras presidencies, and in Bengal and 
Bihar.3
Stokes has commented upon the authoritarian strain in utili­
tarianism revealed by its advocates in India. The philosophy expressed 
by Scott reveals a most intriguing blend of authoritarianism and 
imperialism. Writing about the ultimate political consequences of 
establishing such colonies, he said "If a government strictly military 
were maintained, the children would be brought up with those notions 
of obedience to authority which it is desirable that with reference to 
the object of the establishment they should always continue to retain
1 B.P.C. 13 Aug. 1830, no. 72, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 21 July 
1830.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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and if at any future period they should from their increasing numbers 
and military training become formidable their energies might always be 
conveniently directed to the eastward where the foundation of a fourth 
presidency would afford them employment for which it is not likely 
that with such neighbour as the Burmese and Siamese justifiable ground 
would ever be wanting."*
Scott was not content with posing major problems of the 
British presence in India, and with enunciating a philosophyjhe backed 
up his proposals with a detailed examination of the mechanics of his 
plan. He set out the way in which the Khasi hills might be made pro­
ductive enough, within four or five years, to maintain any number of 
European troops which it might be thought desirable to settle there.
He had already mentioned the ease with which supplies, especially of 
animal food, might be conveyed by boat from Bengal to the foothills.
He now sought to show that the hills might be made independent of the 
lowlands for every description of produce not purely of tropical 
growth. ^
The first step in his plan would be to stock the country with 
twenty thousand black cattle. These could be easily and cheaply 
acquired in the Bengal presidency and could be transported to the 
hills, in the course of a couple of years, at trifling expense. If so 
many were not at once obtainable then a start could be made with half 
that number of cattle, which should be branded and distributed among
1 B.P.C. 13 Aug. 1830, no. 72, Scott to the Chief Secretary,21 July
1830.
2 Ibid.
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the natives of the Khasi hills, in herds of one or two hundreds.* These 
native herdsmen should be rewarded for their services by giving them 
all the bull calves, government retaining all the heifers. Inspectors 
would be placed over every ten to twenty such herds, charged with 
branding the calves and preventing any gross negligence or fraud by 
their keepers. Soil and climate being very favourable the cattle would 
increase and multiply, so that the governments’ part of the stock, the 
females, might be expected to increase at the rate of one quarter of 
the whole number per annum. At that rate, even supposing one eighth to 
be killed annually for the use of the troops there would still be a 
progressive increase of another eighth upon the whole existing stock 
which would consequently be doubled every sixth year. The annual 
slaughter of one eighth of the stock, as the cows ceased to be pro­
ductive, would provide regular supplies for the troops at no further 
expense to the government. Scott told the government that they should 
not consider his reasoning to be based on vague grounds but rather on
past experience. Even better results had been repeatedly obtained in
2
less favourable conditions in New South Wales and other colonies.
Scott then developed his theme of agriculture, which would 
simultaneously flourish. The large quantity of manure produced by each
%,
herd of cattle would naturally be applied to arable farming^and in a 
country so thinly populated a great comparative addition would thus be
, f
1 Scott proposed such a distribution so that ’’the government officers 
should not be embarrassed with the details of a large establish­
ment”.
2 B.P.C. 13 Aug. 1830, no. 72, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 21 July 
1830.
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made to the produce of the soil if not at first in the shape of the 
European roots and grains, at least in that most productive of all 
corn crops, maize, already grown abundantly even without the use of 
manure. The speedy extention of this and other crops without any pro­
portionate increase of the native population would make it possible 
to use some for the feeding of pigs and poultry, for which a ready 
market would be found, first in the preliminary cantonment and then in 
the colony. Scott elaborated in detail how this would help to solve the 
food problem. His plan was by the gratuitous distribution to the best 
native cultivators of two or three thousand swine to increase this 
species of stock so as to provide for the supply of a very considerable 
portion of the food required for even a large body of troops. At the 
expiration of the fourth year - when the first batch of oxen become 
fit for the market - this body might be increased to two thousand men. 
For these men there would then be available annually, produced in the 
country itself, a supply of two thousand cows, twenty five hundred 
oxen and any number of hogs, propressively increasing. The oxen and the 
hogs would be the property of the natives and the meat would of course 
be purchased. But as there would be no effective demand for them except 
on the part of the government the price would necessarily be low, and 
the whole 4 the cost of beef and pork would not in all probability 
amount to one half of what for the time being was paid below.1
1 B.P.C. 13 Aug. 1830, no. 72, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 21 July
1830.
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All these plans and calculations were then set out in a 
table, showing the estimated cost and return involved in preparing a 
site in the Khasi hills for two thousand European troops or colonists.
Purchase of 10,000 cows 
do 200 bulls
do 30 English bulls to improve 
the breed - at Es. 300 
Commission and charges of conveying 
them to the hills 
Building for the cattle 100 sheds
at Rs. 100 each - 
do for the Superintendent 
Charges of superintendence for 4 years 
Purchase of swine etc. to be 
distributed to the cultivators 
Seeds etc.
Total oi
Add interest on 1,20,000 rupees 
for 4 years
Deduct the value of 4,000 cows killed 
for the use of the troops 
Remaining net charge at the end of the 
4th year
Subsequent charges
Interest on Rs. 1,50,000 at 6 percent 
Superintendence after the arrival of 
the troops at Rs. 1,000 per month 
Buildings and contingencies 
Total annual charges after the 4th year
Sicca Rs. 70,000
1,600
9,000
12,900
| *' 0 1M'
10,000
5,000
28,800
4,000
Sicca Rs.
^ ~  ~ ~ 
144,300
28.800
Sicca Rs. 173,100
32.000
Sicca Rs. 141,100
Sicca Rs. 9,000
12,000
7,200
Sicca Rs. 28,200
.i
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Savings to be effected by the arrangement after the 4th year.
Extra insurance on the lives 
of 2,000 men valued at £ 100 each
at 4 percent Sicca Rs. 80,000
Savings on the rations of 2,000 men
at Re. 1 per man 24,000
Annual increase of stock estimated 
at 1/8 propressively increasing but 
in this year would be about
at 7 rupees - _____________ 10.500
Total annual saving Sicca Rs. 114,500 
deduct preceeding charge 28,200
Remaining net savings annually Sicca Rs. 86,300
The above included only the stock farming but Scott said that it 
would of course be desirable to have also a brewery and distillery and 
four mills to be worked by water. The estimated charge for the erection 
of these would be about sixty thousand Sicca rupees which would be 
repaid by a further net annual saving of about twenty percent on the 
current outlay. However, he thought these would not be absolutely 
necessary for a force of only twenty thousand men.^
Scott’s plans for establishing a European military cantonment
w  "t a  ijv f  i i t  . • * Cf
or colonies were certainly a topic of interest to the Calcutta Council •'
for this was a time when men like Bentinck and Metcalfe were giving
tU
serious thought to the task of strengthening^European hold In British
1 B.P.C. 13 Aug. 1830, no. 72, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 21 July
1830.
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India, In October, 1829, Metcalfe thought exactly in the same way as 
Scott did, when he opined that "the most obvious method of improvement 
but that hitherto much disputed, is the admission of Europeans to 
settle and hold property in India. Their settlement has never been en­
tirely prohibited, and latterly has been facilitated and encouraged; 
but the removal of the remaining restrictions on their lawfully 
acquiring and holding property is necessary; and for their satisfaction 
the cessation of the power possessed by the Government of sending them 
out of the country is indispensable".'*' Lord Bentinck himself was un­
happy about "the disproportion between the European and Native army"
2which, according to him, was "quite unintelligible in point of policy" • 
Thus, although Scott’s proposal in June, 1830, for a European canton­
ment, was not at once accepted, he was asked by Bentinck to submit a 
separate dispatch pointing out what previous arrangements should be 
made, and what means might be available on the spot for the construction 
of temporary barracks. Scott was advised to discuss such matters with 
Lt. Fisher of the Quarter Master General’s Department, whose long em­
ployment on the Sylhet frontier would enable him to supply much useful
o
information. The plan which Scott supplied subsequently in July, 1830, 
for the improvement of the resources of the Khasi hills and their
1 Bentinck Papers, PwJf 2479. Extract from Sir Charles Metcalfe’s 
Minute of 11 Oct. 1829*
2 W.C. Bentinck’s marginal notes on Metcalfe’s Minute of 11 Oct. 1829, * 
Bentinck Papers, PwJf,2479*
3 Bentinck Papers, PwJf 2791, 1830. Swinton to Scott, 29 June I83O.
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greater suitability for a European cantonment was found satisfactory
by the government1, but before they could give a final shape to his
plan and carry it out, Scott’s attention was diverted to the troubles
2
of Upper Assam. His death, soon after, in August, 1831, put an end 
to the whole concept of European military colonies in the Khasi hills.
1 Bentinck Papers, PwJf 2791, 1830. Swinton to Scott, 5 Nov. 1830
2 See supra,fp. 1 35 - 13/
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CHAPTER VII
DAVID SCOTT AND SLAVERY IN ASSAM
In 1825 there was a famine in Assam, Much distress had been 
caused by the plundering of the Burmese and their allies, while the 
pressure on existing food resources was increased by the advance of 
British forces and the release of several thousand Assamese captives 
from the hands of the Singphos. To meet this situation Scott adopted 
the old Ahom expedient of allowing freemen to sell themselves as slaves* 
In June he issued a proclamation permitting such sales until the next
harvest in October,* This measure was subsequently sanctioned by the
2
Calcutta Council*
The Court of Directors, however, voiced their strong dis­
approval, declaring in a letter of 10 March, 1830, that "slavery in 
every form was peculiarly revolting to the moral feelings of English- 
men". Scott was thereupon asked by the governor-general-in-council 
to report upon the state of slavery in Assam, and such "practicable
and expedient" measures as would permit a gradual abolition of the
4 5system of slavery* This he did in a long letter of 10 October,1830
1 B.P.C. 3 Apr. 1828, no. 18, Scott to Swinton, 4 March 1828;
P.L.B., vol. 21, letter of 8 May 1829.
2 B.P.C. 3 Apr. 1828, no. 19, Sterling to Scott, 3 Apr. 1828.
3 Courts letter to Bengal, 10 March 1830.
4 B.S.P.C. 30 Apr. 1830, no. 64, Swinton to Scott, 30 Apr. 1830.
5 Appendix VI, No, 5, Report from Indian Law Commissioners relative to 
Slavery in the East Indies. P.P., vol. 28, 1841, Scott to the Chief 
Secretary, 10 Oct. 1830.
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wherein he not only explained what the Assamese system of slavery was, 
and why he thought its abrupt abolition would be unwise, but also set 
out a justification of his 1825 proclamation.
Slavery had long been extensive in Assam. Under the Ahoms the
chief wealth of all the upper classes had consisted of the labour of
the paiks allotted to them by government and that of their slaves, upon
which they depended for the cultivation of their lands.^ Many temples
were granted slaves, or Bohotias. for their service, by the king or
other individuals. Thus one of the temples of Kamakhya held between
2
twenty and twenty five slaves. In many cases the higher orders had no 
other property besides the labour of their slaves. Even in 1830 a 
census which gave the population of Lower Assam as 350,000 estimated
3
that of these 27,000 were slaves.
As in other parts of India, the slave force in Assam was 
mainly derived from the sale of children by their parents in times of 
individual distress or general scarcity. Adult women would also some­
times sell themselves to discharge a debt or relieve their parents and 
relations, while free women who married slaves also became the slaves 
of their husband*s owners. The children born to slaves were themselves 
slaves, and so usually were the children of slave women born to freemen. 
Prisoners of war and criminals often had their sentences committed to
*
1 E .A . Gait, op.cit., p. 241*
2 P.P., vol. 28, 1841, p. 96.
3 Appendix VI, No. 4, R.I.L.C., Capt. White to Scott, 9 Aug. 1830.
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slavery after being condemned to death* The king granted such persons - 
and sometimes even free individuals also — to his nobles and spiritual 
advisers.*
Others became slaves by an abuse of the system of conditional 
bondage which was common in Assam. Such bondage had two main forms. In 
the one, the Bhaktadasa. as he was called in Hindu law books, volun­
tarily placed himself under the protection of some great man in return 
for his food. There were said to be some three or four thousand persons 
of this class in Lower Assam in 1830, working upon the estates of rich 
m£n in return for their bare maintenance. They were at liberty to 
depart when they pleased. Their numbers had grown during the disturbed 
years before the advent of the British. The other main form of bondage 
arose when freemen pledged their services to their creditors to clear 
off a debt. They either mortgaged their services for a specific period 
- for seven, fourteen or twenty years, or until such time as their
services should have cleared off their debt. Such bondsmen easily
2
slipped into the position of true slaves.
Again, many Assamese had been enslaved by the hill tribes
advancing from the Burmese borders towards the Sadlya frontier after
the outbreak of Ahom civil wars in 1814. The Burmese invasion merely
enlarged the opportunities for such slaving by the Khamtis and Singphos
3
who accumulated many thousands of slaves.
1 P.P., vol. 28, 1841, p. 96.
2 Ibid,, p. 97*
3 E.A. Gait, op.cit., p. 286; Asiatic Researches, vol. 16, pp.337-9.
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Such, in outline, was the historical background to the 
situation in Assam : how Scott reacted to it was obviously of impor­
tance to Assam, but also very revealing of his own personal philosophy. 
He opened his argument about what the British government’s attitude to 
slavery should be, by pointing out that slavery, being consistent with 
Hindu and with Muslim law, was necessarily legal everywhere in India. 
Moreover, the frequent refe$e4p\‘<z& kc donations of slaves to temples 
and to pious men showed that the system had been in force among the 
Hindus from a remote period. Slavery in Assam was thus in harmony both 
with law and popular custom.’*'
But though slavery was so sanctioned it was not widespread in
Assam, certainly less alarmingly so than in other parts of India. Even
2
taking Captain White’s figure of one in twelve as correct this gave 
only eight per cent of the population of Lower Assam as slaves, com­
pared with twenty per cent in the Muslim dominated district of Sylhet. 
Moreover Scott believed that White’s estimate might well have been in­
flated by the inclusion of bondsmen who were not slaves in the proper 
sense of the word. For the probably very low proportion of slaves in the 
Assamese population Scott gave several reasons. The main one was that
under the paik system the Ahom government had a claim upon the labour
3
of all free men, or upon their industry.' Fiscal regulations therefore
1 Appendix VI, no. 5, R.I.L.C., Scott’s Report, 10 Oct. 1830.
2 Appendix VI, no. 4, R.I.L.C., White to Scott, 9 Aug. 1830.
3 B.P.C. 3 Apr. 1828, no. 18, Scott to Swinton, 4 March 1828;
Scott’s Report, 10 Oct. 1830.
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prohibited the enslavement of freemen (females of course might sell 
themselves, or be sold by their parents, if the sale was valid in 
Hindu law)• Again, in contrast to other areas, there was no importa­
tion of slaves, except for a few Naga women presented by the hill 
chiefs to the Ahom kings. * Moreover, though according to Hindu law 
a free woman marrying a slave became herself a slave and gave birth to 
servile progeny, in Assam masters frequently permitted their slaves 
to marry free women upon a special contract with the girl’s father 
that the progeny should be free, In cases of doubt, the ordinary rule 
was that the children followed the condition of the parent with whose 
relations the family resided. Thus the children of a female slave 
might be free, if she had married a free man and the children lived 
with him.2
Slavery was thus legal, but af limited extent in Assam. Scott 
was also of the opinion that, on the whole, the slaves of Assam were 
better treated than anywhere else in the Presidency. In poor and 
middling families, the slaves and bondsmen were treated like the other 
inmates, the same kitchen serving for the whole household, and both 
mistress and maid being entirely clothed in home spun dress. Among the 
rich they often obtained great influence and ruled their masters’ 
affairs in the capacity of dewans. Scott reported that such persons 
were even to be seen riding in a sort of palankeen. In such cases the
1 Scott’s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 5.
2 Ibid, para 6 .
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birth of a child entitled the mother to her freedom, and her offsprings 
were also at the same time allowed to share the family property along
slaves in Assam were of dissolute and depraved habits compared with 
the free population, in physical condition they were never worse off 
than the peasantry of the country. Scott argued that if they could not 
legally accumulate property - which, however, in practice was not the 
case - neither could they suffer those evils from the total want of it
to which the freeman was subjected. It had b^tfjbeen uncommon to find 
free Assamese at different periods of Ahom rule seeking to become
had to undergo. Scott declared that slavery was often more a problem
to the owners than to the slaves themselves. When the latter became
too numerous and exceedingly idle, the masters were unnecessarily put
to expense on their account. They had to feed them and provide for the
expenses incidental to their births, marriages, deaths and all other
religious ceremonies, which they performed with the same regularity
as the free population. To sell their slaves was considered highly dis-
3
creditable and indicative of the total ruin of the master.
This picture of the condition of the slaves given by Scott 
was not challenged by the later report of the Indian Law Commission on • 
the same subject. "It appears to be the general opinion" they wrote
1 Scott’s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 9.
2 The slaves were not asked to join the armies at the time of war. The
king had no control over those belonging to the state affKfcrs and
nobles. Such slaves considered themselves lucky in comparison to the
paiks. See S.K. Bhuyan, Ahomar Din (in Assamese), p. 55;
E.A. Gait, op.cit., pp. 241-242.
3 Scott’s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 8 .
with the children of their wives.^ If, as was commonly held the
slaves to avoid which the paiks or other free people
2
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"that the slaves in Assam were on the whole well treated".^ Complaints
of oppression were not infrequent immediately after the acquisition
of the country by the British, but there were many complaints from the
2
side of masters also. Adam White, who was Scott’s assistant in the 
administration of Lower Assam, wrote to him that from every enquiry 
that he had made the condition of the slaves appeared nearly upon a 
par with that of the agricultural labourers. They were employed in 
cultivating the lands of their masters and received a fair amount of 
clothing. If a person possessed many slaves he only required the 
labour of a few in rotation and allowed the others to engage in the 
cultivation of lands, for the rent of which he became responsible, re­
serving to himself what profit there might be after allowing the slave 
a fair maintenance. The same officer argued that the peculiar geo­
graphical position of Assam presented a check on the masters5 severity 
towards their slaves. Being a narrow valley between two ranges of 
mountains, a day’s journey was enough to put a slave beyond the reach 
of his master. He said that he also found on enquiry amongst the paiks 
that they scarcely considered the condition of the slaves at all in­
ferior to theirs, except that they did not possess their personal 
liberty, for the field labours of the slaves did not exceed those of 
the paiks and those were light indeed as compared with the agricultural 
population of Europe.-'
1 P.P., vol. 28, 1841, p.98
2 Ibid.
3 Appendix VI, no. 4, R.I.L.C., Capt. White to Scott, 9 Aug. 1830*
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Having thus set out the nature of slavery in Assam, Scott 
proceeded to give his views about its abolition. In the process he 
showed himself to be in close agreement with Warren Hastings in be­
lieving that ’the people of this country do not require our aid to 
furnish them with a rule for their conduct, or a standard for their 
property",'*' and with Munro in arguing that "neither the face of the 
country, its property, nor its society, are things that can be sudden­
ly improved by any contrivance of ours, though they may be greatly
2
injured by what we mean for their good". In his report Scott made it
clear that he believed it would be morally wrong for the British
government, being pledged to administer to the local people their own
laws in matters of inheritance, contracts etc., to infringe that
principle by the abrogation of a practice so closely interwoven in the
whole fabric of Assamese society. Scott said that it would be unjust
on the part of the British government to breach engagements held hither-
toy so sacred, on the plea that the system was repugnant to humanity
and good morals. The condemnation of slavery by a nation professing
Christianity seemed inconsistent to Scott, for this institution had
been sanctioned by God for the Jews, and since it was humane in India
3
would surely have His sanction there.
1 G.R. Gleig, Life of Warren Hastings, vol. I, p. 401.
2 Minute of Munro * On the state of the country1, 31 Dec. 1824 :
G.R. Gleig, Life of Sir Thomas Munro. vol. Ill, p. 381.
3 Scott*s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 12.
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Scott pointed out the difficult social problems which abo­
lition would create, both for the rich and for the poor. In Assam the 
seclusion of their women by the higher orders of society, and the early 
marriage of the lower orders which made it impossible to hire un­
married girls as servants, as in European countries, made it necessary 
for the wealthy to look to female slaves for household attendants - a 
system quite agreeable to existing usage and custom. Any change would 
be very unpopular with the higher classes.1 Scott also doubted whether 
change would even, in reality, be beneficial to the lower orders. He 
was well aware of the evil consequences of the slavery, and was pre­
pared to admit that perhaps a fourth of all slaves in Assam were of 
more dissolute and depraved habits than the free population. But then 
these were the slaves who had sold themselves for debt, persons who in 
all probability had originally belonged to that imprudent and spend­
thrift class of society, vhich had its parallel in England. In England 
such persons enlisted in the army or navy, or by a criminal career came
to be transported to the colonies "as the undisguised slaves of the 
2
crown”. The problem of the feckless poor could no more easily be 
dealt with in Assam than in the highly civilized European societies.
As he said, ”i¥hether it is possible, even in highly civilized countries, 
to dispense with the retention of this portion of society in a state of 
constrained servitude, is still to be proved, the experiment never 
having been fairly tried by the European states, where the armies, the 
navies, the gallies and the colonies, furnish receptacles for those who
1 Scott1s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 12.
2 Ibid.
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are naturally incompetent to manage their own affairs and to preserve 
their personal independence* The people in this country have none of 
these resources; and the thriftless poor must consequently either 
starve or become the dependants of individuals, or in the capacity 
of criminals and debtors, fill the public gaols”*1
Stokes has commented, of the paternalists Munro, Malcolm, 
Metcalfe and Elphinstone, that ”they had no hopes of audden and miracu­
lous changes in the progress of human society and there lingered in 
their thinking, particularly in Munro’s, something of that older tra­
dition, which saw the division of society into rulers and ruled as a
2
natural ordering ...” Scott in his arguments reflects much the same
feof*
sort of attitude. In his boyhood in B&jjfland the problem of the English
poor had been much debated. There had been some, like the Rev. D.Davies
who argued that the plight of the poor was not the consequence of
defects of the character, but that the defects of character were the
3
consequence of poverty. But there were many expressions of the con­
trary view, ready to argue that ”If the poor do not prudently serve
4
themselves none can effectively befriend them ...”. Scott was evi­
dently very much of the latter opinion : the depraved or foolish poor 
would always undergo hardship, whether slave or not.
1 Scott1s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 12.
2 See E. Stokes, op.cit.
3 D. Davies, The Case of Labourers in Husbandry (1795), quoted in 
A. Briggs, Age of Improvement, p. 60.
4 Eden’s State of the Poor, vol. I, p* 508, quoted in A. Briggs, 
op.cit., p. 60 n.
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Scott also drew attention to the problem which abolition 
would bring upon the government. He doubted whether, while contempla­
ting abolition, the government had given any thought to making compen­
sation to the individuals who would lose a valuable category of private 
property.* He believed that the expense of abolition itself would 
render the plan impracticable, since the slaves and bondsmen in the
two districts of Lower Assam and Sylhet could be valued at not less
2than thirty or forty lakhs of rupees. Moreover, if slavery were done
away with, government would have to make provision for maintaining
the starving poor in times of scarcity. Such provision would be costly
and its administration oftenAto great abuse, which might well have
just as ill an effect upon the character of the people as did the pre-
3
valence of slavery in Assam.
Calculating all these factors, Scott felt that the practical
evil arising from the continuance of slavery was not of sufficient
magnitude to justify the British governments* seeking a theoretical
4
triumph in achieving its immediate abolition. He insisted that 
government should obtain not only the opinion of its European func­
tionaries but also that of a committee of intelligent natives. Accor­
ding to him these last alone were competent to judge in regard to a
1 Scott evidently showed the belief expressed in 1780, that the 
blessings and advantages which England enjoyed sprang "above all, 
from those just and equitable laws which secure property”.
See A. Briggs, op.cit., p. 8.
2 Scott*s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 12.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid, para 13.
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matter in which the English had no personal interest and of which they 
had not even a slight knowledge. Moreover, the subject was so compli­
cated by the delicate questions of marriage and the internal economy 
of the zenana - upon vhich the local peoples including both Hindus and 
Muslims were so exceedingly sensitive - that he despaired of any modi­
fication of the existing law emanating from European legislators which 
would be at all palatable to the upper and middling classes of people.* 
If anything must be done, then he suggested that the state of servi­
tude of the bondsma: entitled to redemption should gradually be sub­
stituted for that of the slave absolute. This might be done, particu­
larly in the case of agricultural labourers, by placing a tax of two 
or three rupees a year upon slaves, but leaving bondsmen exempt from 
taxation, provided the sum for which they were redeemable did not 
exceed forty rupees. If a compulsory register of slaves and bondsmen 
was opened, in which.masters might enter persons either as slaves or 
bondsmen as they wished, he thought numbers of slaves would be entered
as bondsmen to avoid the tax, so ensuring that they enjoyed all the
2
privileges of the latter class.
If a more rapid solution was required then government should 
fix a rate at which they would redeem slaves from their masters. This 
was the only valid way of compensating the higher classes for such an 
invasion of their private property rights : "if something must be done 
at their expense to satisfy the philanthropic feelings of the people 
of England, I should consider this as the least objectionable measure
1 Scott’s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 16.
2 Ibid, para 14.
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that could be adopted, and as one which would also seem likely to 
prove acceptable to the English public, since it would afford to those 
who are zealous in the cause of emancipation an opportunity for the 
exercise of their benevolent views, by coming forward with the re­
quisite funds"."*"
u . u  J - e r ;  v t i  ( ■■■ . ■
From these general considerations Scott next turned to a
e*re,.0 t«,-n .. • ^
defence of his actions in 1825 against the censure of the Court of
th-ff r t t * woiiid tfcjw# v. th i h  ■ d :• e. • re®-# been H
Directors. He began by pointing out that he had been incorrectly
charged with violating the laws and customs of British India. In the
first place Assam had not then come under the formal administration
of the British government, which was at that time much more engrossed
cc
with the conduct of war on the frontier than with the a^licAtion of 
the Bengal Regulations to the society of a little known region. If he 
had sanctioned the sale of men as slaves, during a period of famine, 
he could at the most be charged with suspending the operation of the 
local Ahom regulation enacted to prevent the loss of crown paiks from 
the free population, and the consequent diminution of the state 
revenues. Moreover the Ahom government itself, during past famines, 
had granted permission for paiks to save their lives by becoming 
slaves. Finally, it was not the case, as supposed by the Court, that
i
his sanction had conferred legality and validity upon contracts which 
were not agreeable to the provisions of Hindu and Muslim law. Indeed,
f
in the eyes of the people slavery did not even offend against national
I
2
lagj-— —     »
1 Scottfs Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 15.
2 Ibid, paras 19-20.
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Next, Scott explained the emergency which had prompted such 
a measure and the practical aspect of the question. He believed that 
the lives of the destitute persons, who in 1825 sold themselves in 
Assam, might have been preserved, without their being reduced to 
slavery, by supplying them with food on the public account. But he 
doubted very much whether an application to government for leave to 
expend twenty to thirty thousand rupees, or even a much larger sum, 
the request would have been complied with since the distress had been
■ j • '
occasioned by a scanty crop. Anything short of such sums upon the im-
not
portation of a large quantity of grain would ^ have afforded material 
relief*^ This importation by government was impracticable at that 
time, as the whole tonnage on the river was required for troop move­
ment in the war with Burma, He had no other way of mitigating the evil 
except to secure a reduction of individual consumption, by "making it
the interest of those who had grain to divide it with those who had 
2none”. It was surely a politically prudent act to make use of an 
existing custom when no alternative offered.
Scott was of the firm conviction that the opposition of the 
Court of Directors was the outcome of an Englishman’s abhorrence to­
wards the system of slavery as known to the West. Scott believed that
H
the Directors had absolutely no idea of the structure of society in 
India and the needs of the common people. His measure had been aimed 
at serving the interest of the greatest number : it was not through an
i
alien idealism that the needs and aspirations of the subject people
1 Scott’s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, paras 19-20.
2 Ibid, para 19*
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could be properly grasped.^ He wrote 2 "That slavery, in the usual
acceptance of the word, is repugnant to the feelings of Englishmen, I
am well aware. But the question in this case to be considered was not
whether slavery should, under ordinary circumstances, be patronized and
encouraged, but whether I should in deference to the speculative
opinions of my own countrymen, and in defiance of the wishes and
feelings of those who were alone interested in the result, doom to
certain death hundreds, if not thousands, of a starving population by
refusing them permission to obtain the means of saving their lives upon
2
terms, which, to them at least, seemed advantageous”.
Further, Scott argued that to the people of the East who were 
familiar with slavery, the novel prejudice of Europeans against that 
condition of civil life was quite unintelligible. Hence whatever 
motive he might have assigned for such a piece of cruelty, an order 
prohibiting the self-sale of the male population would have been inter­
preted by the Assamese as ”a sordid determination on the part of their
new masters, not to sacrifice any portion of the capitation tax, let
3the consequences to their subjects be what they might”.
Scott’s contemporaries in Assam held much the same views 
about slavery and its abolition as he did. They believed that any 
attempt abruptly to abolish the system would be wrong. They were not 
blind to the evils in the system, but understanding the organic nature
1 Scott’s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 20.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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of society believed that advance must be slow, and directed to the 
lessening of the evils without infringing the proprietory rights of 
individuals. ^
In his report Scott mentioned with approval Captain White*s 
suggestion that it might be possible to prohibit any future sales into 
servitude except those subject to redemption, and to limit the period 
of bondage either to a term of years, or to the lives of the members 
of the family already in existence at the time of the contract. White 
believed that any total prohibition of sales into slavery would have 
ill consequences, but that future sales should be so limited that all 
progeny born after a contract would be free# Scott proposed that 
White*s suggestions should be given specific form. All adults should 
be at liberty to sell themselves or their children, under such con­
tracts as were valid under Hindu and Muslim law. They should not be 
allowed to entail servitude upon the second generation, or even upon
members of the first generation born after the parents had become 
2
slaves. Moreover those who were subject to servitude would retain 
the right of redemption, upon payment. The payment in the case of 
adults should be of the principal sum advanced, and in that of young 
children, of that sum, together with a reasonable compensation for the 
expense of bringing them up. This additional allowance was to be fixed 
by law, and should be liable to be again gradually remitted according
1 Appendix VI, nos# 3 and 4, R.I.L.C#, Reports of Capts. J.B.Neufville 
and A. White, 26 July, 1830 and 9 Aug. 1830.
2 Scott* s Report, 10 Oct# 1830, paras 21-22.
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to the age the parties might have attained, and the services they 
might consequently he presumed to have rendered to their masters.^
In Upper Assam, the political agent, Captain Neufville, pro­
posed to make slavery less cruel by making the sale of slaves without 
their consent illegal. The transfer of a slave should take place be­
fore the chief of his khel or village, who would be required to ascer­
tain that the person so sold consented to the sale. No one should be 
allowed forcibly to separate slave husband and wife, or slave mother 
and children, upon pain of an immediate grant of freedom to the slave. 
Cases of great cruelty and oppression of slaves by their owners should 
be subjected to the investigation of the village heads, and if fully
nr) <ut im­
proved, punished by fine, or in atrocious cases by the remission of
A
the sufferers. In cases where owners were compelled to sell their 
slaves due to want, scarcity and poverty, the owners would have to 
satisfy the parish meeting of the good character of the proposed pur­
chaser and in this too, the prohibition against the division of a
2
family would stand. Neufville also suggested that the slaves be­
longing to revenue or other public defaulters whose effects were con­
fiscated might be enrolled amongst the government paiks at the khats
or in a district khel, allowing the estimated value to the credit of
3
the owner’s account®
1 Scott’s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 22.
2 Appendix VI, no 3, R.I.L.C., Neufville’s Report, 26 July 1830.
3 Ibid.
In his report of 9 August, 1830,1 Capt. White went a stage 
further in his proposals for curbing slavery* He now suggested that 
life enslavement should be prohibited and no contract of bondage be 
held legal for a longer period than seven or fourteen years. At the 
same time encouragement might be held out to individuals to manumit 
their slaves, by the hope of obtaining government titles and distinc­
tions for which the Assamese, he alleged, were very ambitious. In
addition to this, from a certain date, all children born in a state of
2slavery should be declared free.
White’s summing up of the whole problem of slavery is inter­
esting. While admitting "the demoralising effects of slavery in 
society” he professed the opinion that an immediate abolition of the 
system "would be apt to fail”. He wrote : "From the records of history 
Jewish, Classical, Asiatic and European it appears that slavery has 
everywhere prevailed in the less advanced stages of civilization; and 
I apprehend, Assam, according to European notions, may be considered as 
a country exhibiting a still ruder state of society. Here generally 
speaking, the ryots cultivate only for the supply of their individual 
wants, and do not calculate upon a certain sale for their surplus pro­
duce. What fabrics of manufacture are produced, are generally the work­
manship of the females of the family, not the product of a separate 
class of men; and as yet the commerce of Assam is still in its infancy, 
under these circumstances, if a poor man wants a sum of money for a
1 Appendix VI, no. U9 R.I.L.C., White to Scott, 9 Aug. 1830.
2 Ibid.
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specific purpose, the only valuable article he can give in exchange is 
his labour; and this the rich men naturally endeavour to secure per­
manently by demanding a contract of slavery for life. Besides, here as 
elsewhere, in times of scarcity parents are wont to part with their 
children from a benevolent wish to preserve their lives. Were the 
country further advanced in the career of improvement, and capital more 
widely diffused, it appears to me this system of slavery and bondage 
would gradually diminish of itself as the poor man would obtain a 
small advance on easier terms”.1
In this comment of White’s can be seen once again that prag­
matic approach to the problem of slavery in Assam and of its mitigation 
or abolition exhibited by Scott. Scott’s sanction of slavery in 1825 
did not denote any lack of humanity on his part - it was not a brutal
measure such as Warren Hastings’ draconian law of 1772 for the enslave-
2
ment of the families of dacoits had been, but sprang from a genuine 
concern and understanding. Where he felt he could, Scott acted against 
slavery. Thus immediately after the liberation of Lower Assam he libe-
3
rated some twelve thousand slaves , and ordered Neufville to rescue
4
and free the Assamese enslaved by the Singphos. Again, in 1829, he 
sought the sanction of government for the confiscation and freeing of
5
the slaves of revenue and judicial defaulters. It should be noted
1 Appendix VI, no. 4, R.I.L.C., White to Scott, 9 Aug. 1830.
2 L.S.S. O ’Malley, Modern India and the West, pp. 73-5.
3 E.A. Gait, op.cit., p. 242.
4 See supra, p.
5 B.P.C. 26 Feb. 1830, no. 17, Scott to Swinton, 31 Dec. 1829*
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that on that occasion it was the Calcutta authorities who demurred, 
asking Scott whether the freeing of such slaves would really be bene­
ficial, or whether they would not in all probability sell themselves 
again into bondage, and so defeat the benevolent object of the govern- 
ment. When in I830^once more proposed that instead of allowing 
convicted defaulters to sell their slaves at public auction to satisfy 
their creditor^ they should be compelled to sell them at a fixed price 
to the government, which should thereupon set them free, the Calcutta
p
authorities once more refused to act. What was achieved in 1830 was 
as a result of Scott1s initiative : he instructed the political Agent 
in Upper Assam to open a register for a period of six months for the 
purpose of recording the names of all slaves within his jurisdiction 
and to issue a proclamation that all persons remaining unregistered
3
on the expiration of that period would be held to be free.
But both Scott and White realised that any sudden abolition 
of slavery such as the doctrinaire idealism of the home authorities 
seemed to demand would do serious violence to Assamese society, possib­
ly without any corresponding benefit to the slaves themselves. In 1825 
abolitionist fervour might have caused the death of the starving poor. 
At any time abolition without compensation would gravely affect the
t
upper classes who depended upon slave labour. Mill$£ report, on the 
damaging effects of abolition in 1843, declared in downright terms :
1 B.P.C. 26 Feb. 1830, no. 18, Swinton to Scott, 26 Feb. 1830.
2 B.P.C. 30 Apr. 1830, nos. 63-64, Scott to Swinton, 24 March 1830, 
Swinton to Scott, 30 Apr. 1830.
3 Appendix VI, no. 2, R.I.L.C., Scott to Neufville, 4 Feb. 1830.
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"There is no doubt that this measure reduced the only men of substance
in Assam to absolute poverty".* What was required, as both men saw,
was attention to causes not symptoms. Thus, in his report Scott argued
that the sale of girls and women, with a view to the discharge of their
own or their relatives’ debts, would best be prevented by government
2
aid to their parents. While the need existed, and slavery was agree­
able to the law of the land, only some such practical approach could
3
uproot the evil.
Scott*s attempt to provide the slave-raiding Singphos with
4
new employment as traders and carriers between Assam and Burma , and 
his efforts to press forward with the instruction of the Assamese in 
the useful arts, "without waiting for their slow introduction by 
chance or in ordinary progress of events" , were, as he saw, the only
I
practical approach to the problem of slavery in Assam.
1 A.J.M. Mills, op.cit., p. 17.
2 Scott*s Report, 10 Oct. 1830, para 21.
3 Ibid.
4 See supra, p.
5 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50, Scott to Swinton, 18 May 1831.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID SCOTT
In the last chapter, on slavery in Assam, a special instance 
was considered of Scott’s attitude to questions of moral and material 
progress. It is intended in this concluding chapter to draw together 
other expressions of his ideas on administration and its ultimate aims. 
His career for long stretches was filled with multifarious military, 
diplomatic and administrative tasks, following in quick succession, 
which constantly took him to new headquarters. He had little time for 
elaborate theoretical discussions of the problems of British rule in 
India. Nevertheless from the measures he took and the manner of their 
application, and from his letters and reports, it is possible to see 
the main features of his philosophy of government.
When Scott first came out to India the glow of Wellesley’s 
expansive imperialism still coloured the scene and Scott himself was 
early involved in Lord Hastinges* continuation of that policy of sub­
jecting the whole Indian peninsula to British power. Scott, in his 
frontier field, proved as ready as Malcolm or Metcalfe to think in 
large imperial terms. He came into prominence while opening diplomatic 
relations with Bhutan and Tibet. He played a leading part in advocating 
a forward policy in the Assam valley, Cachar, Jaintia and Manipur. In 
October, 1823, he not only urged that offence would be the best means
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of defence against Burmese encroachments, but strongly recommended that 
even if the existing differences with the Burmese government were 
settled amicably, certain parts of their newly acquired territories 
towards the Company1s Bengal frontier should be demanded from them. 
Scott must share responsibility therefore, for Amherst*s ill-conducted* 
war against Burma, though his own part in it went reasonably well. It 
was Scott*s hope that Lower Assam would yield a substantial revenue, 
and that the internal divisions in an area never fully subjected to 
Ahom administration would make the assimilation of the Kamrup district 
easy, that led him to press upon the Supreme Government the inadvisabi­
lity of an Ahom restoration in the lower Brahmaputra valley. Once re­
tention had been decided upon Scott was led by the difficulties of 
river communication from Bengal, to advocate a land link from Sylhet 
to Gauhati through Jaintia and the Khasi hills. This in turn led to 
the vision of European military colonies in the hills, which would
assure British dominance in India, and perhaps in Burma, making Assam
2
the centre of a fourth Presidency. With this imperial concept also 
went that of trade through Assam to Burma and to China, for as Stokes 
has pointed out, this was a period when the new needs of British 
industry were giving a new purpose to imperialism.
1 "The *Arracan fever* (a particularly virulent malaria) and other 
disease claimed the real victory for in five months alonS 259 
Europeans out of 1,500 and 900 out of 1,000 Indians died and in the 
month of September 1825, 400 Europeans and 3,600 Indians were in 
hospital”. See M # Edwardes, The Necessary Hell, p. 47; see also 
G.D. Bearce, op.cit., pp. 50-51.
2 See supra, p. zzS
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In these imperialistic attitudes, Scott was at one with such 
other great figures as Munro, Malcolm, Metcalfe and Elphinstone. Though 
he never served under any one of these four, and though the records 
provide no evidence of any close association with them, he also shared 
other ideas and opinions with them* Like them he was conservative and 
paternalist, opposed to the attempt to assimilate and anglicize every­
thing traditionally Indian. He shared with them a distrust of the 
Cornwallis system, revolting in particular against the elevation of 
the zamindar class occasioned by the Permanent Settlement. By making 
them a part of the nobility, disrespect had been shown to the original 
institutions of Indian society and the peasantry had been harmed : "The 
only nobility acknowledged under the Mohamedan dynasty” Scott said 
"was that of office; and I believe no part of our system has given more 
general discontent than the undue elevation which the class of zamin- 
dars had attained from their great wealth, the officers of government 
of inferior ranks such as seristadars, tehseldars dewans etc. having 
formerly been considered superiors”.1 This passage can be compared with ' 
that of Metcalfe’s who wrote on the same subject thus ” ... we destroyed
all the existing property in land, by creating a class of proprietors
2
to whom we recklessly made over the property of others". And if the ? 
introduction of English notions of the landowner had damaged Indian 
society, so would the introduction of English law. Scott foresaw that 
it would be the common people of India who would suffer. "There can be
1 Asiatic Journal, vol. 7, 1832, p. 137*
2 See R. Muir, The Making of British India. 1756-1858, pp. 191-192.
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no greater mistake" he said "than to suppose that the lower classes 
are better protected in England than in India. The fact is, that in 
the former country they are entirely destitute of any rights or 
possessions of which they can be deprived, so as to give them any 
cause for complaint* Whoever hears of a day labourer wanting the pro­
tection of the law? He receives his daily hire, and pays for his hut 
or quits it, if he be ill-used, and has no concern with courts of law 
or occasion for their protection. I fancy the people in this country, 
if they ever obtain what it is the fashion to call the benefits of the 
English law, will find themselves in the situation of the frogs who 
prayed for a king, and at length got a stork set over t h e m " A l i k e  
in the Director’s attack upon slavery, and in the application of the 
Cornwallis system, Scott saw - just as the Munro school did - "the
ignorant application of a priori political ideas without regard to the
2
history and circumstances of Indian society".
Scott was also at one with Elphinstone, Malcolm, Metcalfe
and Munro in wishing to conserve native institutions. He was as full
3
of admiration for the popular political institutions of the Khasis ,
as ever Metcalfe was for his "village republics", or Elphinstone for
those Maratha communities which "contain in miniature all the materials
4
of a state within themselves ..." In Assam he not only sought to use 
native juries and native judges for both civil and criminal cases, but
1 Asiatic Journal, vol. 7, 1832, p. 137.
2 E. Stokes, op.cit., p. 15*
3 See supra, p./bo3
4 R. Muir, op.cit., p. 286.
11
260
even supported a system of popular election of revenue collectors.^
He might well have penned Malcolm*s letter to Wynne, quoted by Stokes,
saying "With respect to raising natives both in the fiscal and judicial
line, I am of the same sentiments as Sir Thomas Munro...... . I desire
2
to share the Aristocracy of Office with the natives of India”, ** Scottfs
wish to preserve an Ahom state in Upper Assam was another aspect of
the same basic policy. He saw that in Kararup, under British rule, a
new class of officials must necessarily be introduced : an Ahom state
in Upper Assam would make that provision for the native aristocracy
which could not be made in Lower Assam. As has been seen in chapter
IV (II), Scott believed that the native states had their strengths as
well as their weaknesses, and that their traditional institutions,
3
properly supported, could be made to work very well. What was perhaps 
novel, was Scott’s dislike of the system of subsidiary alliances with 
such states, by which the Company committed itself to non-interference 
in the states* internal affairs. In Upper Assam he was very anxious to 
strengthen the native safeguards against autocratic misrule, and to 
make British government the guardian of the constitution.
In Assam, Scott was in favour of a paternal, non-regulation 
administration. One reason for relinquishing Upper Assam was the desire 
to keep the Company’s possessions in Assam within his own personal
1 B.P.C. 30 May 1833, nos. 89 and 93; see chapter IV (II), p.124
2 B. Stokes, op.cit., p. 16 n.2 ; see also R. Muir, op.cit., p. 284.
3 Stokes points out that this was the attitude of Munro, Malcolm and 
Elphinstone - though not of Metcalfe. See E. Stokes, op.cit., p.21.
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compass* Scott believed, like John Lawrence, that the officer must
know his division intimately*^ In Rangpur, in the Garo or Khasi hills,
in Assam Scott was indefatigable in personally touring his charge,
and he expected his officers to do likewise. He also believed that the
laws and procedure used should be of the simplest kind, based as far
2
as possible on native customs and institutions. With this went
Scott’s stress upon personal accessibility and the maintenance of easy
cominuni cat ions between officials and private individuals : White’s
Memoir makes clear how very fully Scott practiced what he preached in 
3
this regard.
Such a system placed great strain upon the officials who had 
to work it, yet perhaps the most notable and consistent factor in all 
Scott’s career was the scantiness of the European agency with which he 
had to work. Much of the criticism of Scott’s measures might properly 
be laid at the door of a parsimonious government, which left Scott to 
manage vast areas with a mere handful of assistants. A quite typical 
situation was that of February, 1830. The ravages of the river Bornadi, 
which had devastated a tract of land yielding a revenue of some twelve 
thousand rupees, compelled Scott to go to the Darrang district to 
revise the settlement. This meant abandoning the sessions being held in 
Sylhet, for the only European official to whom Scott could have trans­
ferred his duties was the collector of Lower Assam, and he was already
4
deeply involved in the overwhelming criminal business of his office.
1 M. Edwardes, The Necessary Hell : John and Henry Lawrence and the 
Indian Empire, p. 131-
2  S e e .
3 See supra, p. \j
4 B.P.C. 5 March 1830, no. 61, Scott to Swinton, 9 Feb. 1830.
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Later that year both White in Lower Assam1 and Neufville in Upper 
2
Assam stressed their need for English assistants - but the Supreme 
Government not only failed to provide them, but showed itself reluctant 
even to grant Neufville a boat allowance."*
An anonymous author in the Calcutta Review commented upon
another difficulty facing administrators like Scott, White and
Neufville - that of their isolation. The writer pointed out that
"having quitted home when almost boys, with no superiors to look up to,
no equals to associate with, no public opinion to regard", such men had
only the facility of "measuring themselves among themselves and com­
il
paring themselves among themselves". The only factor in Scott*s 
favour was that he had at his command a band of carefully selected and 
very devoted subordinates. He commanded their respect and affection 
and in return did all he could to secure recognition and reward for 
their merits. If John Lawrence offered the tempting prospect of early 
promotion to his subordinates , Scott constantly pressed their achieve­
ments upon the attention of the Supreme Government and their claims
1 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 54, Scott to Swinton, 21 Apr. 1830.
2 B.P.C. 28 May 1830, no. 82, Neufville to Scott, 17 Apr. 1830.
3 See supra, p.
4 Calcutta Review, vol. 19, 1853, p. 423. Assam since the expulsion 
of the Burmese.
5 This can be gathered from some of the correspondence between Scott 
and his friends appended at the end of White*s Memoir. Scott*s 
lasting friendship with his associates in Assam administration can 
also be discerned from the following fact : In December, 1831, the 
friends of the late Lts. Bedingfield and Burlton of Bengal Artillery 
and Beadon, assistant surgeon, Bengal establishment, sought per­
mission to inscribe a tablet on the tomb which was to be erected by 
the government, to the memory of David Scott. See B.P.C. 23 July , 
1832, no. 116, White to Swinton, 22 Dec. 1831.
6 See M. Edwardes, op.cit., pp. 131-132.
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for increased allowances. Thus in 1821 he is found pressing Kishen 
Kant Bosefs claim to an increase after his successful journey to 
Bhutan and extolling the value of his "Account of Bhutan”, and grammar 
and vocabulary of the Bhutan language."^ In 1824, while acknowledging 
his own liberal treatment as political agent, he points out that 
Captain Davidson has at times ”in my absence to officiate in that De­
partment” adding "and I need not say that his pay - military and civil 
is quite inadequate".“ And in 1831 he stresses under what difficult 
circumstances his officials have to act, in a backward country "where 
boats continue to be made from the trunk of trees, where the use of 
saw, a wheel carriage or even a beast of burden is unknown, where the 
natives cannot make marketable butter, sugar or oil, and where half of 
a rich soil, capable of producing every article of tropical growth 
lies waste and is considered absolutely worthless from ignorance of
3
the means of making use of it". Unhappily most of Scott1s earlier 
associates in the conquest and administration of Assam were lost to
-7 r  i v
him. Bedingfield and Burlton, who were engaged in the survey of the
Khasi hills and were in charge of the building of the road and the
sanatoria, Beadon the assistant surgeon who had been looking after his •
4
health since he first fell ill in February 1827 , Brodie, the young
officer conducting so gallantly the military operations against the
5
rebellous Khasis , and Neufville in whose safe hands he could leave the
1 B.C. Vol. 810/21724, pp. 12-13. Scott to Swinton, 21 Sept. 1821.
2 B.S.P.C. 22 Oct. 1824, no. 12, Scott to Swinton, 1 Oct. 1824.
3 B.P.C. 10 June 1831, no. 50, Scott to the Chief Secretary,
18 May, 1831.
4 B.P.C. 16 March 1827, no. 57, Scott to Swinton, 14 Feb. 1827.
5 See supra, p.
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whole administrative burden of Upper Assam for no less than four 
years - all fell a victim to the hostile climate of the frontier.
A second aspect of Scott’s administration and one which might
seem rather at variance with his wish to conserve Indian institutions,
was his interest in Christian missions. Stokes has contrasted the
’’expansive and aggressive attitude” towards Indian society displayed
by the Utilitarians and Evangelicals and the paternalist conservatism
of the Munro school. With that school Scott obviously had much in
common, yet in 1825 he appealed to the Supreme Government to bring
missionaries to the Garo hills, which he presented as a most promising
field for conversion.'*' Scott’s early and long maintained relationship
2with ‘William Carey has already been noticed ; in his last few years he 
had also been in close contact with Colonel Adam White, who in 1822 
had published a book, Consideration on the State of British India.
3
which reveals him as a staunch supporter of missionaries. Again, 
since Scott had entered the service, there had been a steady change in 
the Company’s avowed policy towards the missionaries from an early 
indifference or hostility to that acceptance which received legal ex- 
pression in^Charter Act of 1813. To that changing climate of opinion 
Scott had, of course, been exposed.
1 See Scott’s letter to Bayley, 27 Apr. 1825, quoted in A. Mackenzie, 
op.cit., p. 253 n.
2 See supra, pp. 13-
3 See A. White, Consideration on the State of British India, pp.26-35. ■
4 See M. Edwardes, Asia in the European Age, 1498-1955. pp. 108-115.
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The ideas of those Evangelicals who effected the change in the 
Company’s official policy have been set out by Stokes and by Embree.1 
Their basic concept was that the character of man was a product, not 
of his physical, but of his moral environment, and that salvation 
could be achieved and the individual could be totally transformed by a
<x, 2
direct ass^ilt on the mind. Education followed by personal conversion 
would change the whole nature of society. This emerged from the essen­
tial Protestant belief that Europe’s progress was a direct result of 
the liberation of the individual, the legacy of the Reformation. Their 
logical conclusion was that for India to progress, her people must 
undergo a similar liberation, an assimilation on the deepest level.
In Scott’s appeal for missionary help, and in his own support 
5
of mission work however, it is difficult to find that ’’consuming 
earnestness and conviction, born of a transfiguring religious ex­
perience”, which Stokes thinks^ to have been the hallmark of the 
Evangelical mind. While he had been directly engaged in the settlement 
of Garo affairs, investigating relations between the hill chiefs and 
the plains zamindars, regulating the cotton markets, applying the
1 A.T. Embree, Charles Grant and British Rule in India, p. 141.
2 E. Stokes, op.cit., pp. 30-31*
3 M. Edwardes, Asia in the European Age, p. 109.
4 Ibid.
5 Scott took a keen interest in the activities of the Serampore 
Mission* The Periodical Accounts of the Serampore Mission for 1827 
and 1828 show that he was one of the highest donors to this mission.
Scott and Charles Metcalfe paid an annual subscription of Rs. 200 
which was only second to that of one R. Hume who paid Rs. 250.
See P.A.S.M., 1819-1834, pp. 69-72, Account for the year 1828.
6 E. Stokes, op.cit., p. 29*
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necessary measure of coercion to bring the Garo chiefs1 - some hundred
and fifty five by November 1822 - to coimnit themselves to written
agreements and accept a nominal tribute to the permanent British 
2
power , he had not once called for missionary assistance. Rather when 
he was first called to attend to the Burmese threat, he had relied 
upon the appointment of one or two native superintendents with an 
appropriate staff, working with the neighbouring police daroghas over 
whom they exercised a controlling authority to exercise that administra-
3
tive authority created by Regulation X of 1822." It was only after he 
had left the Garo hills for Assam that, perhaps under the influence 
of White, or from a consciousness of his own precarious health, that he 
appealed for missionary help in settling and civilizing the Garos. It 
was on 27 April, 1825, that Scott wrote to the Supreme Government 
asking permission to negotiate with Bishop Heber at Calcutta for such
1 The chiefs were not powerful or organised enough to use as instru­
ments of British control, as the Rajmahal chiefs had been and Scott 
reported that "unless compelled by a military force few of the class 
would at present submit to any very direct interference in the 
internal affairs, as they have no regular constitutional authorities, 
by gaining over whom we might manage the rest",
B.C.J.C. 27 Sept. 1816, no. 47, Scott*s Report, 20 Aug. 1816.
2 B.C.J.C. 17 Feb. 1825, no. 9, Scott to Bayley, 3 Dec. 1824.
3 The proposed establishment and its expenses were :
Superintendent (one) - Rs. 80
Muharrir and interpreters - 28
Jamadar and peons 38
Office contingent -  4_
Rs. 150.
See B.C.J.C. 17 Feb..1825, no. 9, Scott to Bayley, 3 Dec. 1824.
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assistance. ”1 am satisfied'1, he said, ”that nothing permanently good 
can be obtained by other means, and that if we do not interfere on 
behalf of the poor Garos they will soon become Hindoos or half Hindoos, 
retaining and acquiring many of the bad parts of both their present 
and improved creeds. I would greatly prefer two or more Moravian 
Missionaries of the old school who along with religion would teach 
useful arts”. Indeed, Scott became so much interested in the missionary 
activities that he showed readiness to personally support the mission­
ary venture* ”If Government would ensure them subsistence only in the 
case of success or of my death”, Scott wrote, ”1 would willingly take 
upon myself the expense in the first instance, and £300 per annum 
would suffice”."^ Inspired by a vision of the vast field for conversion 
existing in the Garo hills, he pleaded. ”0f success I have no doubt 
than that, if allowed, you could make Christians of the Hindoo boys; 
and the great error of the Missionaries appears to me to be that of 
directing their attention to polished natives instead of rude tribes 
who are still in that state of national childhood which enables the 
stranger priest to enact the schoolmaster and to teach them what he 
likes. There are many instances of success in cases of the latter des­
cription in modern times, but not one by fair means in those of the
2
former since the age of miracle or very near it”.
1 Scott to Bayley, 27 Apr. 1825, quoted in A. Mackenzie, op.cit., 
pp. 253-25^ n.
2 Ibid.
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In pointing out the tribal areas as the best place for 
missionary activities, Scott has proved very far sighted for it is 
only in the tribal areas that Christianity in India spread most, and 
with some remarkable results in some parts* As it stands today "one- 
half of the Lushais and one fifth of the Mundas and Oraons" are 
Christians*^ About the advantages offered to the Missionaries by the 
tribal areas Scott wrote in 1827 : "While judging from the experience 
of the past and the lights of history we may with reason infer that 
both the Hindoos and Mohamedans of this country have long ago passed 
that stage of society in which the religion of a people can be changed 
by other means than the use of the sword* Numerous examples are to be 
found of this revolution being effected by force of persuasion alone, 
amongst tribes similarly situated with the Garos, and where, although 
the missionary may encounter the dangers of the forests and the un­
wholesome climate of an uncleaned country he has not to contend against 
the unbending, prejudices of a full grown political body, and the
powerful influence of a priesthood to which the multitude have from
2
infancy been accustomed to listen with implicit belief".-
To Scott*s letter, asking for money to run a Garo mission, 
Bayley, the secretary to the government eventually replied, demi-offi- 
cially, with general approval. But he pointed out that "the government 
could not, however, give a salary to the people who might be employed
1 L.S.S. 0*Malley, Modern India and the West, p* 73^*
2 B*C.J.C. 25 Oct* 1827, no* 5^, Scott to H. Shakespear, k Oct. 1827*
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in their capacity of Missionaries, but they might call them school­
masters, and give assistance in that shape".* The aid thus offered 
Scott gladly accepted, and the scheme for the education of the Garos
which he proposed with the advice of Bishop Heber was accepted by the
2
Calcutta authorities in August 1827*~ A school was established at
Goalpara for the education of forty Garo boys at a monthly expense
3of 450 rupees.
School master - 
Native assistants
Expenses of 40 boj^ s
4 Rs. each
Servants and contingenci
Rs. 450.
The whole scheme might seem an example of Evangelicalism at 
work, with the Garos seen as souls to be saved from the evils of 
Hinduism by a missionary effort, directed in the first place to 
education. But the lengthy memorandum in which, in July J.827, Scott 
sketched his ideal mission station, reveals some unexpected and very 
idiosyncratic ideas.
Scott had selected for a mission station the Rangeera 
mountain, which, being detached from the other hills and eighteen 
hundred feet high, enjoyed a climate moderately cool throughout the 
year, and a free circulation of the air. The station was planned to be 
self-supporting. A part of the hill would be cleared, in the first
1 A. Mackenzie, op.cit., p. 254 n.
2 J.L.B., vol. ft letter of 30 Aug. 1827, para 141.
3 Ibid, para 142.
Rs. 200 
50
160
es 40
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instance, by inducing the neighbouring Garos to cultivate cotton and 
rice upon it; as they were obliged to abandon their fields after the 
second year in the existing rude state of agriculture, it would be 
necessary to adopt measures for preventing the jungles from again 
springing up after the expiration of that period; at least twenty to 
thirty rupees would be given in advance for this purpose to each of 
the fifty Garo families, and they would be allowed to retain the use 
of the money so long as they continued to cultivate for their own 
benefit lands pointed out to them in the neighbourhood of the mission­
ary settlement; they would be asked to work two or three days in the 
week in clearing jungle, and making embankments and other improvements 
tending to increase the salubrity of the station and the produce of 
their own lands; a herd of two hundred cows, and the like number of 
sheep and goats would be purchased and the summit of the hill would 
thus be stocked with cattle down to a height of about three himdred 
feet; in the region below, in which springs and rivulets begin to 
abound and where consequently the system of irrigation practised in 
China, Bhutan, and elsewhere might be successfully introduced; the 
scholars would be taught yl the art of the new system of agriculture 
and would be inspired to extend it to their own villages; the arti­
ficial project for irrigation would be undertaken foVagricultural im­
provement and the cold weather cultivation of wheat, barley, potatoes, 
turnips etc, would be introduced; plenty of rich arable land fit for 
the plough l*2£i$e procured at the bottom; and many of the rivulets to­
wards the lower part of their course would be used in a manner to turn
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mills for clearing cotton and paddy.^ Of such a mission agricultural 
settlement Scott declared, "no improvement of equal magnitude whether 
of European or Asiatic origin ©ould be introduced into the hills" - 
and he pointed out its administrative and political advantage : "from
oa migratory, it would convert the Garos into a stationary population".
He then set out the cost of the scheme in detail : six thousand rupees
, 3
for the initial clearance , and eight thousand four hundred rupees in
4
annual charges , easily defrayed from the revenue surplus yielded by
1 B.C.J.C. 26 June 1828, no. 10, Scott’s Memorandum of the arrange­
ments for a Missionary station and an experimental farm, 10 July 
1827.
2 Ibid.
3 Advances to the Garo cultivators for
two years - Rs. 500
Advances to 50 families to settle
permanently - 1,500
To the purchase of cattle - 1,300
Agricultural instruments, tools,
plough, - 700
Buildings - ___ 2.000
Rs. 6,000
eit t£r to >' the Jenrs " • ;.l * o £ - :a.. es on vo
See B.C.J.C. 26 June 1828, no. 10, enclosure D of Scott’s letter, 
10 July 1827.
4 Missionary salary - Rs. 250
Mr. Hurly’s (of Garo school) do - 200
Native teachers - 40
40 boys at 3 - 120
Servants etc. - 40
Allowance to Garo priests - _______50 ♦
Rs. 700
Annual charges - Rs. 8,400
See B.C.J.C. 26 June 1828, no. 10, enclosure C of Scott’s letter,
10 July 1827.
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the Garo hills. Finally having explained what type of missionary 
was required - well qualified in "various European improvements in 
agriculture mechanics and the arts" - he ended with a personal plea,
" ... adverting to the very precarious state of my own health, I would 
earnestly solicit that His Lordship-in-Council will be pleased to 
adopt as soon as convenient such further measures as may be requisite 
to afford to the Garos instruction in Christian religion as constitu­
ting independently of other constructions, by far the most feasible 
and efficacious means of humanizing that race of people and effecting 
the objects which Government has all along had in view in regard to 
them".^
On 10 September, 1827, B . W .  Hurly who had been selected as 
school master for the Garos, submitted his resignation, pleading his 
inability to cope with the savage and unhealthy surroundings, "desti­
tute of the common necessities of European life", and a like inability 
either to master the Bengali and Garo languages or to give lessons on
1 Statement exhibiting the proceeds of the Garo market duties since 
the enactment of Regulation X of 1822.
In the year 1822/23 - Rs. 33,285
1823/24 - 50,471
1824/25 - 54,471
1825/26 - 22,554
1826/27 - 36,013
Average of five years - 39,358
Deduct expenses annually chargeable
to the Garo mountaineers in judicial,
revenue and police establishments - 34,210
Remaining annual surplus - Rs. 5,148
See B.C.J.C. 28 June 1828, no. 10, enclosures A and B of Scott*s 
letter, 10 July 1827.
2 B.C.J.C. 26 June 1828, no. 10, Scott to Shakespear, 10 July 1827
husbandry and horticulture to the tribes,1 The aggrieved Scott made
it clear that men of a different quality would be needed. "An ardent
zeal in the cause of religion is of course a sine- qua- non", he
wrote, "and unless that is possessed in a sufficient degree to place
a man above the inferior considerations of enjoyment of society and
many little comforts to which Europeans are accustomed, ultimate
2success cannot be expected".~ He pointed out that on the Rangeera
station "moderate sized, comfortable homes will be provided, the
necessaries or even luxuries of the table, need not be wanting and a
constant communication by post may be kept up, but beyond this little
can be reasonably expected, and compensation for lost enjoyments and
the privation of other advantages can only be sought for with success
in the zealous prosecution of the objects of the Mission, and in the
cheering prospect of conveying the blessings of civilization and a
knowledge of the true faith to thousands of beings at present immersed
3
in ignorance and imbued with the most savage propensities". He ended
with the noble warning that, "the undertaking must still be considered
as one of an arduous nature, and to which a man ought to go forth
armed with that religious zeal which warmed the hearts of the Moravian
brothren in Greenland and still actuates the missionaries in the wilds
k
of southern Africa".
1 B.C.J.C. 25 Oct. 1827, no. 55, Scott to Shakespear, 4 Oct. 1827.
2 B.C.J.C. 25 Oct. 1827, no. 54, Scott to Shakespear, 4 Oct. 1827.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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One odd feature of Scott’s plans for the Garo mission, and 
one which suggests the Paternalist rather than the Evangelical, was 
his suggestion for medical instruction. He wished for the appointment 
of a well-trained native doctor to the Rangeera mission, whose task 
would be to instruct the priests how to cure the simple diseases of the 
country, such as fever, rheumatism and inflammation of the eyes.^
(Scott himself had successfully introduced vaccination against small 
pox, the value of which was so well understood that the Imperial
Gazetteer reports that "small-pox has been almost stamped out in the
2 "t°
hills'* ) Scott argued that the priests were the only persons resorted^
by the people in case of disease, and that if the priest’s co-operation
was won by the grant of small allowances, the way would be opened for
3
the diffusion of an improved practice of medicine among the Garos.
their position suggests that he scarcely saw them in the same light,
say, as Charles Grant, who denounced that ”crafty and imperious
k
priesthood” as the source of most ills in Hindu society. Scott proved 
equally ready to make use of them in Assam, for in 1826 he requested 
the Supreme Government to sanction considerable land grants to the 
pandits, whom he wished to use to revive education in Assam. He had 
found education at a very low ebb, the old Ahom system having been
nobody’s business since the days of the Burmese invasion and the younger
1 B.C.J.C. 25 Oct. 1827, nos. 54-56, Scott to Shakespear, 4 Oct.1827*
2 B.C.J.C. 17 Feb. 1825, no. 9, Scott to Bayley, 3 Dec. 1824;
B.C. Allen and others, op.cit., p. 511«
3 J.L.B. vol. 11, letter of 30 Aug. 1827, para 146.
4 E. Stokes, op.cit., p. 32.
Scott’s plan to use the Brahmins, and i act to strengthen
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generation having consequently received little or no education* If the 
government was to find capable men for its service the situation re­
quired immediate attention.^ Scott therefore proposed that six hundred 
puras (1800 bighas)^ should be assigned for the support of
pandits or schoolmasters, in Lower Assam* Under the recently introduced 
system these lands would pay some six hundred rupees revenue a year : 
this he proposed to remit in return for service as schoolmasters. The 
custom of the country had been to make such grants to individuals,
resumable on the death of the grantee or upon his ceasing to perform 
2
the duty* Scott proposed to allot from twenty to fifty puras of land, 
in twelve or more convenient situations, to pandits who would then be 
required to teach a specified number of pupils, upon pain of resumption 
of the grant. Such payment in land rather than cash would be "much 
less onerous to the government and would prevent a good deal of trouble 
in the transmission to distant parts of the country of the school­
masters* salaries, while it would be more congenial to the habits of
1 The language taught in Scott*s newly-established schools was Bengali. 
He believed that it differed very little from Assamese; it was 
obviously well suited to the administrative needs; it was already 
the language of the Assamese intelligentsia (B.P.C. 25 Oct. 1826, 
nos* 21-22, Scott to Swinton, 9 Oct. 1826, Swinton to Scott, 25 Oct. 
1826) Another probable reason for introducing Bengali was that the 
intelligentsia of the Assam of his time having had their higher 
education in Bengal, were already well versed in Bengali. Jugyuram 
Phookan’s translations of English prose and poetry into Bengali had 
already caught the eye of the intelligentsia of Bengal, and the 
’literary exertions’ of Haliram Dhekial Phookan, who had written a 
history of Assam in Bengali had already been highly acclaimed by the 
Bengali press, (see Asiatic Journal, vol. 7, 1832, p. 84, Progress 
of the Arts in Assam: M.C.L.R.M., vol. 12, 1819, pp. 19-20, Eighth 
Memoir Respecting the Translations and Editions of the Sacred Scrip­
tures, Conducted by the Serampore Missionaries, no. 17 The Assamese).
2 B.P.C. 25 Sept. 1826, no. 19, Scott to Swinton, 25 July 1826.
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the people and past customs of the country".*
Since government had already showed its interest in his 
2
educational plans \ Scott went on to propose that these schoolmasters
should be put under^superintendence of the chaudhuries and other
officials of the different parganas, who would report whether the
proper number of pupils was being taught. As overall superintendent he
wanted a pandit of more than ordinary acquirements who would visit the
different schools in rotation and report periodically the progress
made by them. It was also arranged to send down an intelligent Assamese
to Serampore with a view of getting him instructed in the mode of
3
teaching f lately introduced in the neighbourhood of Calcutta.
It is true that Scott also sought missionary assistance, and
through the veteran William Carey in 1829 he secured the aid of James
4
Rae, ordained at Serampore. Scott was anxious to establish a school 
for native girls at Gauhati, and this work he placed in the hands of 
Rae and his wife. But his appeal for missionary help seems to have 
sprung quite as much from his appreciation of the educational problem, 
as from desire to see the Gospel taught. It was in no Evangelical frame • 
of mind that he called upon Serampore to supplement the work of his 
Assamese pandits.
1 B.P.C. 25 Oct. 1826, no. 21, Scott to Swinton, 9 Oct. 1826.
2 B.P.C. 15 Sept. 1826, no. 20, Swinton to Scott, 15 Sept. 1826.
3 B.P.C. 25 Oct. 1826, nos. 21-22, Scott to Swinton, 9 Oct. 1826,
Swinton to Scott, 25 Oct. 1826.
4 V.H. Sword, Baptists in Assam, pp. 36-37.
5 Calcutta Review, 1853, vol. 19, pp. 427-430.
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By subsidising the Nilachal temple of Kamrup, Scott further 
showed how little affected his own religious beliefs were by the 
Evangelical spirit. One of the chief objects of the Evangelical 
missionaries was to secure from the government the disconnexion of the 
British power from the support of temples and Hindu and Lluslim reli­
gious festivals.^ Scott took a very different line, for when a tax 
upon pilgrims to the temple proved unproductive, he pressed upon 
government, in July, 1827, the appropriateness of a government grant." 
This the authorities seemed reluctant to allow^, but in September 
Scott wrote again pointing out that grants for Durga Puja had always 
been made by the Ahoms, and had been increased by the Burmese. He con- 
tinued to disburse Rs. 1,121 a year for the purpose. In 1831 to meet 
government objections, he proposed an alternative, ”If Government had 
however any objection to the charge for the expenses of the temple 
appearing in the public accounts”, he wrote, ”this might be carried by 
relinquishing, and appropriating to that purpose the revenue, levied
at present on the temple paikes and lands which amounts to Rs. 1002
„  5 
per annum”.
1 E* Stokes, op.cit., p. 24.
2 B.S.P.C. 17 Aug. 1827, no. 44, Scott to Swinton, 28 July 1827.
3 B.S.P.C. 17 Aug. 1827, no. 45, Swinton to Scott, 17 Aug. 1827.
4 B.S.P.C. 26 Oct. 1827, no. 17, Scott to Swinton, 12 Sept. 1827.
5 B.P.C. 29 Apr. 1831, nos. 36-37, Scott to the Chief Secretary,
16 Apr. 1831.
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The third marked features of Scott*s attitude to the whole
question of moral and material progress is his interest in very
practical improvements in the agriculture1 and handicrafts of the
frontier peoples. Scott being the nephew of Director David Scott
it might be thought that if he was not very close to the Evangelicals
3
he was perhaps to be identified with those free-trade interests who 
in the early nineteenth century became increasingly interested in 
opening Indian markets to British manufactures and in educating and 
reshaping Indian society so as to raise the purchasing power of the 
Indian population. But there is little more evidence that Scott 
wished to refashion and anglicize Indian society for commercial than 
for religious ends. His was a paternalist concern for those under his 
charge T and a keen personal interest in the mechanic and scientific 
arts.
Thus in dealing with the Garos one of Scott’s earliest 
concerns was with the orderly marketing of hill cotton, and at a later 
date he is found recommending that money be spent upon clearing ob­
structions from the beds of the small rivers leading from the Garo
1 Scott’s interest in agriculture may have been due to a tradition of 
agricultural pursuits in his mother’s family for in Epitaphs and 
Inscriptions from Burial Grounds and Old Buildings in the North East 
of Scotland the following sentences, about Scott’s maternal grand­
father, Dr. Chalmers, are very significant: ’’He was passionately 
fond of agricultural pursuits, and he is said to have devoted quite 
as much time and attention to the cultivation of his farm at Selattie 
as to the discharge of his Accademical duties. In Kaye’s curious 
print of ”The Sapient Septemviri” he is represented in the act of 
addressing his colleagues in these words : ’Agriculture is the 
noblest of sciences, mind your glebes - the Emperor of China is a 
farmer’.” See A* Jervise, op.cit., pp. 393-395.
2 See supra, p.jz.
3 See E. Stokes, op.cit., pp. 37-47.
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hills into Rangpur, and upon the making of a track way along the 
southern bank of the Brahmaputra, (Government granted up to fifteen 
hundred rupees for the former and five thousand for the latter)
His very detailed plans for the introduction of European crops, and the 
establishment of herds of cattle and pigs in the Khasi hills have been 
noted in chapter VI* His hopes of trade from Assam into Burma, and his
2
diplomatic and financial efforts to foster it have also been reviewed, 
as have the practical aspects of his proposals for a mission station 
in the Garo hills. One other example, from Assam, will serve to show 
how concerned he was to see local resources exploited, and how tenacious 
in pursuit of his schemes.
In April 1830 Scott applied to the Calcutta authorities for
the urgent adoption of measures to improve the general resources of 
3
Assam. He pointed out that commerce was depressed and the currency
deficient, for there was a constant drain of the small existing stock
of coin remittance to the Presidency. Improvement could only be
achieved, he argued, "by encouraging the production of commodities fit
for exportation, and by substituting on the part of government for a
remittance of the surplus revenue in cash, On investment of the produce
k
of the district". In the early stage of British occupation, Scott had 
been under the impression that the abolition of commercial restrictions 
which he had eventually brought about and the influx of capital from 
Bengal, would gradually remove the evils complained of. But to his
1 J.L.B. 26 July 1826, vol. 9, para 167-169.
2 Chapter IV (I)
3 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 51* Scott to Swinton, 17 Apr. 1830.
4 Ibid.
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utter surprise, five years’ experience had showed that no improvement 
gould be expected from the unassisted efforts of the Assamese. Then 
again, the want of enterprise amongst the Bengali capitalists and the 
exorbitant rate of interest which led them to prefer the trade of 
usurers to Mraaking any advance of cash in those less immediately pro­
fitable speculations11 had compelled Scott to think about other measures 
of achieving his objects^.*
He pointed out that Assam was an agricultural not a manu­
facturing country, and that with a peasant population there could be 
no great market for rice and such crops. Moreover, owing to the want 
of boats and the navigational difficulties of the Brahmaputra, ”no 
relief from the evils” could be expected from the exportation of so 
cheap and bulky a commodity as grain. Scott therefore argued forcefully 
that unless means were immediately adopted by government to encourage 
the production of the more costly articles of export such as raw silk 
and muga* in particular, it would soon become necessary either to 
reduce materially the amount of the scanty revenue at present derived 
from the districts or to revert to the former system of compulsory 
labour.^
Scott had in fact been pressing for the development of the 
Assam silk industry since 1826. In that year he had sent some specimens 
of Assam silk pieces to Calcutta for study by the Board of Trade. He
1 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 51, Scott to Swinton, 17 Apr. 1830.
* See supra, p.non.
2 B.P.C. 13 Oct. 1826, no. 44, Scott to Swinton, 18 Sept. 1826.
had also urged that the Assamese be instructed in the most modern
methods of winding their silk and that the machinery in use in Rangpur
should be introduced into Assam. He considered that the muga silk was
likely to become the most important article of export from Assam for
Asiatic consumption and with reference to its well-known superior
strength and durability, he found it highly probable that it might
capture the European market too.^ But on receipt of anunfavourable 
2
reply from the Board of Trade the plan was pronounced unprofitable 
by the government. In bringing up the issue again in 1830, Scott re­
minded the government that he had initiated the plan not with a view 
to commercial profit, but in hopes that the measures would benefit the
inhabitants, and ultimately increase the revenue of the district under 
3
his charge. He again urged a trial of his plans, "although they may
in the first instance involve some trifling outlay on the part of the
state, and even although it should appear that the more immediate and
direct pecuniary return for such outlay will accrue rather to its
4
subjects than to government itself”.
Scott had specific reasons for directing his attention 
specially towards the development of raw silk. He wrote : "Although 
the soil and climate of Assam is well adopted to the production of 
articles raised in Bengal, I shall confine ray observations to .the 
single commodity of raw silk both because it does not necessarily
1 B.P.C. 13 Oct. 1826, no. 44, Scott to Swinton, 18 Sept. 1826.
2 B.P.C. 30 Dec. 1826, no. 66, George Udny and Mackenzie to Lord 
Combermer, Vice President-in-Council, 14 Dec. 1826.
3 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 51, Scott to Swinton, 17 Apr. 1830.
4 Ibid.
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require continued European superintendence to bring it to perfection 
and because the inhabitants of Assam are already so universally 
acquainted with the analogous operation of winding the silk called 
moogah that there is every reason to think that they would soon become
competent to prepare the ordinary raw silk in a manner superior to
that which can be expected from the cotton clothed natives of Bengal, 
among whom the art of rearing silk worms and the subsequent treatment 
of the produce was by no means so generally known and where it is 
indeed still in a great measure confined to a particular class”.*
The ultimate commercial value of the trade for the Company 
was also not ruled out. Scott went on to point out ”it is very 
necessary to keep in mind that the Assamese are already like the 
Chinese, chiefly clad in a species of silk which although not of a 
description known to be suited to the European market is nevertheless
prepared in a manner entirely similar to that sort, so that any person
acquainted with the mode of winding the one is competent, with a 
little practice, to perform the same operation on the other, under 
which circumstances it is not perhaps expecting too much to suppose
that many of the inhabitants will engage in the preparation of the
(^ 6v<wv
real silk if/*to render available to agricultural purposes land which
is not at present considered worth cultivating and of which there are
large tracts unoccupied merely for the want of any suitable article 
2
of culture”.
1 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 51, Scott to Swinton, 17 Apr. 1830.
2 Ibid*
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With this end in view Scott presented a three point plan to 
the government* First, plantations of the mulberry should be prepared 
at the expense of government in favourable situations in Assam* The 
inhabitants could thus be taught the plantation method of mulberry 
cultivation, for mass production of silk worms* Secondly, the people 
should be instructed in the improved mode of winding silk, reels of a 
proper description being prepared in the country and distributed to 
those who would undertake to rear silk worms and to use the apparatus 
for winding the muga silk. Finally, when progress had been sufficient 
to warrent the measure, a small coimnercial Residency should be estab­
lished, superintended by the medical officer at Gauhati, with a view, 
not so much to securing an immediate profit on the investment, but to 
create a steady demand for the silk.^ To effect the first two objects 
Scott conceived that an outlay of from twelve to fifteen thousand 
rupees would be required* If government was not prepared to laying- out 
such a sum, then Scott suggested that an extra cess should be levied 
upon the inhabitants. "The trifling additional burden to which the
T n />vv£/v\i y
people would thus be individually subjected”, Scott assured^ "would be
speedily and amply repaid by the increased value of the land and by the
introduction of an article of exchangeable value so much wanted at
2
present to enable them to provide for the payment of revenue"*~
Scott1s proposals were discussed again in official and busi­
ness circles and expert opinions were called for from firms like
1 B.P*C* 7 May 1830, no* 51* Scott to Swinton, 17 Apr* 1830.
2 Ibid.
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"MacIntyre and Co " and "Palmer and Co The experts appreciated the
quality of the Assam silk but about its immediate commercial value
2
they were not so sure. This again discouraged the government. But 
Scott was tenacious. He pointed out to the government that such plans 
ought to be undertaken if they really wanted properity in Assam. He
A.
also reminded them that "the perfection of manufacture of raw silk in
Bengal was not attended but at a considerable expense and trouble,
Italian artificers* having been brought out to teach the native 
3
spinners". In arguing further, Scott reminded the government of its 
duty to its subjects and the folly it would commit in failing to en­
courage such a plan. He said : "Where the interest of Government in
promoting agricultural improvements is so direct and obvious as it is 
in a country situated like Assam, blessed with a fertile soil and 
favourable climate, but at the same time labouring under an almost 
hopeless state of penury from ignorance of or inattention to the
j
measures of benefitting by those advantages, it will seem to be a most 
imperfect system of policy that would reject all certain obvious
methods of improving the resources of the country and increasing the
1 B.P.C. 7 May 1830, no. 52, Swinton*s note on the market value of 
Assam silk - the sample of which was sent by Scott, 7 May 1830.
2 Ibid.
* The advantages of the Italian method over that of the country was
said to be very evident. The experiment had been made at Kashimbazar. 
factory under the supervision of ’Wiss and Robinson’.
See Bengal Public Consultation, vol. I R. 2 (25 May 1772), p. 325, '<i
Committee of Commerce Proceedings, 5 March 1772.
3 B.P.C. 29 Oct. 1830, no. 36, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 6 Oct. 
1830.
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revenue of government"•  ^Scott charged the government with "a con­
tinued reliance that the need will he met by private individuals
although that expectation has been contradicted by experience of sixty
2
years in Bengal".
He referred to "the recent change in the state of the British
silk trade", which made it particularly necessary "to adopt every
practicable means to increase the quantity of raw silk imported and
to lower the price". He then placed before the authorities yet one
more proposal, that a grant of ten thousand bighas of land fit for
cultivation of the mulberry and other dry crops, to be held rent free
in perpetuity, should be offered to any individual, European or native,
who would invest one lakh of rupees in mulberry plantation and the
establishment in Assam of silk filatures on the Italian model. In
taking such a step, Scott declared, the government would, in reality,
sacrifice nothing, since land of that sort was mostly unassessed and 
3
uncultivated.
The government acknowledged with pleasure "the laudable spirit 
of zeal" which prompted Scott to offer the suggestions^but remained
reluctant to sanction any outlay in establishing a silk filature in
4
Assam and also averse to the sanction of any increased cess on the 
people. However it did ask for a modification of Scott*s pldn with
1 B.P.C. 29 Oct. 1830, no.36, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 6 Oct.1830.
J
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 See supra, p,I«3
5 B.P.C. 29 Oct. 1830, no, 37, Chief Secretary to Scott, 29 Oct. 1830o
i m p r o v i n g  t h *•'? 1 1 •-1 «  o r  x n w  j w & a  •-*« 1
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regard to granting of a rent free tenure in perpetuity or for a given 
period of years. A moderate proportion of land on conditions likely 
to be more acceptable to speculators - native or European - than the 
outlay of so large a capital was suggested by the government.1 During 
the remaining period of Scott1s career nothing was heard about such 
modified plans, but Scott continued to take a keen interest in in­
structing the Assamese through experts from Bengal, in modern devices
o
for manufacturing raw silk.“* Only four months before his death he sub­
mitted another novel plan of experimenting on a small scale with the 
manufacture of raw silk by means of convicts from the silk districts
of Bengal. He suggested that such a measure would not involve any extra
charge to the government and he requested therefore, that the 
magistrates of the silk districts should be instructed to place at his
disposal any prisoners in their jails acquainted with the art of 
3
winding silk.
These prolonged discussions over the development of an 
Assamese silk industry, pressed with vigour and tenacity, are very re­
vealing. Scott1s whole career, from the early days when he attracted 
attention by the ability and zeal displayed in opening communications 
with Bhutan and Tibet down to his death as first sole commissioner of 
Assam, had been spent upon the North East Frontiers of India. .During 
three decades the Indian government had placed ever increasing reliance
1 B.P.C. 29 Oct. 1830, no. 37, Chief Secretary to Scott, 29 Oct.1830.
2 Scott introduced from Rangpur reelers, reels and plants of the morus 
alba and established a factory at Darrang with the object of exten­
ding the cultivation of the pat or mulberry-reared silk worm, and of
improving the reeling of the muga worm.
B.C. Allen, op.cit.,pp. 1-10.
3 B.P.C. 20 May 1831, no. 38, Scott to the Chief Secretary, 30 Apr. 
1831.
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upon his ability and judgement and had continuously laid larger and 
heavier burdens upon his shoulders. Scott, for his part, had showed an 
increasing understanding and affection of the people he was called 
upon to administer. He noted and accepted the good in Indian society, 
he was unwilling needlessly to change, though, as over the prospects 
for Assam silk^he could be passionate in pursuing improvement. He 
ended, as many of the great administrators did, by identifying himself 
with the interests and the good of the people under him, by being 
truly paternalist.
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APPENDIX
Epitaph on the government-built tomb of David Scott at Cherrapunji.
IN MEMORY
NoYtlv -
of David Scott, Agent to the Governor-General of\ theAProntier of 
Bengal, and Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit in the Districts of 
Assam, North-Eastern part of Rangpur, Sheerpore and Sylhet, died 
20th August 1831, aged U5 years and 3 months. This monument is erected 
by order of the Supreme Government, as a public and lasting record of 
its consideration for the personal character of the deceased, and of 
its estimation of the eminent services rendered by him in the adminis­
tration of the extensive territory committed to his charge. By his 
demise the Government has been deprived of a most zealous, able and 
intelligent servant, whose loss it deeply laments, while his name 
will long be held in grateful remembrance and veneration by the native 
population, to whom he was justly endeared by his impartial dispen­
sation of justice, his kind and conciliatory manners and his constant 
and unwearied endeavours to promote their happiness and welfare.*
1 Holmes and Co., The Bengal Obituary or A record to perpetuate the 
memory of the Departed Worth. Inscription in the tomb at Cherrapunji, 
p* 369; see Bengal Past and Present, vol. V and Asiatic Journal, 
vol. 7, 1832, for the photograph of the monument at Cherrapunji and 
other obituary notes.
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